Impoverishing Tibetans
Although there is continuing debate about ways in which
the right to development can be realised, there is now
no real doubt as to its existence as a key human right.
The mystery this right still evokes relates to its
interdisciplinary nature and broad ranging scope, though
neither should act to impede its progress.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
recently commented that the right to development is
"all encompassing [and] demands the realization of all
human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and
social." This at first makes the right appear too general
and non-substantive, but as subsequent sections shall
illustrate, the Declaration on the Right to Development
in 1986
6
clarifies the scope and content of the right clearly and
unambiguously. The broader, integrative character of the
right to development derives in part from its relationship
with development as a concept. Indeed "development" is
defined by the UNDP in similar terms: "Development is a
comprehensive process directed towards the full realization
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms."
7
Though this relationship is critical, it is also
pertinent to consider the right to development as a
human right in and of itself. Mary Robinson, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, charts the beginning
of recognition of the right to development as a human
right with the formulation and subsequent ratification
and adoption of the International Bill of Human Rights,
comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the two International Covenants on Human Rights.
In 1977 the Commission on Human Rights requested that the
Secretary-General of the United Nations undertake a study
on the right to development. This process led to the UN
General Assembly adopting the Declaration on the Right
to Development in 1986 which made absolutely clear that
the right to development was a human right (Article 1).
This was re-emphasised
in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action at the UN
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. The
Vienna Declaration further recognised and established,
"... the
right to development, as established in the Declaration on
the Right to Development, as a universal and inalienable
right and an integral part of fundamental human rights."
Following this the UN High Commissioner has been given a
mandate by the UN General Assembly to "promote and protect
the realisation of the right to development and to enhance
support from relevant bodies of the United Nations system
for this purpose." There is also an independent expert on
the right to development, appointed by the UN Commission on
Human Rights, who works in conjunction with the Working
Group on the Right to Development.
8
Even before the adoption of the Declaration on the Right to
Development in 1986, the right was implicit in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Following the Vienna Declaration, the right to development
has been subsequently reinforced and further recognised at
the International Conference on Population and Development
(Cairo) [see Principle 3 of the Cairo Programme of Action],
the World Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen)
[Commitment 1(n) of the Copenhagen Declaration], and at the
Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing)[Article 213 of
the Beijing Platform of Action]. Following such
confirmation, "there is no doubt that the right to
development is not a mere pipe dream or ideological slogan.
It is a human right guaranteed by international law."
9
The concept of development is as we shall see hotly
contested. For some it means pure economic growth with
little synergy with human rights, for others it is the
bedrock upon which civil and political rights can later
be nurtured, for others again it is seen as a specific
right under international human rights law. This paper
will consider the concept of "development" in its various
meanings, while arguing that increasingly it has come
to mean a specific set of rights as articulated under
international law, especially following the emergence
of the Declaration of the Right to Development in 1986.
Development is closely tied to the whole family of
economic, social and cultural rights and as such this paper
shall focus on questions such as the level of poverty in
Tibet and the level of enjoyment of subsistence rights
in Tibet. While referring to legal instruments and
specific rights as enumerated under international law,
it is intended that this paper also focus on the ways in
which development impacts upon Tibetans living in Tibet,
rather than becoming lost in legal argument.
The Right to Development is itself undergoing development;
this paper hopes to give voice to a variety of Tibetan
concerns and realities to contribute to this evolution
and encourage a more representative and fuller debate.
It is true that some have benefited from development under
China, but it is important to look at who is benefiting
and why. Development is in itself not a wholly bad thing,
and although there are legitimate social, environmental and
cultural concerns relating to its unchecked practice in
Tibet, this paper argues for greater Tibetan involvement
in and benefit from development. At present much of the
development and economic growth in Tibet involves imposing
a Chinese conception of development over the region while
funneling the benefits to the minority of urban dwellers,
many of whom are Chinese settlers or administrators and
security forces, or to fuel the rapid growth of Eastern
mainland China. The great majority of Tibetans are not
being given the chance to participate in the changes that
are taking place, although this is not to say that Tibetan
resistance or participation is non-existent.
While development may have meant the building of hospitals,
mines, hydro-electric power projects, schools, highways
and new Chinese housing (in some bigger cities); issues of
access to any flow on improvements in standard of living,
as well as substantive evaluation of what has been gained
as balanced against what has
been lost, must be foremost in any critical evaluation of
development in Tibet. Above all development rights are
about participation. The Declaration begins with the
recognition that:
"development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural
and political process, which aims at the constant
improvement of the wellbeing of the entire population and of
all individuals
on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom."
10
(emphasis added)
While various aspects of the right to development find their
specific articulation as socio-economic rights in the
classic texts of international law such as UDHR and ICESCR,
it is with the 1986 Declaration of the Right to Development
that we see a clear emergence of the twin discourse of self
determination and development.
The distinctiveness of the right to development lies in the
fact that it synthesizes pre-existing human rights that have
already found consensus in international law. The right is
premised on fundamental principles which are already binding
on all states as customary international law; the UN
charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International covenants. It also expressly implements the
UN goals to remove obstacles to human rights enjoyment.
An examination of the declaration reveals that the
declaration refers to individuals, peoples and states as
beneficiaries of development even though it does not clearly
define the right holder. It has been argued that
"[I]t is
analogous to the right of peoples to self determination, the
benefits and power to make a claim thus flow to a group."
11
Thus the Tibetan people have a claim as a collective body of
the violation of their right to development. Through the
analysis in the later chapters on the socio-economic
conditions of the Tibetan people it is evident that the
denial of their socio-economic as well as civil and
political rights arise as a direct result of state policies.
By invoking the Declaration of the Right to Development,
restrictions can be placed upon the state’s exercise of its
duties and, therefore its right to administer development
policy in two ways:
-
by mandating the participation, consultation, and benefit
of the people as right bearers
-
by requiring development of a synthesis of economic,
social, political and cultural rights.
To fulfil its duty a state necessarily has to take into
account the wellbeing and constant improvement of the
entire population and of all individuals, on the basis
of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits
arising therefrom. The Declaration also demands that
states should encourage popular participation in all
spheres of development.
12
The requirement of distribution of benefits is
re-emphasized by the duty to "ensure equality of opportunity for all
in their access to basic resources such as education, health,
services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of
income."
13
States not only have to implement the social, economic,
cultural and political development of peoples, but must
also do this in a democratic manner ensuring that the
people are part of the decision making process. The
importance of the rights enumerated in the Declaration
rests on the fact that it reconciles the largely false
divide often forced between civil and political rights on
the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on
the other. It expressly recognises the indivisibility of
all human rights.
14
In recent years the international community has moved
closer to an engagement approach with China on human
rights and development, rather than a punitive approach.
The possible benefits of this new turn are that it
includes China in an ongoing human rights dialogue and
might encourage China to participate in the reporting
requirements attached to the mainstream international
human rights framework. To this end China recently
signed the ICCPR and ICESCR. The politics of development,
international trade and aid,
are all wound up with this new approach.
However, it remains to be seen whether the premise of
attaching human rights with development will materialise as
an improvement in the human rights situation in Tibet.
In fact, serious questions must be asked of the sincerity of
the changes mooted. For one, China has yet to ratify the
two human rights covenants it has signed. Secondly, there
are signs that business and trade will again be put ahead of
human rights by companies and institutions dealing with
China. Human Rights Watch report that:
"Human rights
concerns dropped even lower on the agenda of China's major
trading partners in 1999 as Beijing used the Belgrade
embassy bombing to create a crisis in its overseas
relations."
15
Human Rights Watch also noted that some of
the forums created to encourage dialogue on human rights
were fairly unproductive. In 1999,
"Germany hosted an E.U.-China dialogue in Berlin on
human rights focused on China’s relationship to various
U.N. human rights mechanisms, the recent crackdown on
political activists, and Tibet. NGOs were invited
to attend part of the meeting, but most declined to
participate. There was no public report on the results
of the dialogue."
16
The controversy
surrounding the World Bank's Western Poverty Reduction
Project in Tibet further illustrated that international
financial institutions, foreign governments and companies
all have a stake in the development that will occur in Tibet
and can also fail to integrate their activities within a
framework of human rights protection and ethical business
practices.
China, along with some other developing Asian countries, has
echoed its hesitancy about mainstream human rights in a
number of different ways.
17
Firstly there is the argument
that human rights are individualistic and clash with the
"primacy of the community" in Asia. Secondly, the
argument proceeds that human rights are primarily civil and
political and of secondary importance in an underdeveloped
economy. Thirdly, it is contended that human rights are
divisive and threaten political stability and the national
interest. But Yash Ghai and others have countered that such
arguments voice elite, governmental concerns and blur the
actual dynamism and diversity inherent in "national"
cultures. It is also countered that
when communitarian concerns are raised to dilute human
rights concerns, the conception of "community" is usually a static,
state-centric community. Whereas, to many observers, "The
contemporary State intolerance of opposition is inconsistent with
traditional communal values and processes" In the case of Tibet and
China, of course, there are competing conceptions of Statehood in the
first place.
18
In its latest white paper on human rights the Chinese
government has yet again made an argument for a different
path for China, claiming that: "To promote human rights
in such a country, China cannot copy the mode of human
rights development of the developed Western countries,
nor can it copy the methods of other developing countries.
China can only start from its own reality and explore a
road with its own characterisitics."
19
But this approach must be critically examined.
Increasingly international legal scholars such as Jack
Donnelly are convincingly arguing that globalisation and
the commodification of culture has lead to some negation
of the cultural relativism argument advanced to oppose
human rights, in any case. Donnelly notes that, "Leaders
sing the praises of traditional communities _ while they
wield arbitrary power antithetical to traditional values,
pursue development policies that systematically undermine
traditional communities, and replace traditional leaders
with corrupt cronies and party hacks. Such cynical
manipulation of tradition occurs everywhere."
20
Indeed the next section shall explore the various claims
made by China in terms of its development and human rights
strategies.
Amartya Sen has also critiqued the presentation of a
homogenous set of "Asian" values that is said to conflict
with a Western, universalist conception of human rights
and development.
21
He has put forward an engaging and influential thesis
of development as freedom. However, Sen is also keen to
emphasise that "freedom is an inherently diverse concept",
which moves his conception of development towards more
substantive territory than the narrower, teleological
vision of development as national metaphor for progress,
strength and unity which China has put forward.
22
In this way we can begin to see the process of development
and even the right to development itself as wound up
with freedoms. This current
trend shifts the focus in examination of development from
the means to the ends, conceptualising development as
"a process of expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy."
23
This conception of development is particularly
powerful in the case of Tibet, where as we shall see the
non-participation of Tibetans in the processes of
development and their lack of basic freedoms has led to an
inertia in the state of development in Tibet and a
disintegration in the Tibetan people's quality of life.
Critically by viewing development as freedom we can begin to
see freedoms as not only the ends of development, but also
"among its principal means".
24
Sen's thesis has real
resonance when applied to the case of Tibet and he argues:
"Development requires the removal of the major sources of
unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation,
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over
activity of repressive states."
25
The latest formulation of China's human rights strategy
with its focus on development and subsistence was released
early this year:
"The characteristics of this road are, in terms of the
basic orientation of developing human rights, that we stick
to the principle of developing the productive forces and
promoting common prosperity, based on the improvement of the
living standards of the entire people and promoting the
human rights of the entire people; in terms of the order of
priority, the top priority is given to the rights to
subsistence and development, while taking into consideration
the people's political, economic, social and cultural
rights and the overall development of individual and
collective rights; in terms of the methods of promoting and
guaranteeing human rights, we stress that stability is the
prerequisite, development is the key, reform is the motive
power, and government according to law is the guarantee."
26
(emphasis added)
In fact "development" has become a metaphor for the Chinese
official, linear view of the history of their involvement
in Tibet since the 1950s. We are presented with an
"old" pre-communist Tibet and China which approximate
rhetorically with the dark ages. From this point endless
comparisons are made with "new" China and "new" Tibet.
The 50 years since Communist control in China are presented
as an enormous time of growth and alleviation of suffering,
and this discursive framework is also applied to Chinese
activities in Tibet.
27
According to this view, while there have been difficulties
and hardships, things are getting better all the time,
and development is the touchstone for such improvements
in people's lives.
28
China's focus on the right to development has been
a constant in its human rights strategies. This is
one reason why a discussion of the realisation of the
right to development in Tibet is timely and necessary.
China's focus on development can be traced back through
various white papers to the landmark white paper in 1991
which states that:
"China pays close attention to the issue of the right
to development. China believes that as history develops, the
concept and connotation of human rights also develop
constantly To the people in the developing countries,
the most urgent human rights are the right to subsistence
and the right to economic, social and cultural development.
Therefore, attention should first be given to the right
to development" (emphasis added)
29
However, from 1991 through to recent claims about human
rights the Chinese government has continued to assert
state sovereignty and domestic law, while marginalising
international law. In discussing the 1991 landmark
Chinese White Paper on Human Rights, Kent argues: "The
achievements it claimed in economic and social rights
were more descriptive of the Maoist past than of the real
economic and social issues with which China was currently
grappling."
30
The tone of these papers is more defensive
than creative or engaged. Real questions must be asked of
whether China's human rights talk is more bound up with creating
a progressive mythology of Chinese communist history, rather
than facing the realities of life in Tibet.
The Chinese government makes constant claims about the
improvements that have been made in terms of development in
Tibet. But if we look closely at some of these claims we
can begin to see the elements to China's development
strategy. Firstly, it is clear that the claims for success
are reliant upon figures which are themselves heavily
reliant on the artificial boosting of large Central
government subsidies. These figures do not reveal a healthy
economy, but rather one that is entirely reliant on outside
sources, a classic pattern of control. A recent article in
the Chinese press illustrates both the extent of the
subsidies and the ways in which the government and media are
luring Chinese migrants into Tibet:
"Thanks to the one-billion-yuan subsidies from the central
government, Lhasa's economy grew 16 percent last year. The
figure for Tibet was 10 percent, higher than the 7.8 percent
national growth rate. 'There are opportunities for
everyone', said Pincuo Lewang who is an employee of a
state-owned transport company by day, and a taxi driver by
night. He is saving money for his wedding and says that
life has never been better. Beijing hopes the market
economy will further integrate Tibet with the rest of the
country, and ease the tension created by the separatist
activities in the region."
31
The example given is someone who works in a state-owned
transport company revealing the emphasis on state-owned
enterprises, but critically the theme of development as a
sop to Tibetan nationalism, and a means to solve the
"separatist activities" emerges. Elsewhere the Chinese
government has been even more blatant about its hopes of
using economic growth and development to quell Tibetan
resistance. Most recently Hu Jintao, member of the CCP
Central Standing Committee Political Bureau Standing
Committee and vice-president, made the following comments on
Tibet to NPC Deputies from Tibet:
"The continuous
development of Tibet's economic construction and other
social undertakings and the achievements attained in recent
years are inseparable from our efforts to maintain social
stability." (emphasis added)
32
However, pessimism about the level of development that has
actually occurred in Tibet can also be detected in the
Chinese media,
and in various government statements. Given that China has
had 50 years to develop Tibet, it really has not matched
its claims with any marked improvements and so another
strain to the government rhetoric is a discriminatory
categorisation of Tibet as backward and lacking in
potential, needy and dependent.
33
Such themes can be read as Chinese admission of failure
in critical areas. In a recent interview Chen Kuiyuan,
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Committee of
"TAR", made the following comments about development and
the Western Development plans:
"Generally speaking, Tibet is a region yet to be developed,
on this stretch of land which accounts for one-eighth of
the national total area, most of the resources above- and
under-ground have not been tapped and utilized Tibet's
shortages stem from the low level of economic development,
the lack of talents and the lagging of infrastructure
construction."
34
Behind the discrimination of the final statement can be
seen the failure of Chinese development policy and its
dogged reliance on large scale infrastructure projects
which fail to deliver even the most basic infrastructure
to large swathes of remote Tibet. Despite claims of
kilometres of highways built, a big issue in the Tibetan
economy, along with unemployment, underemployment and the
unreformed state-owned enterprises, is that there is no
local transport infrastructure for a great many nomads and
farmers at the village and town level. In fact, Tsewang
Phuntso writes that there was no public transport system
at all in Tibet until the 1980s and that the strategic
roads built by the Chinese from the 1950s onwards "had
little economic value for the Tibetans until [the ] 1980s,
as they were used exclusively for military purposes."
35
This focus on military objectives in planning basic road
infrastructure has led to Tibetan farmers and nomads
often being unable to achieve real market prices for
their goods and having to sell to the government or to
a small number of traders. This hampers a significant
sector in the Tibetan economy.
Chinese sources also reveal other significant problems
in the Tibetan economy. The 1996 TAR budget report
revealed fiscal indiscipline, and a continuing deficit in
the region. Causes listed
included the admission that
"In financial resources, total
supply and total demand have not been balanced for a long
time"
and that,
"Loose financial management, lax budgetary
restraints, and extravagance and waste existed in varying
degrees, which were also causes for a financial deficit,
causes which are not to be neglected."
36
This has led to pressures within Tibetan areas to raise
domestic funds by increasing taxation collection, which
as we shall later see has led to increasing hardship for
Tibetans. The report on the "TAR" 1996 budget revealed
that due to the revenue issues, "Tax departments across
the region went all out to collect and manage taxes
and collected a total of 380.17 million yuan of various
taxes ..."
37
There are also indications of a cover up of the real
situation in Tibet, both in terms of the economy, social
conditions and the eradication of poverty. Gyalcian Norbu,
Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's
government, reported the following in 1997: "We should do
away with the unhealthy trends of boasting and exaggeration
and hiding the truth from higher levels in the work of
aiding the poor."
38
[ Next:
II. Poverty in Tibet ]
[ Contents ]
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