South East Asia: Human Rights Seminar on Tibet (1998)
The
implications of the situation in Tibet is not limited to the Tibetans’
homeland. The effects are relevant to all of mankind - it is in the
interests of all humanity to respect human dignity and equality of all
peoples. To engage in meaningful dialogue on Tibet from a human rights
perspective and to create awareness on the human rights situation in Tibet,
the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, in collaboration with
the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, organised “South East
Asia: NGO Human Rights Seminar on Tibet” in Dharamsala, India from June
17 to 20, 1998.
Thirty-six
representatives from 12 South Asian and South-East Asian nations attended
the seminar and there were also 50 individuals who sat in as observers
during the seminar.
The
decision to hold this conference is based on the belief that human rights
organisaitons should work together to achieve their common goals and a
regionally united stand will promote peace and respect for fundamental
freedoms not only in Tibet but in the region as a whole.
This
publication is the compilation of the speeches given by specialists during
the Seminar and hope that this would provide insight information on different
aspects of human rights violations in Tibet to a larger public.
The
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy would like to thank to the
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre and to all those who contributed
to making this Seminar a sucess. We hope that this Seminar has helped
strengthen links between the nations represented and has helped create
the foundations for meaningful relations based on shared interests of peace
and equality.
Lobsang
Nyandak
Executive
Director
Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
October
1998
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Tempa
Tsering, Vice Chairman
Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
Honourable
T.C. Tethong; Mr Ravi Nair, Executive Director of the South Asia Human
Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC); Mr Lobsang Nyandak, Executive Director
of the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD); and friends.
First
of all I would like to very warmly welcome you all to Dharamsala and also
would like to take this opportunity to say how grateful we are for you
to come here to participate in this first seminar on Tibet. The seminar,
as Mr Lobsang Nyandak has just mentioned, is jointly organised by TCHRD
and SAHRDC. Dharamsala, as you must have experienced, is a very remote
place and communication is not always easy; it is inaccessible, it is difficult.
But the fact that you have chosen to come all the way to Dharamsala and
to participate in this seminar I think clearly indicates your deeper interest
and sympathy for Tibet and we appreciate this very much.
Before
I make a general introduction on the Tibetan situation, as the Vice-Chairman
of this Centre I would like to say a few words on the Centre itself. The
TCHRD was founded in 1996, a little over two years ago. The Centre is a
non-governmental organisation and is registered with the Indian Societies
Registration Act of 1861. The patron is His Holiness the Dalai Lama and
the Chairman is appointed by him. The Centre functions under the guidance
of a 12-member Board of Directors which includes professors, representatives
of organisations, individuals and institutions. The Centre also has a five-member
International Board of Advisors which includes some Nobel laureates, a
Chinese scholar plus other international experts on human rights.
The
basic objective of the centre is to promote human rights, to monitor human
rights in Tibet, to educate about human rights and to instil values of
human rights among our own people. In Tibet before the Chinese invasion
in 1949, the concept of human rights as we understand it eings as precious
and sacred - especially to be born as a human being is sacred - and
also believe in the law of dharma. I think it is this belief that we are
able to protect human rights in Tibet, of which there are not many violations.
As for the future, there are uncertainties. Because of these uncertainties,
one of the main purposes of the Centre is to educate our people on the
protection of human rights in accordance with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and also in accordance with the Buddhist law. In the past
I think that human rights protection came from within because of their
belief in karma, the law of karma, the sacredness of all living beings,
rather than coming from international laws and conventions. So for the
future I think we have to try and work in both ways. Firstly, to educate
our people in accordance with international norms and secondly to revive
past traditions by which we can again protect human rights. This is an
effort that the centre is trying to make.
As for democracy, the principle of democracy is not alien to the Tibetan
society; this principle has been practised in our monasteries. But democracy
as a system of government is new to us. Because of this, since 1960 His
Holiness - after his arrival in India - has been trying to bring about
a democratic system of government. Now we have a democratic functioning
government in exile. Yet at the same time, instilling in people and educating
the values, rights and responsibilities of responsible democrats is not
easy and we are also making efforts in this.
So these then are some of the basic objectives of the Centre. The Centre
has for the past two years - it’s not that I’m the Vice-Chairman of the
Centre - done extremely well. The credit for this really largely goes to
the Executive Director, Mr Lobsang Nyandak, and the dedicated staff that
he has, including quite a few volunteers from different parts of the world.
We are grateful to the Director and the staff for having done extremely
well during this short period of time.
Now, having said this, as I mentioned earlier, I would like to say something
about the general situation of Tibet. Although the time we have is very
limited, I will try to give a very brief overview of Tibet so that you
will have a better understanding of the situation.
Tibet had a recorded history of over 2000 years and during this long period
the Tibetan nation had many ups and downs, many developments. Before the
introduction of Buddhism in the seventh century Tibet was a great military
power. There were times when the Tibetan king marched into the east,
into Chinese territory, and in fact in 763 a Tibetan king installed a puppet
Chinese emperor in the Chinese capital. The Tibetan army also advanced
into the south and west. It marched right up to the plains of the Ganges.
In the seventh century Buddhism was introduced in Tibet and that martial
and mighty Tibetan race was tamed and subdued. The entire efforts of both
the Tibetan leadership and people were dedicated to the steady practice
and promotion of Buddhism and so Tibetans began to devote energy into peacefulness,
non-violence and compassion. And that’s how we are today, a subdued people.
But
at the same time, just as we were successful as a martial race, we have
also been very successful in protecting and promoting Buddhism. Buddhism
was originally founded in India and from India it came to Tibet in the
seventh century. Since then Tibetan people have preserved that Buddhist
tradition, that philosophy. In fact today it is only in Tibet that you
find the complete form of Buddhism. There are three schools of Buddhist
thought: the Mahayana, the Hinayana and the Tantriyana. The Tibetan form
of Buddhism practises all schools of thought.
From Tibet, this complete form of Buddhism then went to other parts of
the world. It went to Mongolia, Russia, the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal,
Bhutan, the Indian states of Ladakh, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and even
this state of Himachal Pradesh where we are here today. So today, although
Tibetan Buddhism faces complete destruction in Tibet itself, I think Tibetan
Buddhism is very much alive in all these areas that I have just mentioned.
So, both in waging a war or becoming a non-violent, peaceful, compassionate
people, I think Tibet has been very successful. Yet the Chinese today say
that Tibet has always been an integral part of the motherland and that
Tibetans are barbarians and the most backward, uncivilised people on earth.
It is up to you to judge this claim but at the same time we are not claiming
that the past Tibetan society was a perfect ct His Holiness the 14th Dalai
Lama, was making changes when China invaded and occupied Tibet, but he
was unsuccessful in being able to carry out his plans.
Materially Tibet certainly was backward and needed development, but at
the same time Tibet had a rich culture, a rich civilisation, a living culture
which is useful in our lives, a culture which has potential in making some
contribution to others who are interested in this way of life. That is
part of how backward - it is up to you to judge really - and how uncivilised
Tibetans were.
Now as for Tibet being an integral part of the motherland. Chinese keep,
I think, changing their position on this. First they kept on saying that
Tibet has been an integral part of the motherland since time immemorial
and when they could not substantiate this claim then they changed their
position, saying that Tibet has been part of China since the seventh century.
An argument for this is that the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo had married
a Chinese princess. But they did not realise that the same king also married
a Nepalese princess and the Nepalese princess happened to be a senior princess
and the same king also had a Tibetan princess.
This argument also could not stand and China today claims that Tibet has
been part of the motherland since the 13th century. Their base for this
claim is that in the 13th century Mongolia was one of the most important
nations or empires in Asia; it occupied a large chunk of Asia and even
came right up to Europe. At that time China and Tibet also came under Mongol
domination. The Chinese recognise and admit that Mongolians were a foreign
power at that time that Tibet was under the Mongolian influence. So, based
on this, their claim is that Tibet has been an integral part of China.
We certainly don’t feel that these claims have much of a basis. As far
as the historical part is concerned, we leave it to historians and impartial
people to study both or all accounts - the Chinese side, the Tibetan side,
the historical - and then come to a conclusion.
According to international law, for a country to be independent, there
must be a people, a territory, a government that functions in that territory
and has the authority to enter into international relations. I think Tibet
possessed all those prerequisites and even more. Tibet had its own army,
its own currency, its own postal system and its own taxation system and
Tibet has entered into treaty relations with its neighbours: China, Russia,
Mongolia, British India, Nepal. So all these clearly indicate that there
is more than China claims.
As you can see, both from the historical perspective as well as the present
situation in Tibet, there are two versions, two very contrasting versions:
a Tibetan version and a Chinese version. What we really request of you
is not to believe us but to study it and then to draw your own conclusions
as to who has the basis of truth and then, based on that, to support or
to oppose. In this effort of course we will be very happy to provide you
with whatever information you may need on the Tibetan side of it.
As Tibetans of course we feel confident that the truth is on our side and
in fact we believe that the only weapon the Tibetan people have is truth,
justice and non-violence. It is because of these beliefs that today Tibet
has become an international issue. There was a time when Tibet was not
known at all, it was always the Chinese version. Now I think that having
been here for the past 40 years there is a lot of support. We have all
over the world Tibet Support Groups, about 350, and then Parliamentary
Groups in 34 countries and Student Groups for Tibet.
Now all these groups were founded not through our initiative but through
their own conviction. Many of them have been to Tibet and then found for
themselves that injustice is done to the Tibetan people, that destruction
is being carried out, that Tibetan people are being deprived of their fundamental
human rights. Then they came back and they said there is a cause that deserves
support, there is a people who deserves support and they formed these organisations.
Or there are people who might have met His Holiness the Dalai Lama or who
have come into exile just as you have come here and found the Tibetan people
and then through their own conviction these organisations have been formed
and are functioning today.
Many of these organisations feel that Tibetan culture has a value and has
the potential to make some contribution to world peace, to harmony and
to bring up moral values, and now they feel this is being destroyed. And
if Tibetan culture is being destroyed - it is not just Tibetan culture,
any culture belonging to any nation is part of this he world should be
responsible to protect this culture, because the destruction of one culture
will make the world poorer by one culture.
For these reasons international support has today come. What is most encouraging
for us is the support that is coming from the Chinese people; not
only Chinese scholars and students who are outside but from Chinese people
from the mainland. This we feel is very encouraging. This gives us strength
and encourages us. This really indicates that what we are saying is not
just our own conviction but that there is a basis for it.
Just as we say truth and justice, we feel that Chinese people are also
a people with a long civilisation, a long culture. Now they are for the
first time hearing something apart from their own Party and government
line. Having heard this then I think they are beginning to support. This
is a tremendous encouragement to us.
Because of Tibet’s geographic and strategic location what happens in Tibet
has a direct implication for the security and stability of Asia. Just take
the example of environment. Tibet is the source of almost all the major
rivers that flow into Asia. We have done a statistic study and about 47
percent of the world population somehow depend on these rivers that originate
from Tibet. Since the Chinese occupation and invasion of Tibet, it’s not
only the cultural destruction, it’s not only the human rights deprivation,
but even environmentally there is great damage and loss. All the forests
and mineral reserves that have been there for centuries are now being tapped
or exploited recklessly and this is I think causing problems.
Apart from the cultural devastation, it is a well known fact now that nuclear
wastes are being dumped on Tibet. If these rivers are being contaminated
by these nuclear wastes, then the repercussions that this will have on
other nations, including China, are quite disastrous. In recent times we
have seen increased floods, not only in India and Bangladesh and other
neighbours, but in China itself and many scientists attribute the cause
to what is happening in Tibet environmentally.
So I think the issue of Tibet is not just an issue of the freedom of six
million Tibetan people. It is a moral issue. It is an issue that is related
to peace in the world. It is an issue that concerns security and stability
in Asia. So I think for these reasons we are very happy that at this first
conference or seminar on Tibet,- a lot of South East Asian representatives
have come and we appreciate your coming here and we hope that you will
find the conference of some interest.
Our request for you is that we would like you to share whatever you have
learned, whatever you have gathered, whatever you have come to know, with
your friends, with your institutes, with your colleagues, so that people
become more aware. And once they become more aware I think they will be
more concerned and then hopefully there will be more support. Finally,
I would once again like to thank you very much for coming here and, although
our resources are very limited, I hope you will enjoy and you will also
learn something more about Tibet. Thank you very much.
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T.C.
Tethong
Foreign
Minister
Tibetan
Government-in-Exile
Good
morning ladies and gentlemen.
Welcome
to Dharamsala. I would like to thank the organisersmof this seminar
form asking me to say a few words this morning.
I wish to introduce briefly the background of the Tibetan government-in-Exile’s
policy. The fact that the reforms of the Tibetan government or governmental
system that you see now being carried out in Dharamsala is not something
that happened after 1959. In fact these reforms did take place before then.
When Communist China invaded Tibet in 1949, when the “liberation” army
first marched into eastern Tibet, a year or so after that His Holiness
the Dalai Lama took over the temporal power of Tibet. No sooner had he
taken power, he started introducing reforms in the tax system and the running
of the government in every field.
After the so-called signing of the 17-point treaty when Chinese authorities
tried to introduce reform, there was a reform already taking place that
had further expanded from His Holiness’ side, from the Tibetan Government’s
side, but that reform was obstructed intentionally by China. However, the
Tibetan Government continued and there was a functioning government in
Tibet until 1959. We claim that we have a legitimate government in Tibet,
although it is called de facto by people - that means we were functioning
as a government. We have the Tibetan people and we have Tibet as a territory
on the map of the world.
So this forceful entry, militarily, by China is in violation of international
law but of course no body spoke up coherently so China got away with what
it did. Following that, I am sure most of you are interested in Tibet,
you have read about Tibet, so I am not going to go into the historical
background.
After
1959 - after His Holiness the Dalai Lama took asylum in India and at that
time there were about 80,000 Tibetan refugees who escaped down than he
thought that we should start working for a free Tibet. Not just a freedom
struggle alone but a plan for what is going to happen in Tibet in the future
and so a draft Constitution was drawn with the help of experts, friends,
a lot of them from India, legal experts. With that draft constitution our
first democratic step in the modern sense of the administration took place
and the Tibetan National Assembly with its popularly elected membership
was initiated in 1960.
Thereafter
more improvements took place. We have in our own humble and simple way,
the three main pillars of a democratic society: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. This we follow as close as possible, seeking assistance
so that we do what we think is correct and also in accordance with the
will of the Tibetan people.
The basic policy of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile is to regain Tibetan
freedom. This has a very vague connotation. Many take it as independence,
but the freedom that we are talking about is the basic freedom of the Tibetan
people first, and that is where the emphasis of His Holiness’ policy lies.
Why I am saying this is because right now there is no freedom in Tibet.
All that glamour and glitz that you see now in the television or those
glossy magazines that come out of the People’s Republic of China are nothing
more than propaganda. Those who have travelled to Tibet have seen with
their own eyes just the contrary. Therefore it is the duty, especially
of those Tibetans who are outside Tibet to present to the rest of the world
what is really happening there.
This struggle has been going on for the last forty years or so. There has
been progress - progress in the sense that we were able to first organise
ourselves here in India as a batch of refugees. We have managed to establish
a society with a government as a successful refugee resettlement programme.
We have been simultaneously trying to see what we could do to help our
fellow Tibetans in Tibet after seeing all that injustice being done there.
Up to the end of the Cultural Revolution it was almost impossible to penetrate
because there was so much secrecy, so many restrictions. Still we managed
to keep the flames of the Tibetan people’s spirit alive and it is mainly
because of His Holiness the Dalai Lama who is accepted by Tibetans inside
and outside Tibet as the unquestioned leader of the Tibetan people and
who has struggled in an unrelenting effort and has managed to keep the
Tibetan issue alive until now.
Then after the liberalisation policy that was carried out in China, after
the death of Mao Tse Tung, after the Cultural Revolution, there was a glimpse
of hope. For a year or so there was a chance; we thought we might be able
to establish some sort of contact relationship with Tibet and with China
as well. Several groups of delegations managed to go to Tibet with the
consent of the Chinese and even with the invitation of the Chinese to some
of them.
But then all of a sudden there was - amongst the Tibetans in Tibet - this
yearning for them to have their own government; to have a Tibet that is
administered by Tibetans and not by some foreign invading troops or military.
Because of this Tibetans demonstrated peacefully in Lhasa, led mostly by
monks and nuns and the Tibetan public. This demonstration was put down
- this was just before the Tiananmen Square massacre - very brutally and
thereafter came a clampdown of martial law and Tibet once again was in
a very precarious situation.
Thereafter the Tibetan Government-in-Exile still tried to convince the
leadership in China for a peaceful negotiation and settlement of the Tibetan
issue. This has been emphasised always by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
He has asked all the Tibetans not to resort to violence, but that we will
achieve our goal if we are consistent, if we are patient and if we trust
in our cause that is based on justice and truth. His Holiness always advised
that we will succeed. Based on that His Holiness tried and the Tibetan
Government tried, to no avail. We did not get any positive response from
China. However, we are grateful to people, friends, who came in support
of Tibet. His Holiness has always mentioned that the support which we get
from, as we call them, ‘TSG’s is genuine because these people have nothing
to gain materially from Tibet. They have come because we are, our struggle
is, based on non-violence and Tibet is only six million struggling against
a country with a population of a billion people, and is based on truth.
So this support is genuine and His Holiness says that we should have a
special appreciation.
This support that we are now receiving internationally, and of course with
His Holiness’ obel Peace Prize, has increased tremendously.
Recently we have been further reassured by the publication of two reports
on the situation in Tibet: by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
and the International Commission of Jurists. Both reports condemn in categorical
terms the increasing abuses of human rights in Tibet and call for a U N
supervised referendum in Tibet to determine the will of the Tibetan people
regarding their future political status.
Thereafter a number of parliamentarian delegations visited Tibet and also
various governments through their department of foreign affairs took up
the Tibetan issue bilaterally with China and all these are still happening.
Although externally we do not see any evidence of change in the heart of
the Chinese leadership, there is definitely pressure on China.China has
expressed its willingness to have a dialogue with the Dalai Lama, but with
conditions. Even that I think to some extent is a success, otherwise China
does not have to make any statement. Because of these pressures the statements
are coming out. Also a new development that we have been tremendously encouraged
is the reception accorded to the Dalai Lama by the people of Taiwan when
he made his first historic visit to that land. And that I must say was
a risky trip because Taiwan is a controversial state. His Holiness wanted
to establish a relationship between the people of Taiwan, the Chinese and
the Tibetans. He wanted to show that there is no animosity. That could
have backfired but it went really well. That was a tremendous success not
only for the Tibetan and Taiwanese relationship but it had a lot of impact
on mainland China as well because of the news media reporting.
Another development is the spate of support coming from mainland China;
support coming very courageously from dissidents or intellectuals writing
open letters to the leadership asking them to support the Tibetan issue,
asking them to have a dialogue with the Dalai Lama. It is not easy to write
those letters because you are risking your life. To be a dissident in main
land China is to live every day with danger of being arrested or disappeared.
With all of this that we know, there is a core of support in China from
the Chinese and I am sure as time goes by there will be more support because
people have more information on Tibet. For the Chinese, until the liberalisation
time there was a lack of information. All they knew was the propaganda
that comes from the Communist Party.
Despite such encouragement on the international scene, I am sorry to say
that the situation in Tibet is not getting better. On the contrary, it
is going from bad to worse. As you may have read Congressman Wolf’s report,
he calls it Tibet being under the ‘boot heels subjugation’ and that is
exactly what the Tibetan situation is right now. You can not utter a word
without offending the Chinese authorities; you are kicked and you are taken
right inside the prison without any question.
In spite of the international situation regarding the Tibetan issue, the
Tibetan Government’s policy is still to negotiate with the Chinese leadership
so that the issue of Tibet is settled peacefully, without bloodshed, to
our mutual satisfaction. The middle way approach adopted by His Holiness
to settle the Tibetan issue is nothing new. As far back as the 1950s the
Dalai Lama has been cautioning the militant Tibetans not to take up arms.
In fact he said that he felt like he was sitting between two volcanoes,
both about to erupt anytime.
There is frustration on the part of the Tibetan people; not that they like
to resort to violence but it is pure frustration that is driving the Tibetans
to some degree of violence. We know that they are trying to follow His
Holiness’ advice but when they see that there is no positive response coming
from the Chinese leadership side, they are desperate, they are frustrated.
We have heard of a few cases of bombing in Tibet and a recent example is
the Tibetan Youth Congress’ hunger strike until death. These are the symptoms
of people’s frustration and if this negotiation does not take place there
will be more violence and there will be more tragedy. So it is important
that we all try to get this negotiation; individually we make that effort,
we do everything internationally, to pressure China to have this dialogue.
This is where the Tibetan Government is consistent on having a peaceful
negotiation with Chin.
In the meantime, I hope that you will convey this feeling and this part
of the Tibetans ready to have a dialogue with China and that is one of
the main issues. It is not that difficult; it is a simple fact that we
want to go by. Thank you very much.
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to Seminar
Mr. Ravi Nair, Executive Diorector
South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre
Honourable
Mr T.C. Tethong, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government-in-Exile
of Tibet; Mr Tempa Tsering; Mr.Lobsang Nyandak; friends from all
over South East Asia and South Asia; ladies and gentlemen from other parts
of the globe. We are very happy to have you this morning here with us.
We are meeting at a very opportune time and this is not a platitude that
one states at every seminar or workshop. Because all of you must have read
the papers yesterday. There is a certain difference in China’s response
yesterday and I am sure the Tibetan Government-in-Exile must be reading
between the lines very carefully on the newest statement.
But it hasn’t come about all of a sudden. It has come about because today
there is a new geo-political environment in the world to which China
is clearly subject to its pressures and pulls. And much more so in this
part of the world in the Asian land mass. It is for this reason that we
need to consolidate, to disseminate, to put forward a range of public responses
across this region and that is why we thought of this seminar a few months
ago.
Colleagues in the TCHRD have done a wonderful job in trying to organise
this seminar with little resources and little time. I must say that while
in the next two days we will be hearing a lot of talks on a range of issues
concerning human rights in Tibet, it is important that while we discuss
and listen, we must also start formulating plans for action to carry back
to our countries. And to create the kind of institutional platforms back
in our own countries to carry the battle forward in terms of the rights
of the Tibetans and the rights of self determination.
As a human rights activist, to me, the first article in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which is also the first article
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
relates very aptly and specifically to the issue of Tibet and the
issue of the human rights of the Tibetan people.
It is clear that there is a sense of frustration amongst younger Tibetans
to which Kalon T.C. Tethong has alluded. Yet the strength of the Tibetan
struggle has been that it has been able to hold the moral high ground.
It has not come down to using the same language as that of the oppressor.
Even though the oppressed feel a sense of helplessness, in that sense of
helplessness are the seeds of a new source of empowerment, in terms of
holding the moral high ground, through the pursuit of the policies
of the middle path as enunciated by the Dalai Lama.
It is clear that the Chinese now cannot brush it away with the alacrity
that they did in the past and that is why you see the kind of new statements
emanating. Obviously one will have to consider them a lot more carefully
in terms of responses.
Coupled with this is the new power play and the diminution of the concept
of the nation state elsewhere: the responses of NATO on Kosovo, the issue
of the gradual erosion of the notion of sovereignty of nation states, whether
it be the political power play issue at the United Nations or the UN human
rights mechanisms. Clearly one important development is the international
criminal court and the formation of the diplomatic and plenipotentiary
conference that is meeting presently in Rome. To have an international
penal court to look at the core issues of genocide, aggression, and human
rights violations, is key to the diminution of the blatant misuse of power
that you see since the Second World War. It is clear in a number of other
areas that self-determination of all peoples, an issue put on the back
burner during the Cold War period, is once again on the agenda. I think
that it is for all of us, who are friends of Tibet, to understand that
all of this affords certain opportunities. But opportunities, if they are
to be taken advantage of, need preparation, need the kind of marshalling
of human and other resources to make sure that plans come to some kind
of fruition.
It is clear also that the process of democratisation in China itself also
affords certain opportunities. The Chinese people are a very great people
with a great civilisation and a great world view. Unfortunately they have
been cursed with authoritarian regimes one after another. I think the genius
of the Chinese people will triumph; that genius of the Chinese people that
you see in the strength and courage of the dissident movement in
China, in the brilliant symbolisation of one individual standing in front
of a phalanx of tanks in Tiannanmen Square. I think it is that unity of
purpose that we will have to forge with others fighting for democracy across
this region.
It is clear also that we need to marshal our resources in the Asian land
mass much more cogently and effectively than we have done so far.
The fact that publicity on the Tibetan struggle and their quest for leading
a life of dignity and human rights is much more of an issue in the public
eye in western Europe or North America than in Asia definitely needs some
amount of evaluation on our part. Around this table are senior activists
from a number of Asian countries, people who are important public figures
in their own countries. I would like all of us outside of the formal discussions
during the course of the seminar to engage in bilateral and multilateral
discussion so as to strengthen the process of highlighting the issue of
Tibet in each of our countries at public fora.
It is clear that some of the problems that concern the raising of Tibet
and Tibetan human rights in the international arena, at the UN, is because
of the pusillanimity of a lot of Asian states in following Chinese or other
nation state overtures on non-action resolutions in the Commission on Human
Rights. It is necessary for us to create public constituencies in each
of our countries to say that even if we do not vote against China, we should
not vote for China. We should have enough public constituencies to have
our countries remain neutral in these voting patterns. That is I think
a task that we need to set ourselves to and clearly keep in our minds,
and between now and the next Commission on Human Rights in March next year,
this is a goal and programme we must engage ourselves in to bring to some
kind of fruition.
Moreover, we also need to address senior diplomatic and media representatives
in each of our countries. It is not enough to say, as is rhetorically done,
that Tibet must be put back on the UN agenda. There is a certain process
of bringing it back on the agenda and that process is not only through
demonstrations and hunger strikes, however important they are in bringing
the issue into public focus. There is a diplomatic n the Tibet solidarity
groups across the world need to reach to that higher level that will bring
us into sharper engagement with our own governmental representatives in
the twelfth committee and the sixth committee of the UN. This is the process
to take if we are to bring back this issue of the three resolutions on
Tibet that were passed and have been put on the backburner for so many
years.
I would like to say a lot more but I am sure there will be ample opportunity
in the next two days. Only finally to say that Tibet’s quest for human
rights, its quest for finding a rightful place in the committee of nations
is no longer an idea. It is something that is here to stay and, to paraphrase,
it is an idea whose time has come. I think that clearly a few years ago
if you had asked me whether Armenia would ever be a nation state I would
have looked at you in aghast horror. But today Armenia is a very important
player in politics in the central European region. We see of course Latvia
and Estonia and a number of other nations that had lost their independence
to big power nations in the immediate aftermath of the last war.
The
Cold War and its ending has opened up new possibilities but it is very
important for us to understand that human rights and self-determination
are too important to be left only to the corridors of power. It is necessary
for us in the people’s domain to channel, to put the imprint of public
approval on such diplomatic overtures and manoeuvres. I hope that we have
a fruitful engagement over the next two days and I thank you very much
for your attention.
(Back
to Contents)
Lobsang Nyandak, Executive Director
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
Let me welcome you all once again, on behalf of the Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy, to this seminar. I am
sure that many of you are aware of the human rights abuses taking place
in Tibet. Violation of the fundamental human rights of Tibetan people is
not new. It has been going on ever since China invaded Tibet in 1949.
I will, however, not deal with the sufferings and the atrocities Tibetan
people underwent in the early years. I prefer to present to you the current
situation.
Nevertheless, I feel it important to briefly introduce you to the background
of my country and its people. Tibet, known as the “roof of the world”,
is situated at the heart of central Asia between China and India. It is
inhabited by 6 million Tibetan people with a culture and way of life totally
different from that of the peoples of the neighbouring countries. Tibet
was an independent country. Throughout its history Tibet possessed all
the attributes of independent statehood recognised under international
law. It had a defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory,
a government, and the ability to enter into international relations. The
turning point in Tibet’s history came in 1949, when the People’s Liberation
Army of Communist China invaded without any provocation. Ever since, the
fate of Tibetan people has changed.
The people and nation of Tibet are at the mercy of Communist China. Tibet’s
culture and national identity are being systematically destroyed. More
than 1.2 million Tibetans, about one sixth of the population, have died
since 1949 due to political persecution, imprisonment, torture and famine.
Over 6,000 of Tibet’s rich religious and other cultural centres have been
destroyed. Tibetans were forced to leave Tibet in 1959 and over 85,000
Tibetans sought asylum in India, Nepal and Bhutan. The only long-term solution
to Tibet’s problems, including human rights, is to find a political resolution
to the question of Tibet. Since the People’s Republic of China first invaded
Tibet in 1949, the people, led by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, have striven
for a peaceful political solution. Rather than responding to violence of
any kind, Tibetans have favoured temperance and compromise in their initiatives
with China to safeguard their cultural identity. In 1988 His Holiness the
Dalai Lama proposed a framework for negotiations with China. It asks that
Tibet be granted self-governing, democratic status while relinquishing
foreign policy and defence to China.
This proposal of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, on behalf of his people,
is a consistent and simple one ¾ genuine autonomy. An autonomy not
only for the so-called “Tibet Autonomous Region”, but for the entire Tibetan
region. An autonomy that will allow Tibetans to freely practise their religion
and to retain their distinct cultural identity - rights to which every
human being is entitled. The proposal continues to be either ignored or
discredited by Chinese leaders.
It is evident from the consistent peaceful struggle of the people, both
inside and outside Tibet, that Tibetans are not happy under Chinese rule.
The present situation in Tibet testifies that China’s occupation has brought
suffering, destruction and misery to the I will try to convey some idea
of the extensive brutalities that continue to be perpetrated by the People’s
Republic of China against the people of Tibet. The human rights of every
Tibetan in what has recently been termed “the world’s largest remaining
colony” have been drastically eroded under Chinese occupation; our individual
rights and our rights as a people are trampled under the boots of Chinese
military. In recent times the Chinese government has intensified repression
and brutality in Tibet.
The violation of human rights in Tibet has a distinct character. They are
not isolated cases. Tibetans are being targeted and human rights abuses
are often the result of systematic and institutionalised racial and cultural
discrimination. Tibetans are facing a gradual ethnic cleansing - the annihilation
of an entire race, religion and heritage. The prevalence of arbitrary
detentions, the lack of criminal justice, the absence of freedom of speech
and assembly, and the disregard for the basic rights of women and children
are some of the critical grounds for concern for the Tibetan people.
As of December 1997, there were 1,216 known political prisoners languishing
in Chinese prisons in Tibet. Of those, 295 are women and 39 are juvenile
prisoners below the age of 18. Under China’s “Strike Hard” campaign, Chinese
work-teams forcibly enter the monasteries and nunneries and seek to re-educate
the monks and nuns. Those who do not comply are either expelled from their
monasteries or arrested. As of today, we have learnt that under China’s
so-called “Strike Hard” campaign, 4,239 monks and nuns have been expelled
from their monasteries or nunneries, including 937 novice monks and nuns
below the age of 18. 332 arrests and 14 deaths were reported, and some
eight monasteries and nunneries are completely closed down.
The motives for launching the “Strike Hard” campaign in China and in Tibet
are totally different. In China, the official aim of this campaign is to
crack down severely on general crime and end corrupt practices. However,
in Tibet the motive is to intimidate and eliminate those supporting Tibetan
independence and human rights activists in Tibet.
The “Strike Hard” campaign and its attendant “re-education” drive, launched
in Tibet in early 1996 and rapidly extended in 1997, signals an increasingly
intensive momentum by Chinese authorities to crack down on Tibetans who
call for independence and respect for human rights in Tibet. As Chinese
work-teams surge into more and more of Tibet’s monasteries and nunneries,
controls have been tightened and populations strictly limited.
China’s clamp down has not stopped at Tibet’s religious institutions. Threatening
to extend “re-education” sessions into all spheres of Tibetan culture -
which authorities recently declared “non-Buddhist” - the PRC has already
made massive inroads into its efforts to sinicise the Tibetan people. Tibetan
language and Tibet-related education has been drastically downgraded. Population
measures - a ceaseless flow of Chinese settlers transported in to “develop”
the region and the forced sterilisation of Tibetan women - combine to produce
an ever-growing threat to the Tibetan people’s survival. And as “development”
causes drastic changes to the Tibetan social structure, the most striking
feature of Tibet’s Chinese-engineered economic lift-off is the lack of
real benefits to the Tibetans themselves.
Tibetans are arrested mostly as a result of seeking to exercise their freedom
of expression and opinion. The term “endangering national security” has
been introduced in amendments to the Chinese criminal law, replacing the
revolutionary”, but it appears that any expression of perceived political
opinion in Tibet can amount to a threat to China’s “national security”.
Tibetans have been arrested in 1997 for pasting pro-Tibetan posters, hanging
the national flag, writing leaflets calling for Tibetan independence, and,
as always, for speaking the forbidden phrase of “Free Tibet”.
Despite modifications to the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law put into effect
in 1997, politically motivated prosecution and disregard for due process
continue to be sanctioned in the PRC’s judicial system. Arrest without
warrant or charge, prolonged detention without trial and denial of access
to legal counsel is commonplace for Tibetan political prisoners. Many detainees
report being tortured during interrogation to “confess to their crimes”
and closed trials in cases involving “state secrets” are still permitted
under the revised law. Seven reports of Tibetans arrested for alleged “espionage”
activities for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile were received in 1997. In
each case there was a complete absence of any supporting evidence other
than the fact that they had, in some cases, made a visit to India. The
most notable case of arbitrary detention is that of Ngawang Choephel. In
October 1996 China officially acknowledged the detention of Ngawang Choephel,
a Tibetan musician and scholar arrested by Chinese authorities in September
1995 while travelling in Tibet. He was held incommunicado for more than
15 months without charge or trial. On 26 December 1996 he was sentenced
to 18 years in prison, accused of undertaking espionage activities at the
behest of the Tibetan government in exile.
Tanak Jigme Sangpo, a former primary school teacher, now 70 years old,
is serving one of the longest sentences imposed on a prisoner of conscience
in Tibet. Tanak Jigme Sangpo had already served some 13 years in prison
for independence activities when he was sentenced in 1983 to 15 years imprisonment
for “counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement”. His sentence was
subsequently extended by five years and later a further eight years for
shouting independence slogans in prison. By the time he is released in
2011, he will have spent 28 unbroken years and a total of 41 years behind
bars.
China’s “patriotic re-education” or the “Strike Hard” campaign, launched
in May 1996 and intensified during 1997, further restricts freedom of expression.
Tibetan monks and nuns have been ordered to sign pledges of political allegiance
and to accept without question the work-teams’ re-styling of Tibetan history
and religion. If a monk or nun ventures to speak their own opinion, or
to question those of the Chinese officials, they face arrest and expulsion
from their monastery or nunnery.
In Tibet torture is an instrument of political repression and a symbol
of power. It has been used by Chinese authorities against Tibetans since
the
first Chinese armies entered Tibet in 1949. On October 4, 1988 China ratified
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, which they had signed in 1986. In November 1988, a member
of the Chinese delegation at the UN General Assembly stated that “China
will implement in good faith its obligations undertaken in the Convention”.
Within a few months Migmar was tortured to death in Seitru Detention Centre.
One year later, Lhakpa Tsering, a student accused of belonging to a “counter-revolutionary”
organisation was beaten to death in Drapchi Prison.
Lobsang Dhargay who was arrested for distributing leaflets reading “Free
Tibet” and “Chinese Quit Tibet” recalls: “The worst torture I endured was
when I was handcuffed with my arms around a hot chimney and left there
for a whole day without food or water. The scorching heat of the chimney
resulted in blisters all over my body. There was water running from the
blisters and my wounds were stinging painfully from heavy perspiration.
At night, when the prison guards finally came to release my cuffs, my boots
were completely filled with water from the sweat of my body.”
Dozens of cases describing brutal torture methods by police and prison
officials were reported. Victims recall being beaten with rifle butts and
sticks, kicked and punched all over the body, shocked with electric cattle
prods, outh, being placed in dark, tiny confinement cells in freezing temperatures
and being subjected to blood extraction.
The electric baton since its introduction has become an “essential” weapon
of torture in Tibet. The majority of Tibetan political prisoners report
that they were beaten with electric cattle prods. Tibetan women and nuns
suffer from particularly degrading forms of torture. Reports of electric
baton being inserted in nuns vaginas, anus and mouth or being interrogated
while stripped naked are common.
Kalsang
Dawa, a 29 year old painter from Phenpo in central Tibet, suffered tremendously
during his two and a half years of prison torture. He was arrested in April
1993 for having painted the Tibetan national flag and pasting independence
wall posters. While in Sangyip prison he was tortured and suffered a severe
beating by prison guards. Since then, he was said to have shown signs of
disturbance such as often covering his ears with both hands and crying
out: “they are inserting electric batons into my ears.” After eight
or nine months in prison, Kalsang’s sentence was pronounced and he was
transfered to Toelung Trisam, a labour camp where prisoners are made to
perform hard labour. On October 14, 1995 he was found dead in his
cell, hanging from the ceiling.
Reports of deaths after release have increased during the last few years.
A torture victim, Lobsang, a monk from Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Shigatse
who arrived in Dharamsala on October 10, 1997 says that during torture
sessions he heard Chinese prison officials say ‘Do not hurt him on the
outside; disable him with internal injuries’.
Jamyang Thinley, 25 year old monk of Chamdo monastery, died just five days
after his release from prison on September 13, 1996. After four months
of severe torture and beatings by prison officials in Chamdo prison, Jamyang’s
state became critical and he was quickly released.
Yeshi Samten, a 22 year old monk of Gaden Monastery, died a week after
his release from Trisam Prison on May 12, 1998. He suffered from severe
torture during two years of imprisonment. At the time of cremation, the
person performing the funeral rites discovered that two of Yeshi’s ribs
were broken.
Phuntsok
Yangkyi, a 20 year old nun from Michungri Nunnery, went into a coma after
Chinese doctors extracted fluid from her body and her nails, tongue and
lips turned bluish-black before she died. Tibetan women have been subjected
to brutal repression following the severe religious crackdown launched
in 1996 and 137 nuns are known to have been expelled from nunneries. Tibetan
women, often nuns, continue to be arrested arbitrarily and subjected to
ill treatment and torture while in prison. Of the 1,216 known current political
prisoners, 295 are women and 11 female political prisoners are serving
more than 10 years. One woman, three months and 17 days pregnant, was kept
standing in a cold room for 14 hours in a row the night of her arrest while
being interrogated. She told her interrogators that she was pregnant and
was feeling weak, however the pleas were ignored and the questions continued.
She miscarried her child in a prison toilet shortly afterwards.
Ngawang Sangdrol, a Garu nun, is serving an 18-year sentence, the longest
known sentence of any female political prisoner in Tibet. Originally arrested
for taking part in a pro-independence demonstration, she and 13 other nuns
had their sentences extended after recording pro-independence songs in
prison. In March 1996 Ngawang Sangdrol was amongst a number of female prisoners
who refused to tidy her cell, apparently as a protest against the Panchen
Lama re-education campaign being conducted in the prison, and also refused
to stand up on one occasion when a Chinese official entered the room. When
she was sent to stand in the rain as punishment, Ngawang Sangdrol called
out “Free Tibet”. As a result, Ngawang Sangdrol’s sentence was extended
by nine years in July 1996.
Throughout 1997, Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily detain and
torture Tibetan children, to subject them to religious repression and to
deny their educational and cultural rights. At least urrently languish
in Chinese prisons in Tibet for trying to exercise their freedom of expression.
They are frequently detained in adult prisons, denied legal representation
or contact with family and subjected to severe ill-treatment.
When Gedhun Choekyi Nyima was six years old, Chinese authorities abducted
him and to date the whereabouts of this boy remains unknown. His only “crime”
is that His Holiness the Dalai Lama recognised him as the 11th reincarnation
of the Panchen Lama on 14 May 1995. Some days later the six year old boy
and his parents disappeared. No international monitor has yet been
allowed to visit the family.
Roughly one third of school-aged children in Tibet continue to receive
no education at all. Most new schools are built in urban centres and designed
for the children of Chinese settlers. Tibetans are commonly unable to enter
schools due to prohibitively high school fees and the fact that admission
exams are conducted in Chinese. Monastic education has also been targeted;
the number of student monks and nuns has been strictly limited and high
bribes are demanded to admit a child to a monastic school. A total of 613
child monks and nuns were expelled in connection with the “Strike Hard”
campaign during 1996-97.
In contrast with claims made by the PRC regarding the advancement of socio-economic
conditions in Tibet, the accounts of 70 Tibetan refugees who recently escaped
from different parts of Tibet reveal that China’s economic policy has severely
affected the huge percentage of Tibetans who live in rural areas. Innumerable
Tibetans report that economic repression is drastically affecting their
livelihood and their ability to feed themselves and their family.
China’s taxation policy plays a crucial role in this repression. Tibetans
are subjected to various forms of taxation, some unbelievably high, irrespective
of their economic position, and there is no evidence that those who are
forced to pay the taxes benefit in any way. A variety of taxes are imposed;
on land, animals, wool and fur, hides, meat, grains, butter, milk, cheese,
hay, fertiliser and medicinal plants. “Old age” and “education” taxes are
also charged, even if the person receives no schooling or social security.
A tax on non-residents who visit Lhasa has also been reported to have been
in place since the beginning of 1997. A new tax on the right to perform
religious rites at the central temple in Lhasa and even a “human tax” were
reported.
The PRC justifies its denigration from individual rights on the grounds
that it has concentrated on promoting collective rights. Tibetan people
are nonetheless deprived of their most precious collective right: their
cultural identity.
At the 53rd UN Commission on Human Rights, the PRC launched massive lobbying
efforts to end the “confrontational approach” and to adopt a “more positive
bilateral dialogue”. A number of countries have taken China up on this
offer, holding high level meetings with Chinese officials where human rights
were indeed placed on the agenda.
What has this approach yielded for the human rights of the Tibetan people?
An occasional symbolic gesture - the release of one or two political prisoners,
the signing of certain international instruments - always timed to influence
UN voting patterns or economic negotiations with particular states.
The reality is that non of the bilateral “dialogues” have brought any concrete
results or alleviated the sufferings of the Tibetan people.
(Back to Contents)
Ven. Gyaltsen Ghoetso
Former Political Prisoner in Tibet
As
introduced, I am Gyaltsen Choetso. I am a nun at Dolmaling Nunnery and
I escaped Tibet in 1991. Now I am studying in Dolmaling Nunnery but the
reason I fled Tibet was for political reasons to escape the violations
of human rights.
I am from Dechen County in Lhasa. I joined Garu Nunnery in 1986. When I
first joined the nunnery it was a shambles as a result of the Cultural
Revolution. The nunnery was renovated by the 10 nuns there and with help
from donations from others around us. For a year the construction and renovation
continued until 1987 when I participated in a political demonstration.
Then I became politically active which was the primary reason why I had
to escape to India.
The reason why I participated in the demonstration was that in 1987 there
was a whole reawakening of the political struggle in Tibet. The monks at
Drepung Monastery started to demonstrate in September and October and for
the first time in many years there were many young monks and nuns who were
involved in the demonstrations. After the largest demonstration ever in
1987 the Chinese government clamped down on demonstrations most severely
- martial law was imposed, many people were arrested and beaten in prison.
The media reported that it was only a minority who were trying to split
the nation but then we initiated a demonstration in December which was
to show that it was not just a small percentage of the population who were
after freedom but to illustrate our support. The demonstration that we
took part in was the first of its kind for nuns. It took place in the Barkhor
and was for the political prisoners languishing in prison and for Tibet’s
freedom.
We were not arrested immediately on the spot like the previous demonstrations
where many were arrested and killed. In order to avoid that they waited
on the outskirts of where the demonstration took place and arrested us
there. We were handcuffed and taken to Gutsa Detention Centre where we
were beaten. There were six of us. Six trucks with People’s Armed Police
officers came and started to beat us with whatever they had in their hands,
including iron rods. Then we were interrogated.
They said, “Who is your leader? You were born when Tibet was already part
of China so why are you calling for freedom - who has put you up to this?”
They would ask questions about who was master minding our protest and said
that it must be the Dalai clique who was behind us. We replied that “there
is no one behind us and to us it is obvious that we are a different race
and that makes us raise our voice about your presence in our country”.
We said that we based the point about being a free nation on the fact that
we know we have a different language, a different race, a different currency;
these are things that we can see for ourselves as proof that we are a different
nation.
Then they started torturing us as they were not satisfied with our answers.
They electrocuted us all over our bodies and two policewomen stripped us
naked and put the electric cattle prods in our mouths. Now some of the
nuns are still incontinent because of this.
So the interrogations continued. I was detained for one month and three
days and every time they would ask the same question again and again and
I was questioned four times each day. They kept asking us to disclose our
leader. It was very cold and they would throw water on the floor that then
turned to ice and afterwards it was very difficult to get our feet off
the ground.
Then one day the prison officials came to us and told us that we would
be returned to our homes as we had agreed to what they had said. But this
was not the truth; the Panchen Lama had intervened and there had been a
lot of international pressure including from the Government-in-Exile.
In 1988 on April 17, 13 nuns were arrested after another protest in the
Barkhor area. The nature of arrest was the same: they waited until
we had finished the protest, and the reason behind the arrest was also
the same. Every time that I was detained there were changes in the methods
and nature of beatings, torture and the general treatment. We were handcuffed
and taken away to Gutsa Detention Centre.
The second time I was arrested and tortured things were different. Three
or four People’s Armed Police men came and handcuffed us and threw us on
the ground in a courtyard. They made us kneel on gravel and then they started
to stamp on our backs and kick us with their boots. Then they told us to
get up but we couldn’t as we were in too much pain and we were bleeding.
Then they would beat us even more; they would use sticks and iron rods
and kick us all over. Then they would pull us on the ears; some nuns almost
lost their ears as they pulled so hard. From 10 o’clock until noon they
would kick us and then they would stop for lunch. They took one nun into
a cell with two men dragging her on the ground.
The questions were the same as before: “Who is behind all this?” “Who is
masterminding the protest?” The beatings were so severe and so loud that
other nuns at the other end of the corridor would hear us. They would get
so tired that they would take off their shirts and then continue to beat
us. We were prepared for beatings and in fact for death so we had worn
lots of clothes to protect ourselves. But when we got to Gutsa they lifted
up our garments until there was only a thin layer of cloth and then they
beat us there. The other way of threatening us was that they released two
dogs on us. The dogs didn’t do too much but it was very scary to have dogs
pulling on our clothes. They beat us until 5 o’clock and we had no water
to drink. We thought that we would die as we were so badly injured. Two
men came and dragged us into separate cells and we were left there. This
interrogation was on the first day that we were taken to the Gutsa Detention
Centre.
The prison was very full and there was never enough food. All we would
get for a meal was one tingmo [steamed bun] and vegetables that were very
dirty with animal excretions and it was very salty. We were very thirsty.
For one whole week we were not given any water. Fortunately some criminal
prisoners were able to bring us some otherwise I don’t know how we would
have survived.
Another severe problem I faced was that in the cell where we were kept
there were no mattresses and no bedding and there was only an excretion
bowl in the room. It was very cold and this was hard to bear. We were interrogated
four to five times a week. After that I was kept for 11 months and 13 days.
Sometimes a nun would be interrogated and if the guards were smoking they
would put the lit cigarette butts on her face. One nun came back with many
scars on her face from this and even today she is still scarred. We were
brutally punished and suppressed and we were also made to do work like
making bricks and carrying sand around and we were not given enough to
eat. It was very difficult.
The third time that I was arrested we did not take part in any protest.
We were just sitting at the nunnery when 20 men came and told us that the
Dalai Lama was chosen as the Nobel Laureate but that we must not show any
sign of happiness at this. We were also told to write a letter saying that
we were sorry that we had participated in the earlier demonstrations. None
of us really listened to them; according to our traditional customs we
burned incense and raised prayer flags and we refused to write the letter.
We told them that we had given deep thought when we demonstrated and that
it was not impulsive.
So they said that we must go to the prison with them and they threatened
to close the nunnery. Then eight of us nuns were taken by the work-team.
This arrival of the work-teams to announce ppy occasion was not just at
our nunnery but it was throughout the nunneries and monasteries and in
the offices. There were about 300 expulsions from the nunneries and
monasteries. From our nunnery 21 were expelled and eight were imprisoned.
We were taken at night straight to Gutsa. The methods that they had then
for torturing political prisoners was a move away from beating us with
sticks and leaving scars that others could see. Instead they wound a thin
wire around our fingers and they wound up the current and then shocks were
sent along all our nerves and our bodies. We would scream out loud. It
was done one by one and the other nuns in the courtyard who were tied to
trees or handcuffed could hear the screams. We were perplexed when we were
outside as we could not hear any signs of violence.
When we were taken inside we realised what an awful form of torture it
really was. We became unconscious and when we awoke we had red vision and
it was also blurred. We were not ourselves when we came to. Later we were
all taken into the room and handcuffed to each other. We were then electrocuted
one by one as the current ran through the cuffs. It really hurt us internally.
There was a pull throughout our bodies from our toes to the top of our
heads and then we all fell unconscious. The new technique was so intense
that if anyone said anything to do with winding we would all be very quiet
as we were afraid and the impact of the torture was so great.
There was no real reason for our arrest the third time but they accused
us of functioning as a “splittist” section in our nunnery. Of course we
denied this. We were detained for six months and were then handed over
to the county police. We then had to follow many restrictions.
The post-release trauma was very difficult. For example, because of our
participation in political activities, we were not allowed to return to
our monasteries and nunneries. Children are not allowed to return to school
and lay people are not allowed to return to their offices. Monks and nuns
are not allowed to visit homes to pray for various families. Also, if we
want to visit anywhere else, even somewhere 30 minutes away, we have to
go and get permission form the local county. From my place to Lhasa it’s
half an hour by vehicle but because there’s no freedom at all in Tibet
- of expression or education or anything - this is why I fled to India.
I was still sick when I left the prison and so was able to visit Lhasa
as I had a medical pass to visit the hospital in Lhasa. Otherwise
I could not have fled Tibet.
What I have told you is my personal account of what I have suffered but
when I consider the plight of other prisoners I think that I have not suffered
so much. Propagators of freedom and human rights especially at the time
of interrogation undergo the worst treatment. Dhondup Dorji had his hands
tied and when he continued to speak for the freedom of Tibet, hot boiling
water was poured down his throat right from the flask into his mouth. He
had severe blisters the next day. He could not even close his mouth for
days. This is the kind of punishment and maltreatment prisoners go through.
Therefore when I think of these people I think what I went through was
nothing. Once prisoners are arrested cases of death is commonplace and
even if they survive, they are often permanently scarred by the time they
are released. They would be crippled physically or mentally. And there
are many more who will always suffer internal health complications due
to the beatings.
I am sure you are aware of the kind of torture and punishments people go
through as many of you are directly involved with such issues when you
work for a human rights organisation. But let me tell you that of those
who are released there are many people who continue to suffer as a result
of their time in prison, permanently scarred, some in wheelchairs, others
crippled.
The most recent incident that I am aware of is the May 1 and 4 protests
at Drapchi Prison. When this protest happened the Chinese People’s Armed
Police force and Chinese prison officials violently clamped down on the
protesting prisoners and I heard yesterday that four nuns died. I want
to also tell you about another nun, Ngawang Sangdrol, who is the longest
serving female political prisoner. She was arrested at a very young age
and her entire family was involved in the freedom struggle. Her father
is still in prison and her brother was in prison.
Such young nuns continue to suffer in Chinese prisons in Tibet. I am very
concerned about them as they have been solely arrested for their freedom
of expression and opinion and this is what I feel is the most unjust thing
to happen to any human being.
In prison there are political prisoners as well as non-political prisoners
but in the eyes of the Chinese authorities, whether they are political
or non-political, everyone is treated badly if Tibetan. Let me give you
a small example of when the May 1st demonstration took place. There was
Karma Dawa and Karma Sonam. They were initially arrested due to non-political
reasons but inside the prison I hear that one of them died.
In 1987 there was a similar incident. Migmar Tsering and Dawa were also
arrested for non-political reasons but once inside the prison, being a
Tibetan, no one can endure what the Chinese are doing to us. Once inside
the prison they took part in a political activity. They were executed in
Toelung for this.
Basically,
Chinese officials try to say that the Tibetan “splittists” are just a minority
group and that the majority of Tibetans accept the presence of the Chinese.
But when you look at all this, even non-political prisoners when they get
inside the prison, they find reason to shout out. I think this is a clear
indication that what the Chinese are saying is not true, that the majority
of Tibetans do not accept the presence of Chinese in Tibet.
This is my personal account, as I said before. Many more continue to suffer.
Days pass not knowing how the nights will pass. I hope that you all, being
involved in the kinds of organisations concerning human rights, will help
us to get political prisoners released and to generate more awareness about
the plight of Tibetan prisoners and of Tibet. I thank you for coming here
and for allowing me to speak. I could still talk on many issues relating
to human rights but due to time constraints I will stop right here. Thank
you very much.
(Back
to Contents)
Kate
Saunders, News Researcher
Tibet
Information Network, London
Chinese
policies of population transfer and birth control have been described as
genocidal attempts to exterminate the Tibetan population. Before we make
this judgement I feel it’s important to look at the forces driving these
policies and to explore the policies themselves - are they made at central
level with a clear objective, or are they influenced in their scope by
local officials?
I’d like to add a note of caution before I begin the topic of birth control.
We have received no internal documents on the subject of birth control
since 1994, when we produced two detailed reports on this issue. We have
not been able to find any material since then that significantly changes
the findings of these reports, and cannot say whether this means the situation
remains the same, or whether there is a more effective block on information
reaching the outside world.
Interviews on the subject do tend to produce very subjective results, partially
because the issue depends on the interpretation of words like “force” and
“voluntary”. Occasionally we find that women who say they have been sterilised
have since conceived. Until recently, when both TIN and TCHRD published
firsthand accounts of sterilisations and abortions, reports were generally
second hand.
These recent women’s reports make chilling reading. The official documents
detailing birth control policies are equally chilling. The language used
in these policies is a language of control and manipulation; a language
which leaves women powerless and vulnerable to a combination of social,
economic and ideological forces. It is a language that aims to stop reproduction
and not to increase the knowledge or power of women.
For instance, the Municipal Planned Birth Leading Group in Lhasa announced
in its fifth report of 1994 that: “It is the shared feeling of the whole
party, the whole nation and the people of all nationalities in our country
to practise planned birth, to strictly control the population growth and
to raise the standard of population quality. The group has started from
solving the problem of the people’s ideological consciousness; organised
the government branches; manipulated all forces from all fields in society;
guided the masses in practising planned birth and gradually formed a multi-level
system.”
Chinese documents studied by TIN over the past ten years reaffirm the specific
aim of this ideological control - that of halting population growth. More
than once, the authorities state the linkage of slowing reproduction and
economic progress. “Birth control is a national policy of our country.
It underlies the whole situation of economic and social development,” according
to the Sichuan Provincial Leading Group for Planned Birth in March 1990.
“At present and for some time to come the population situation in the province
will remain very serious. If we relax a little, the scheduled population
plan for the year 2000 will quite possibly be unfulfilled. This will no
doubt affect the economic and social development of the whole province
and the realisation of each item of set targets.”
The same document refers to a prevailing theme in virtually all of the
documents we have studied - the involvement of all work units and levels
in the party hierarchy in the birth control campaign. “Such work units
as propaganda, culture and broadcasting must regard frequent propaganda
and planned birth as part of their job,” states this document. “Finance,
personnel and staffing departments must help the planned birth departments
to improve their working conditions and to equip them where necessary.
Departments and organisations such as industry and commerce, public security
and private labourers’ associations must greatly strengthen the mobile
population’s planned birth management.”
It is clearly the intention that this particular party policy is carried
through to every level of society - including its furthest reaches, nomads
and herders in remote rural areas of Tibet. Research elsewhere in the world
has shown that when women in a society are educated, the birth rate decreases.
Little attention is paid to this notion in China however - there is no
reference in Tibetan birth control documents as far as we know to sex education
and contraception, but only to surgical methods of abortion and sterilisation.
TCHRD has noted that in a document issued by the National Family Planning
Commission and Health department dated 3 September 1995 that the use of
certain of these words was banned. The document insists that the terms
“drug-induced abortion”, “surgical abortion” and “sterilisation” are not
used and that the more anodyne terms “family planning clinics”, “operating
hospital” and “out-patient operation” are used instead. In other documents,
the Chinese refer to the “remedy method” which is described as the best
form of contraception. In other words, abortion.
This may partly be because there is no quota for officials in carrying
out education in the use of contraception - while there are quota on numbers
of abortions and sterilisations. Another of these targets is limiting the
number of births. If an official fails to reach his or her target each
year, he or she can be fired or lose their job.
Several documents we’ve collected list in detail the fines for couples
who have extra children - and other penalties. For instance, a child born
out of plan will generally be treated as a “non-person” - he or she will
not receive a residence card, education, or any other facilities. In the
TAR 3,000 yuan (approximately $371) was charged to a Chinese urban couple
who had more than one child in 1992. Approximately $1000 was charged in
the same year to a Tibetan or Chinese without registration papers for the
area where they are living and who give birth to one child. These Tibetans
are sterilised in the TAR if they have a child out of plan unless they
return to the place where they are registered. Fines are also given as
punishment for failing to observe the correct interval between births,
which is three years.
Compared to Chinese women, who are generally only allowed one child, Tibetan
women can have two children or sometimes more if they live in the countryside.
However, we have to remember that for Tibetans, these rules are imposed
on them by foreigners. The average urban income in China is now three times
the average rural income, and hence the threat of a fine is a much stronger
use of force to a poor village woman than to a woman in a town.
A Tibetan who was a birth control supervisor in a rural area of eastern
Tibet reported that families with three or more children had to pay a fine
of 1800 yuan a year - a sum equivalent to the annual income of a well-paid
civil servant. Women had to seek permission from him to have a child, and
he recalled giving 95 such permits in a village of some 4000 people over
a period of nearly four years.
Fines imposed generally vary in different areas of Tibet according to the
maximum number of children allowed per family. All of the reports on fines
clearly contradict the Chinese government’s claim that no limit on the
number of children is imposed on Tibetan families.
A doctor from Gonghe, Amdo, told TIN that both Tibetan and Chinese government
employees were allowed one child and non-government workers were allowed
two. The doctor, who was 26 years old, when she was interviewed shortly
after her arrival in India in 1990, was a doctor of western medicine in
Gonghe, Qinghai prefecture. I’m going to read some of her testimony:
“Even when we were allowed to have two children we were not allowed to
have them any time we wanted. There is a waiting list for years and only
two children per department from the office per year can be born. We were
four or five in the department.
“In July 1984 I went to Hainan Civil Hospital in the Gonghe region, a hospital
where both western and Chinese medical sciences are practised together.
I find it hard to explain about the gynaecology and maternity sections.
It seems to most that those who come there are either expectant mothers
for delivery or to check up for gynaecological disease. But it is a painful
truth that they are there for neither purposes; they have come there (under
pressure) to undergo a surgical operation. Most of those who come there
are Tibetans from far-off areas. A number of them are there for sterilisation
and others for ‘yin chan’ [abortion]. All of them have come at the insistence
of the staff implementing Chinese birth control policies.
“When I wanted to have a child I had to go to my work unit, the Health
Department. I had to ask there at a certain desk. From there it went to
the main office, a higher authority, to get permission. In every work unit
or office there is such a desk. They will get permission from a main Birth
Planning Office. You are put on a waiting list for at least four and a
half years after you are married to get the pass for your first child.
“When we got married in 1984, I was 22. From a medical point of view, the
best time for giving birth to children is from 23 to 25. Thinking of the
well-being of ourselves as well as our undelivered child, we ran everywhere
and with our best effort eventually we were able to get a permit.
“I conceived a child in 1985 and delivered on March 10, 1986. My daughter’s
name is Dekyi Tsomo. We wished she had been born the previous year but
you could only give birth to a child after getting permission from the
office where you are working, and from the regional and the district offices
implementing the Government’s birth planning policies. It had taken 2 years
to get the pass. We had to bribe, pay money and use backdoor connections
to get the permission to have the child. All together we paid 300 yuan,
and had bought cigarettes and alcohol. Normally you need to wait 4-5 years
and do not have to pay, but there are people who have already waited for
more than 5 years because their turn has never come up. I know of cases
like that.
“When my daughter was three, we decided to have another child. But this
time, there was no way to get a birth permit. So all our family decided
to pay 1,700 yuan for a birth permit and we got it. The Chinese government
decreed that a fine must be paid by anyone who gives birth to an additional
child going against their birth control planning. Each regional office
decides the amount of money to be paid in such a case and in our Tsholho
region the fine was 1,700 yuan.
“On October 1988, the second child was conceived. My boss in the office
came to know about it after two months. Because of my vomiting it became
obvious. She would visit me almost everyday and used all means to try to
convince me to have an abortion. I did not listen to her at all and made
it clear to her that I would certainly give birth to my child. My Chinese
boss told me, ‘Go home and think well. Return to work after you have thought
well. You should do the abortion soon.’
“I simply let the time pass and after some time I went to see her. I told
her that I would like to have the child and would pay any amount of money
as a fine. She became furious and warned me, oing your way, do it. Paying
the fine is just a small matter. You will be punished by the Chairman.
From your salary you will be given only 30 per cent to live on and it will
never be increased. Your child’s name will not get registered. He or she
will therefore not be allowed to go to nursery or school. Both of you could
be dismissed from your jobs.
“We did not know that it was such a serious matter or that there were as
many regulations as my boss pointed out to me. We thought it would be alright
to pay the fine and that we could then have our child. Initially, I even
thought that she was simply frightening me. But later I learnt that there
were finalised documents on such matters which are circulated officials,
but were never announced to the public. Under such repressive condition,
I had no choice but to have an abortion.
“At that time the child in my womb was already two months and twenty-four
days old. With a few more days I could have already crossed the three-month
child abortion period. The best time for child abortion is between 45 to
50 days. But my child was already 84 days old so the only way to do an
abortion was through the ‘sbug ‘jog bu dbyung’ technique. It causes a lot
of bleeding and pain.
“First they insert a sort of flexible rubber tube with a pointed end into
the cervix. There is no medicine in this. They leave this inside for 24
hours. Because it stimulates the birth canal, which opens up slowly and
gives way to the flow of blood, a lot of bleeding starts after 2 hours.
After 1 day they take it out. It has become bigger inside so it is easier
for the knife to get inside. They insert an instrument that has a sort
of long handle with a knife at the end. They put this inside and start
to move it around, cutting the fetus in pieces. Then it is very easy to
extract.
“The foetus then has been reduced to many small pieces and is removed by
using a sort of compressor, with a pressure of around 200. The foetus is
sucked into a sort of container that is then thrown away. This method is
commonly used for abortion.
“There was no medical treatment afterwards. You have to leave immediately
after receiving this operation. You get 15 days off from work and miss
your allowances. You have to pay for the treatment, about 17 yuan, to the
hospital. You can stay for a night in the hospital but I went to my house.”
Birth control was introduced in the Tibet Autonomous Region in a gradual
way from the mid-1980s. It began in the towns and was applied firstly to
Tibetans working in the government. It was only in 1990 that it began to
be applied to Tibetans in the countryside, and then only in a small pilot
project.
In the eastern areas of Tibet outside the TAR, known traditionally as Kham
and Amdo or by the Chinese as western Sichuan and Qinghai, the policy appears
to have been applied aggressively at first and then for a while more moderately.
In some rural villages, women were forced to have abortions by the threat
of large fines. In some cases, they were also sterilised without their
knowledge, thinking they were having an abortion. Sometimes women were
physically dragged into vehicles to be taken to hospital, although these
tactics are not used in towns and cities, and especially not for people
in government offices. The threat of fines and other punishments in effect
made many abortions and sterilisations forced, even though the women are
not physically dragged away.
A 41-year old woman from Dargye in Ganze, eastern Tibet, said that the
Chinese authorities had appointed a woman in the village to see if anyone
had more than two or three children. If they did, they must either pay
the fine or have an abortion. If the woman did her job well, she would
receive a reward. Her presence in the village is an example of some of
the subtler, “grass roots” forms of control of the rural population in
Tibet.
The woman told TIN that: “If someone has more than three children that
woman, or man, will also be punished. They will not get any reward or promotion,
and the woman who gave birth will be punished. All the villagers are very
unhappy for the woman. They say that if they give birth to the children,
then they, the families, will look after the children and care for them.
So why should the government care? Why should they interfere in our lives?”
Anecdotal accounts of birth control in Tibet indicate that the number of
sterilisations and abortions in a particular area are dependent on the
approach of local cadres. In regions where officials carry out the policy
more stringently, there is evidence of greater numbers of abortions and
sterilisations, whereas some areas are less thorough in their implementation
of birth control, and families may have three or four children. It is not
known whether the strengthening of the grass roots organisations in Tibet,
announced in numerous speeches this year, will lead to a more thorough
application of the policies in local areas. The issue of population transfer
is quite rightly linked in the minds of many with birth control as two
of the most serious issues facing Tibetans today. Comrade Mao Tse Tung
referred to the desirability of populating Tibet further as far back as
1952, in his “Directive on Work in Tibet”. “Tibet covers a large area but
is thinly populated,” said the Great Helmsman. “Its population should be
increased from the present two or three million to five or six million,
and then to over 10 million.”
Today, more than 40 years later, Chinese people dominate commercial, social
and political life in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and outnumber Tibetans
in prefectures and counties outside the TAR, despite evidence from Chinese
statistics. (I enclose with this paper details of the population of Tibetan
prefectures given by the Chinese census).
Ragdi, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibetan Regional People’s
Congress, denied that any population transfer was taking place in Tibet
when he said that only those who “harbour ill intentions” hold the view
that officials from other parts of China sent to work in Tibet serve as
tools of the government to strengthen its rule over Tibet. Ragdi also declared
that the Chinese cadres who have been sent to Tibet are acting as a “bridge”
in economic co-operation between Tibet and other parts of China.
“Cadres from the hinterland have come to work in Tibet and enterprises
from the hinterland have operated and carried out co-operative projects
in Tibet,” Ragdi said during a meeting last December. “This has not only
promoted Tibet’s development and stability, but has also facilitated exchanges
and unity among nationalities.” Ragdi then quoted Deng Xiaopeng, who had
commented: “If the number of Han people in Tibet has grown a little bit
and helps the development of the local ethnic economy, then this is not
a bad thing.” Ragdi added: “If some people do not change their stance and
viewpoint, they are bound to be swept away by the torrents of Tibet’s development.”
In these comments, Ragdi was expressing the key elements of Chinese thinking
on the numbers of Chinese currently present in Tibet. The Chinese development
policy for Tibet is to improve the infrastructure, invest in industry,
encourage enterprise, and generally integrate the rural population in the
Chinese market economy. It aims to deal with Tibet as another province
of China. Chinese immigrants into Tibet generally share their government’s
view that they are there as “civilisers” and “developers”. The influx of
Chinese into Tibet also has the effect of marginalising and controlling
the Tibetan population - and hence in Chinese eyes, minimising dissent.
Although Ragdi denies that this is the case, control of Tibetans
is a key element of the thinking of government officials on population
transfer.
I’m going to give a brief history of the issue of population transfer following
the Communist take-over of China in 1949 to help us understand the present-day
context.
From 1950, the CCP began a programme of “socialist reconstruction” to repair
some of the damage caused by decades of warfare and to transform China
into a modern nation state. The focus of this programme was on industrialisation,
particularly across northern China, necessitating the migration of millions
of people from the populous Chinese provinces of the south and east to
the non-Chinese regions that formed the north and west of the PRC.
Between 1956 and 1960 Qinghai had a net in-migration of 610,000, while
Xinjiang saw a net in-migration of almost 760,000 people between 1954 and
’59.
In August 1957, Zhou Enlai made a key speech on the incorporation of non-Chinese
regions into this national plan. He announced: “Only when our fifty-odd
nationalities work closely together to achieve common progress will it
be possible for us to cast off poverty and backwardness and build a modern,
powerful socialist state. That is a task which the Han people are incapable
of accomplishing alone.” Zhou continued as follows: “In the Han-inhabited
regions there is not enough land available for reclamation, and underground
natural resources are not so abundant as elsewhere. Development of the
natural resources in areas populated by the fraternal minority nationalities
provides popular support for the nation’s industrialisation. However, these
natural resources have remained untapped for lack of labour power and technological
expertise. Without mutual assistance, especially assistance from the Han
people, the minority peoples will find it difficult to make significant
progress on their own.”
This speech indicates quite clearly that there were strategic, economic
and demographic reasons both for the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the
subsequent influx of population. With control of Tibet, the Chinese would
not only gain access to a range of previously untapped mineral resources
and secure their south- western borders, but they would also gain huge
new areas of sparsely populated land in which to settle the growing Chinese
population.
Between 1950 and 1959 the Chinese established control over all of Tibet,
lessening the impact by breaking up the country and incorporating large
areas into the neighbouring provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan.
The “rustication” programme from 1956 in China sought to transfer millions
of people from the urban areas of eastern China to the remote and sparsely-
populated regions in the north and west of the PRC. Since most of those
people were transferred into the “minority regions” of the PRC, this programme
also had the intention of integrating the minorities into the Chinese majority
and strengthening national defence in the border areas.
Some 600,000 people were sent down to Winghai, Gansu, Nignxia, Xinjiang
and Inner Mongolia during the first two years of the rustication campaign
and thousands more to Sichuan and Yunnan. Central Tibet saw its first influx
of Chinese cadres, receiving effusive welcomes, according to the following
extract form Guangming Daily in 1959: “When the youths supporting the frontier
areas arrived at the settlement area, crowds of Tibetan people welcomed
them in a manner in which they might celebrate their own festivals, helped
them carry luggage, obtain water and cook rice. After supper each day young
Tibetan men and women go to the Han youths, asking questions and teaching
them the Tibetan language and folk songs.”
Despite this idyllic portrayal, many Tibetans had little interest in teaching
Chinese in-comers Tibetan folk songs. The introduction of reforms in agriculture
has led to a widespread Tibetan revolt in Qinghai province that had just
been suppressed in 1958, to be followed several months later by the Lhasa
uprising in 1959.
The rustication system helped set up an alien economic system in Tibet
which had little connection with traditional practices and methods of production.
New Chinese towns were created in Tibet, including Golmud in Qinghai, dominating
the region economically. In a sense, the rustication campaign could be
regarded as having laid foundations for the influx of Chinese during 1980s
& ’90s.
The urbanisation that took place as an effect of the rustication campaign
was a precursor to the economic reforms that swept the country in the early
1980s under Deng Xiaopeng’s leadership. The ideological and political campaigns
of the Cultural Revolution were swept aside in the economic fervour unleashed
by the “Four Modernisations”; the reform of agriculture, the reform in
urban areas, the decentralisation of control over state-run enterprises
and reform of the price structure to reflect conditions in the emerging
market system.
Deng Xiaopeng’s “Spring Tide” campaign began in late January 1991 and initiated
campaigns throughout China to “deepen” and “speed up” economic reform.
Signs of the campaign first emerged in Tibet on 15 April 1992 when the
new Party boss Chen Kuiyuan announced that there would be accelerated reform
in Tibet. This was followed by statements in June that a special economic
zone would be established in Lhasa and that Tibet would be opened up to
the outside world.
Conservative or anti-Tibetan factions within the Tibetan leadership in
Tibet took advantage of the Spring Tide campaign to introduce high-speed
marketisation into Tibet, and to remove most vestiges of positive discrimination
in favour of Tibetans in trade, government appointments and other areas.
In April 1992, Tibetan government offices were instructed to build hundreds
of small retail shops for rent to petty traders; 5,000 new private businesses
emerged in Lhasa alone in 1993. The number of private businesses in the
TAR by the end of 1993 was 41,830, compared to 489 throughout the TAR in
1980. This increase acted as an incentive to Chinese entrepreneurs to move
to Tibet. Ten months later, in December 1992, checkposts on roads between
Chinese provinces and Tibet would be removed - which effectively meant
that Chinese entrepreneurs and casual labourers could move without hindrance
into Tibet.
A Western economist who was in Tibet at the time of the announcement that
Tibet was to be a special economic zone said that this policy meant abandonment
of the principle of training Tibetans to run a Tibetan-oriented development
policy. Instead the new policy means bringing Chinese in to develop the
economy. He also noted that the policy would serve to attract more Chinese
into the country.
This aim is clear if we analyse official statements of the time. A report
on Tibet TV in April 1992 stated that: “It is necessary to apply the central
authorities’ preferential policies creatively and to utilise their economic
benefits in conducting lateral cooperation at home and opening Tibet to
the outside world”. We can interpret the notion of “lateral co-operation”
as the acceptance of investment and workers from China. Some Chinese official
figures even show that the proportion of Tibetans in Qinghai dropped from
nearly 60% of the population in 1949 to 19.36% of the population in 1982,
33 years later. This drop was mainly due to the huge increase in Chinese
settlement in cities in the area, as urbanisation became an established
policy.
Those who favoured a more “Tibetanised” form of development and reform
were frequently criticised in statements such as the following: “At present
some comrades are fearful of making detours and are full of misgivings.
Being content with the existing state of affairs these comrades take a
wait and see attitude and follow the beaten path. Such ideas are ideological
obstacles to emancipating the mind and boldly accelerating the pace of
reform and opening”.
A statement given privately to TIN in the year Tibet became a special economic
zone indicated the concerns of Tibetan intellectuals on the new economic
policies: “When they talk of an open door policy for Tibet, it means two
doors, not one. There is a little door and a big door. The little door
opens to the outside world, and the big door opens to China. The big door
cannot open without the little one also opening.
“Up till now there have been quotas and controls and sanctions on the numbers
of Chinese coming to Tibet and on Chinese investment in Tibet. But now
with this new policy all these will be swept away. While there will be
some foreign investment, and this can be useful and beneficial, there will
be a huge flood of new Chinese investments and promoters. So this policy
is double-edged. The big door will outweigh the little door and Tibet is
more than ever in danger of being engulfed.”
The increase in the flow of Chinese to Tibet appears to contradict not
only the commitment given by Hu Yaobang in 1980 to withdraw Chinese cadres
from Tibet, but also Beijing’s official position on the sending of Chinese
in Tibet as expressed in 1985. This position was outlined in an official
textbook, Questions and Answers about China’s National Minorities, which
said: “The government is taking measures aimed at restricting the growth
of the Han population [in minority areas]. In the case of Tibet for example
the personnel sent there shall henceforth be confined to graduates from
institutions of higher learning and secondary technical schools, and specialised
professions, such as doctors, teachers, scientists and technicians.”
Since then, official Chinese statements have referred only to cadres or
specialised personnel and technicians, all of whom are going to Tibet to
“help”. In fact these people are only a small proportion of the Chinese
population in Tibet at any one time. A Xinhu article last month announced
that a second group of 637 officials had been chosen from across China
to replace the 621 inland officials sent there three years ago. “The officials
chosen from the inland areas have strengthened prefecture and county level
leadership in Tibet, promoted economic growth and social progress in Tibet
and enhanced ethnic unity,” according to Xinhua. The unofficial, unregistered
entrepreneurs and cheap labour population in Tibet today are of course
a far greater cause for concern than the groups of cadres from inland provinces.
Concerns about this influx of people were voiced soon after the economic
policies began to bite. A hand-printed poster produced by a Tibetan underground
group called the Unified Committee of the Three Provinces of Tibet said
in 1992: “Tibet belongs to Tibetans and the red Chinese are invaders. Nowadays
China is opening up the whole of Tibet on the pretext of economic development,
but in reality it is doing it in order to deny Tibetans rights and work
through the endless transfer of Chinese people to live here. It is clear
that this is to make it impossible for Tibetans to live in their own land.
For example, at the moment the Tibetans towns and the farming and pastoral
areas are teeming with Chinese; different Chinese military army personnel
are stationed along the borders and in every corner. In addition, anyone
who has eyes to see with can see houses for Chinese being constructed everywhere,
in great haste.”
This unofficial population is increased by the so-called “blind flow” or
floating population of several hundred million unskilled and skilled Chinese
drifting from rural areas to cities and towns in search of work throughout
China. The mechanisation of agriculture and general industrialisation has
made many of them surplus to requirements in China, and some are enticed
to Tibet by salaries that are higher than in mainland China and other incentives.
Projects like the controversial Panam Rural Integrated Development scheme
in the TAR will undoubtedly act as a focus for many of the unemployed workers.
With about 6 million Ecu worth of aid from the European Union (the budget
was confirmed just before this conference began), this project aims to
turn the western edge of the Lhasa-Shigatse-Tsetang triangle into the “bread
basket” and commercial and industrial heart of the autonomous region.
The Panam project might well have serious implications for population transfer
into Tibet - not necessarily in that it would require the immigration of
labour or that it would provide food for an increasing population, but
simply in that the rapid development envisaged by the scheme would probably
become a magnet for the floating population. The Panam project, which has
been criticised by Tibet Support groups in Europe and other NGOs, is similar
to other current Chinese efforts to raise funds abroad for the expansion
of agriculture.
The Chinese authorities now appear to accept that widespread migration
is an unavoidable consequence of their economic reforms. The “blind flow”
is set to remain a feature of modern Chinese society. However, the general
intention of the Chinese government is to prevent huge numbers of migrant
workers settling in urban areas - and so this floating population is encouraged
to move to the northern and western regions. Administration changes make
such migration easier.
In large cities like Beijing or Shanghai, migration is perceived as a grave
social and economic problem, and measures to limit the influx of the floating
population have been introduced. In Tibet, migration by Chinese into the
region is encouraged and welcomed with the pretext of enabling economic
development.
The economic and administrative reforms in Tibet had by the end of 1992
given people both the right to move around and also access to an expanding
road and rail network. In the new relaxed atmosphere, traders from outside
were able to move in and around in Tibet without restriction, and since
they were no longer dependent on the state for work, food, housing and
other services, with temporary residence status they were able to remain
as long as their business was successful.
The authorities have since begun to develop and promote preferential policies
to attract individuals to Tibet and enable them to set up private enterprises.
Since 1993, business licences have been available on provision of just
an identification card and a letter of recommendation from the appropriate
authorities, and the official media has reported a continued increase in
the number of individual and private enterprises in the region.
In the past four years, the government has also developed a framework for
increasing international trade through Tibet. In 1992, it was announced
for the first time that more than a third of the border counties in the
TAR were to be opened for international trade. The Hong Kong newspaper
Wen Wei Po reported that Tibet would “take advantage of its geographical
position” to open its borders further. There is a wide range of benefits
available for skilled personnel working in Tibet, mostly of a financial
nature - higher wages, hardship allowances for people living in a remote
mountain area, reduction of or exemption from some forms of taxation, improved
pension opportunities and so on. Chinese cadres and staff living in the
TAR are also eligible for better housing, improved access to educational
facilities, and longer periods of vacation and leave.
The following letter, written by Tibetans in Tibet and sent to TIN, gives
us an idea of the situation in Lhasa: “According to a population census
in 1990, 95% of the population is Tibetan and only 5% are non-Tibetans.
In this census however the Chinese have only included those Chinese who
work in offices and factories. They have not included military camps based
in Tibet, businessmen, builders, masons, miners, fishermen, butchers, tailors,
prostitutes, thieves and beggars.
“The Chinese have built shops in every street around Lhasa from north to
south, and east to west. In the Barkor market there are Chinese cobblers,
carpenters, tailors, butchers and grocers. Every trade is run by the Chinese.
It is only the incense stalls that are run by the Tibetans. Undertakers
are Tibetan. There is a vegetable market on the east side of the Potala
which is now filled with Chinese butchers and greengrocers. Only a few
Tibetans can be seen in around the Jokhang. Kungpo and Chamdo have virtually
become like Chinese towns.”
According to Ragdi, the 1990 population census included all persons living
in Tibet for more than six months. Chinese statistics on population do
not include the military (a recent Chinese statement said that there were
“less than 200,000 troops in the TAR”, but according to unofficial reports
there may be considerably more) and unregistered workers. The discovery
of a new mine, for instance, can lead to a massive influx of Chinese workers
into an area - in 1995, a Chinese report claimed that more than 10,000
miners had moved to the Nagchu area after the discovery of a large gold
vein in the region.
The framework of administration measures, such as the removal of checkpoints
into Tibet and the simplification of the registration system to enable
more migrants to settle, combined with material incentives such as higher
wages, all indicate official encouragement for Chinese settlers in Tibet.
When taken in the context of a general guideline that migration to Tibet
is a good thing for the People’s Republic of China as a whole, it is clear
that the Chinese authorities are directly and indirectly responsible for
population transfer to Tibet.
Both population transfer and birth control in Tibet are deliberate ways
by the Chinese authorities of controlling the Tibetan population. Although
there is not yet enough evidence for us to determine whether these policies
are genocidal in their intent, this does not in any way detract from the
violations of, for instance, birth control practices that are undoubtedly
carried out with the use of force.
While many Tibetan entrepreneurs have undeniably benefited from the economic
reforms and opening up of Tibet, the majority of Tibetans appear to be
suffering from Chinese encroachments on agricultural land and domination
of business and politics. The current strategy of development of Tibet
is to integrate the Tibetan economy into that of China’s - hence creating
opportunities for increasing numbers of Chinese settlers. This means that
the Tibet population is placed under the control of an administration that
is largely biased against them while facing further pressure from the influx
of Chinese into Tibet and repressive birth control measures.
(Back
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Professor Dawa Norbu
Jawaharlal
Nehru University
Friends,
thank you very much for the kind introduction which Lobsang Nyandak la
did for me. As a Tibetan academic I would like to say how glad I am to
see so many people from different parts of Asia, especially from South
East Asia. It is heartening at a time when the interest in and the support
for the Tibetan cause has been mostly active in the Western countries,
especially in the United States. It is really heartening for Tibet, which
is located in the heart of Asia, that Asian nations are taking or beginning
to take interest in the cause of Tibetan people. So I would like to say
especially thank you very much and in my own individual capacity as a Tibetan
academic, welcome to the Tibetan exile community.
Now, about my presentation. I’ll be really brief. I’ll tell you why. A
few days ago when Lobsang Nyandak asked me to make a brief presentation
on this occasion, I was in a fix because my area of specialisation is not
really human rights or international law. This is not because I consider
them unimportant or not valuable; that is far from it.
I am a writer and an academic and as such my own survival depends on democratic
rights, human rights, and academic freedom. I value them very much. But
I think the main reason is that I am absorbed in my trained areas of specialisation
and I get kind of carried away by my own professional training. I really
do not have much time, or I feel I can’t provide much competition, in the
area of human rights, with so many competent people, especially international
lawyers, interested in the area.
So what I decided was, as my obligation to the Tibetan community and to
this occasion, I have to say something. So I decided to do a close and
critical reading of the texts of the past three United Nations resolutions
on Tibet.
Now what really happens is - I don’t know what happens to you - I often
tend to treat resolutions as pieces of legal formalism. Not much content,
kind of a lot of platitudes and principles. But really what is important
when you think about the past three international resolutions on Tibet
- for example, now I agree the superpowers at that time had that necessary
power to make their views read - is that we must concede that behind the
scenes there are a lot of discussions within the UN, a lot of negotiations,
a lot of bargaining that goes on. And to that extent it is much more than
a piece of legal formalism. I mean it indicates a certain international
consensus, a certain epoque of world history on the subject of the Tibetan
question.
That is why I could not do any research into the human rights violations
or religion and repression and so on, but I decided to do some close and
critical reading of the UN resolutions on Tibet which might have some timely
message or connection with what we commonly advocate as human rights. In
that spirit I would like to do some reading.
As you know, United Nations resolutions were passed in 1959, 1961 and 1965.
Now what is so interesting about this is the certain assumption of human
rights that the UN resolutions envisage and the definition of human rights,
content of human rights and specification of what constitutes human rights
in the Tibetan context. This is I think a great corrective to the current
discourse on human rights especially pertaining to Tibet.
As to be expected, the legal basis of the three resolutions passed by the
United Nations is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially
in the 1959 resolution. Again in the 1961 text the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are referred to twice
in the course of the text. It also includes freedoms about which we will
talk later. Again in the 1965 resolution, it repeats human rights and fundamental
freedoms set forth in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights three times.
So we see that the legal basis on which the past resolutions were passed
were very much within that international legal framework of the United
Nations, namely, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. But I think that these are to be expected as these resolutions
were coming from the United Nations.
What is so interesting, at least from my point of view, is the notion of
human rights: what the United Nations resolutions at those times - right
from 1959 to 1965 - and “human rights” mean within the Tibetan context.
What does it mean? I would like to submit that if you read the three resolutions
closely and critically, they point out one fact which is very salient in
all of these resolutions: that human rights are co-terminous with freedom.
It seems to argue that without freedom there are no human rights. And without
human rights there is no freedom. In other words, human rights and freedom
are co-terminous, one cannot be separated from the other. This is the lesson
we will draw if we read closely the United Nations resolutions.
The phrase “human rights and freedoms” was repeated in the 1959 resolution,
1961 resolution and 1965 resolution. So one point is clear and anyone who
reads the resolutions will see this repeatedly occurring; that what the
United Nations resolutions meant when they say “human rights in Tibet”
is that human rights necessitate freedom. And in a state of freedom, human
rights flourish. And they see a close correlation between human rights
and freedom.
What do they mean by “freedom”? If they are equating human rights with
a state of freedom within the Tibetan context, then what sort of freedoms
- it is a plural that is used often in these resolutions - what do they
mean by “freedoms”? If you read the texts closely, you get some clues as
to what freedoms they are talking about within the Tibetan context.
The 1959 resolution talks about “seminal and religious liberty” and advocates
“autonomy which they traditionally enjoyed”. Again the 1959 resolution
talks about the definition of content of freedom in Tibet - “distinctive
cultural and religious life”.
In the 1961 resolution the same phrase occurs: “Distinctive cultural and
religious life which they have traditionally enjoyed”. The 1961 resolution,
as most people may be aware, includes a very important clause: the right
to self-determination. Mind you, in the right to self-determination they
did not add the controversial adjective “national” self-determination.
It said just self-determination. “Self-determination” was repeated twice
in the 1961 resolution.
So first of all, according to the United Nations resolutions, there is
a close correlation between human rights and freedoms. Secondly, I would
say, the resolutions give us clues as to what kind of freedoms we are talking
about, specifically referring to religious and cultural freedoms. They
also talk about the “autonomy which they traditionally enjoyed” and then
of course the 1961 resolution called for the right to self-determination.
These are some clues you get when you talk about the sort of freedom the
United Nations in those years was thinking about.
As for whether these resolutions are binding, or to what extent, this is
quite interesting. I mean to the extent they have been effective or not
so
effective. The 1959 resolution called for respect for the distinctive cultural
identities. It just called for “respect”, it didn’t call for action or
implementation of the resolution. The 1961 resolution urged the member
states to take actions to implement the resolutions - a much stronger phrase.
Then the 1965 resolution endeavoured to achieve resolution. In other words,
of the three resolutions, 1961 and 1965 seem to be much stronger, making
the resolutions binding on the member states and therefore urging the member
states to take concrete and serious action to implement them.
When you compare the three resolutions, I would say the 1959 and 1961 resolutions
are certainly important, especially the 1961 resolution in the sense that
for the first time in a UN document, the call for self-determination, the
right to self-determination, figures. The 1965 resolution was merely a
reminder of the two previous ones.
Now that is it basically, I mean it is a short one as I said. I would like
to have a discussion on these aspects of human rights, especially as reflected
in the UN resolutions. There are international lawyers, human rights activists
and human rights experts here and, as I said at the beginning, I’m no expert
in any of these areas. But what occurred to me while reading these resolutions
was really that most of the things have been done, not necessarily according
to what the United Nations resolutions recommended, but maybe what Amnesty
International thinks.
One of the major targets of human rights advocacy has been the political
prisoners. I am not saying they are not unimportant - they are - but when
you try to implement or publicise human rights as it results in the United
Nations resolutions, I think we need to go beyond the usual boundaries
of the human rights NGOs. They call for action for freedom in the way the
UN resolutions understand. So far most of the application and practices
have been confined to certain categories of people in Tibet, for example,
as I said, political prisoners, monks and nuns and so on. They are individuals,
they are human beings.
But what the UN resolution seems to suggest is that it is a collective
freedom that is envisaged. When you talk about human rights violations
in Tibet, they are violated not purely because they are human beings. Rather,
they are violated for the crime considered much more criminal than legal
crime - that is, on charges of treason. That they are not loyal to the
Chinese state. This indicates that it is not purely a normal human violation.
They involve group rights, group identities, group freedoms. And to that
extent, that is why I re-read the UN resolutions. And they are worth reading
in the sense that in the Tibetan context they criticised and condemned
human rights violations but at the same time they defined indirectly what
they mean by human rights.
And these human rights they understood to be co-terminous with freedom,
and the freedom they specified as relating directly or indirectly to cultural,
civil, social and religious freedoms that were denied Tibet. Especially
the 1959 and 1961 resolutions clearly indicate why the Dalai Lama ran away,
why the Tibetans ran away. Because they were denied the traditional freedoms
which they enjoyed. These are some of the things and, if that’s the case,
then I think we need to re-think about human rights in the Tibetan context.
Let me make a clarification at this stage. I have been writing about nationalism
and that sort of thing and people, especially in the west, think that this
guy is into some fascist trip or some kind of a collective trip that completely
denies and condemns human rights, individual rights. I can assure you that
if you know me individually and personally you will see that if there is
one person among the Tibetans who values individualism and democratic values,
I try to implement them. And as I said, as a writer and an academic my
survival depends on such freedoms. There is a distinction between what
I write and what I personally go by in my daily life.
To that extent, since this task is to re-read the UN resolutions, I would
like to propose that these resolutions seem to have understood some of
the dynamics, some of the realities of the Tibetan situation. They have
become all the more urgent, as Kate Saunders has indicated, and they boil
down to the Tibetan collective rights in the first place. Of course when
they achieve their collective rights and collective freedoms - it goes
without saying, as you ask any anthropologist - when the struggle for tribes’
survival is accomplished, then family and individual rights are also achieved.
And this kind of thing is not there.
The point is first things are first and the Tibetan survival depends on
Tibetan freedom, cultural identity, and human rights. These are the contents
of Tibetan human rights as understood by the United Nations resolutions.
If that is the case, then I want to provoke you into a discussion. Let’s
think about human rights in the Tibetan context, as reflected in the past
UN resolutions.
As you know, when you confine your human rights violations or abuses to
a certain category of people - who are very important human beings who
are locked up in prisons - their suffering and their problems are at the
same time part of a larger context. Without changing that structure, it
would not make much sense. Yes we can shout at the top of our voices or
the top of our roofs, either in east or west, but it won’t change. At the
same time, according to the human rights resolutions, they are not too
ambitious politically so as to threaten or scare the Chinese. They are
quite reasonable, as you saw them; they are fairly human and reasonable.
If that is the case, so far we have confined ourselves to certain categories
of Tibetans whose liberty is most seriously threatened, such as political
prisoners. Now, as I suggested, we need to re-think and move to another
framework, according to the UN resolutions, by which human rights are co-terminous
with Tibetan freedom and there cannot be one without the other. The two
are inseparable.
So let’s try to put both of these on the agenda, especially freedom,
and it is normally within the scope of the NGOs, as you know. If that is
the case, we need to move beyond the NGOs, not bypassing but possibly with
the constructive contributions and help of the NGOs, to raise this fundamental
question of Tibetan human rights and freedom at the world body where these
resolutions originated and were passed many years back.
What is the next step? I would like to suggest that it is worthwhile raising
the question of self-determination and reminding the United Nations of
its resolution in 1961.
There is a certain degree of consensus from the people who are concerned
about the Tibetan question. I’ll cite some. The International Commission
of Jurists’ report which came the end of last year talked about the right
to self- determination. Again, recently, the Tibetan Parliamentary and
Policy Research Institute in Delhi, which is sponsored by a German NGO,
came out with a thick book talking about the right to self-determination.
And among these if I might include my own contribution, I have done one
piece called “Self-Determination in Post-Soviet Era: The Case Study of
Tibet”.
Apart from that, I would say that the current post-communist context provides
the right opportunity to raise the question of self-determination within
the Marxist-Leninist framework where a lot of changes have taken place.
Since 1986 up to 1991, something like 29 or 30 nations or nationalities
which were subjugated and made part of the soviet empire have obtained
their independence on the basis of referendums, plebiscites and self-determination.
Tibet is occupied by a Communist State in the name of ideology, progress
and revolution. But as I said, red star has turned yellow star now. There
is no longer revolution, no longer ideology and if they continue to rule,
dominate and exploit the Tibetan people in these hallowed ideological names,
they will not be tolerated by the international community. Regarding Communist
revolution, the ideological justification are invalid in the case of Tibet
since 1986 or 1991. And if that is the case there is a case for self-determination
within a communist framework.
If you go by the UN resolutions, it says just | 