Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy

Publications

Racial Discrimination in Tibet (2000)

Discrimination in Public Representation

The Role of Tibetan Cadres

The term "cadre", according to the TIN Directory of Leaders in Tibet , refers to "any person with a responsible position in the government administration or the Party, whether or not they are Party members", as well as a large number working on official projects or in state enterprises who are not immediately involved in political institutions. According to a Xinhua news report, there were more than 50,000 "ethnic minority cadres" in the Tibet Autonomous Region as of the end of 1998, which is claimed to be 74.9% of the total regional number. However, only a tiny proportion of these are what the Chinese call "leading cadres" - those that occupy senior positions and that have any substantial authority. Recent statistics are as yet unavailable, but as a guideline it may be observed that of the 23,295 cadres present in the "TAR" in 1991, only 1,069 were "leading cadres". The figure of 74.9% quoted for the end of 1998 should not therefore be interpreted in terms of a Tibetan administrative majority, as the Chinese would have us conclude.

It must also be considered that the appointment of Tibetans to government positions is a highly selective process resulting more often than not in officials who are politically "pure" and loyal to the policies of the Communist Party. In February 1999 a new campaign was launched in the "TAR" with the specific stated intention of "enhancing the [cadres"] overall quality, particularly the[ir] ideological and political quality." The campaign focused explicitly on "separatist tendencies connected with the Dalai Lama clique", and stressed that cadres are required to take a positive stand on the economic reform and "opening up" policies encouraging the massive influx of Chinese settlers into Tibet.

In February 2000, exactly one year later, new restrictions were imposed on the relatives of cadres working in Nyemo County, Lhasa Municipality, in order "to strengthen the image of Tibetan officials and their reputation in the government offices of the PRC". All monks and nuns related to the governmental Tibetan officials in the area were thus instructed by the authorities to remove themselves from religious institutions. Those who refused instantly terminated the position of their relative working in the government, irrespective of his/her position in office. It is not yet known exactly how many monks and nuns were forced to change their lives because of these restrictions, or if this rule is currently in force in other counties in Tibet.

These reforms and restrictions are the latest in a long line of campaigns designed to inculcate Tibetan cadres into loyalty to the motherland. Previous campaigns have included the inspection of cadres" homes for pictures of the Dalai Lama and other religious articles, and the requirement to withdraw their children from Tibetan schools in India. Many Tibetan cadres have also reported the existence of Chinese "watchers" called "liaison officers" in their place of work whose role is to scrutinise and authorise all of their decisions. It is they, not the Tibetan cadres, who have the ultimate power.

One cadre, who worked in the District Office in Lhasa for over a decade before his escape to India in 1992, had this to say about his responsibilities. "The head of the District Office in Lhasa during my time - the person who had the real political power - was a Chinese addressed as Rhuchi (Zhushi). There were four administrative officers (Ching Li) in the District Office, the highest ranking of whom was a Tibetan. However, such power as there was in such a position lay with the Chinese officers. Suggestions about whether Tibetans would like our products, which had a strong propaganda value), were not accepted under any circumstances, whatever the rank of the person. Orders concerning their content came direct from Beijing and could not be questioned. Even supporting a Tibetan in a political argument with a Chinese could result in him being handed over to the police" the office will take no responsibility for him. He will then be "black-listed" in the office, and if it was a serious political mistake he would be put under surveillance at all times, including while at work.

Tsering Wangchuk was a reporter with Radio Lhasa for five years and found that the real responsibility and power of his position lay in the hands of his Chinese editor. "A few thousand people are employed by Radio Lhasa, with about 60 Tibetans working as translators, reporters and announcers. There were three Chief Editors, all of whom were Chinese and it was with them that the real power lay. I was allocated a geographical area to cover, but had explicit written instructions of 'dos and don'ts'. Reports must not contain anything insulting to communism, and must depict the Chinese as having brought wealth and happiness to Tibet. I could not write about unpleasant things such as crimes, demonstrations, fires, etc. as these reports would be regarded as 'mistakes'. If a 'political' mistake was found, then the reporter would be expelled from the office and would face prison. However, it was rare for reporters to make these mistakes, as they were constantly monitored by the Chinese while at work."

One senior Tibetan cadre worked in an office concerned with tourist development in his part of Tibet before his escape to India. "I was appointed to my position on the condition that I became a Communist Party member, which I did. As well as Tibetans in my department there were also many Chinese 'liaison officers' brought in to check and screen all of our decisions. All decisions of any significance, including all funding decisions, the use of all resources and all matters with a political content, significance or connection, are made by these Chinese officers. A large number of ex-officers from the People's Liberation Army were also recently placed in managerial positions, further intensifying this intimidation."


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