Publications

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Behind Bars: Prison Conditions in Tibet (1998)

Impoverishing Tibetans

II. Poverty in Tibet

China has signalled that the Year 2000 is a target date for the eradication of poverty in Tibet and in China. A recent article in the China Daily, quoted Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao reiterating this claim and reveals the government's focus when it talks of poverty eradication. The Vice-Premier urged that the focus be "placed on poverty relief in areas in need of major capital construction projects, including transport and water conservancy infrastructure." ³⁹ This, while necessary, reveals the pre-occupation within the Chinese government's central planning agencies with big developmental statements (rather than sustained and sustainable development involving local participation, skills and reflecting local priorities): highways, urban housing and big hotels, dams, mines and factories. China is confident of achieving its aims, and claims in its latest human rights white paper that 95 per cent of rural people had enough to eat and wear and that the targets "to solve the problems of food and clothing of the entire Chinese people and to enable them to live a relatively comfortable life _ have already been basically achieved." ⁴⁰

In its plan to eradicate poverty in Tibet, China has focussed heavily on income generation in certain areas of the Tibetan plateau, hoping that a rise in income statistics, taken out of the context of the many other possible indicators of poverty such as health, education, nutrition, clothing, housing, quality of life, access to the right to development and so on, will show that poverty has been eradicated. However, many areas within Tibet remain neglected and as we shall see there are important questions to be asked in terms of access to the development and wealth generation that is occurring in Tibet. Gabriel Lafitte has identified Tibet as a "land of centres and peripheries a patchwork of development and underdevelopment," and the inequalities that mark colonial economies can be increasingly discerned within the Tibetan economic environment. ⁴¹ The development that does occur is large scale and often out of step with the traditional economy and local communities.

China's claims about poverty are cash-based, but even if we examine the latest Chinese statistics on income, there are marked disparities between urban and rural areas (where the majority of Tibetans live), and real questions to be asked of the means of calculating such figures. Chinese figures state that in 1998 the average per capita income of rural Tibetans in the "Tibetan Autonomous Region" was 1158 yuan, while the average urban income in TAR was 5400 yuan per year. ⁴² These statistics can be compared with those for China as a whole. The average annual income per rural resident in China was 2162 yuan in 1998, almost double that in TAR for the same period, while the average annual income per urban Chinese resident was an equivalent 5425 yuan in 1998. ⁴³ This equivalence fits into China's strategy to focus on urban areas in Tibet. China claims that this leaves only 110 000 poor people in TAR, but as we can see the rural figure in itself leaves rural Tibetans in TAR earning nearly half the "one dollar per person per day" global measure for the poverty line if we are to use the official exchange rate of roughly one US dollar to 8 yuan. This measure in itself often underestimates the real extent of poverty and generally we can see that a narrow focus on income without looking at issues such as access to health or education, the nature of subsistence production, the gap between official income statistics and actual consumption, and more detailed surveys of standard of living in Tibetan areas, will not give a clear or accurate picture of the level of poverty in its many senses. ⁴⁴

It is often difficult to find realistic statistics for Tibetans living in areas outside of TAR such as those living in Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces (Amdo and Kham). However, there are also indications that the inequalities developing in Tibet go beyond the urban/rural divide. Qinghai is relatively more developed than other areas as a whole and in 1998 the per capita income of farmers in Qinghai rose to 1347 yuan with that of herdsmen at 2300 yuan. ⁴⁵ These figures still fall well below acceptable rates but begin to reflect regional inequalities. ⁴⁶

The Chinese government's claims that Tibetans have benefited greatly from their policies regarding poverty can also be tackled on their own terms. Even if one were to rely on Chinese statistics themselves there is an indication that over 70% of the people living in the Tibet Autonomous Region are below the poverty line. ⁴⁷ These figures are also confirmed by refugee reports which indicate that many people face problems with food shortages, access to health care, education, and in other areas such as employment and housing.

Despite China's claims, and its successes in alleviation of poverty and hunger elsewhere in mainland China, there are many indications that in Tibetan areas poverty and basic subsistence issues dominate the daily structure of life. In December 1997 the International Commission of Jurists argued that in the 1990s, "nearly all Tibetans continue to exist at subsistence level, their lives little touched by China's massive investment in Tibetan infrastructure and superstructure." ⁴⁸ As we enter a new decade there is little evidence to suggest that this situation has changed, and heavy taxation and rural/urban divides in terms of access to development, continue to mean that poverty is a present concern for many Tibetans. While the total household spending in rural TAR (where 90% of Tibetans live) is 564 yuan per capita ⁴⁹ (78% below the global poverty line), the per capita income for TAR's urban areas (where almost all Chinese settlers live) is 5036 yuan, or ten times as much, and is growing at twice the rate. ⁵⁰ Tibetans spend just 15.4% of the rural Chinese average on health care, 7.7% of that of their Chinese counterparts on education, culture and recreation, 54.9% of rural Chinese spending on food and only 39.1% of that spent by rural Chinese on housing. ⁵¹ These figures consistently rise for Qinghai (Amdo) and again for Sichuan, ⁵² where the percentage of the Tibetan population decreases. Further, due to huge PRC subsidies and incentives, Lhasa is the highest waged city in all of China, ⁵³ an incredible fact given Tibet's overall deprivation, while it simultaneously contains large numbers of desperately poor Tibetans.

What then do these statistics mean for the lives of Tibetan people? What do they mean for their socio economic rights, and what do they mean when we contrast them with the official claims of the Chinese government? The categories of discussion in the following section are based around key indicators in examining standard of living, subsistence issues, and the right to development. The focus in part follows the categories enumerated under Article 8 of Declaration on the Right to Development which establishes the following guidelines and areas of focus:

"States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution in income. Effective measures should be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process. Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all social injustices." ⁵⁴ (emphasis added)