Publications

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Annual Report 2001

Political Freedoms

Beijing swiftly exercised this new tool of repression when several hundred Tibetans were detained in the “TAR” in November.⁴ Western diplomats in Beijing are commenting on the significant increase in People’s Armed Police (PAP) personnel and troops in major cities in Tibet. To date it is not clear how long the Tibetans detained in Lhasa and other cities will be held. But quite evidently, the “splittist” crackdown is a strategy Beijing has employed to join the anti-terror bandwagon.⁵

Almost two weeks after the NPC meeting, High Commissioner Mary Robinson paid a two-day visit to the PRC. She publicly and firmly warned China against using the American-led campaign against terrorism as a pretext to suppress ethnic minority groups, while also expressing concern about the situation in Tibet. Mrs Robinson said it was difficult to see how a balance between anti-terrorism and anti-discrimination action could be struck because terrorism itself is not defined.⁶ A political analyst maintains that this leaves the definition open to manipulation to suit a country’s political agenda as witnessed by China’s new classification of so-called “splittists” in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as the Falun Gong, as “terrorist organisations”.⁷

Several international events have reinforced Beijing’s confidence in its global image and role. Despite scrutiny at this year’s United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the Chinese government managed once more to evade censorship. Success in winning its bid to host the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 was followed by China’s long-awaited entry to the World Trade Organisation.

The Chinese authorities are currently employing all the procedures available to them to crush any Tibetan resistance to their rule. The re-launch of the “Strike Hard” Campaign in April 2001, extending for a period of two years, has had instant implications in Tibet. ⁸ When Beijing unleashed the “Strike Hard” Campaign in the “TAR” in April 1996, the first priority was given to “crimes that endanger state security”. ⁹

According to Shen Liang, vice president of the Higher People’s Court of “TAR”, safeguarding social stability was their bounden duty.¹⁰ Under “Strike Hard” any signs of reverence for the exiled Dalai Lama are interpreted as equating to “endangering state security” or “affecting stability and unity of the motherland”. The State therefore is employing various comprehensive strategies to strengthen its denunciation campaign of the Dalai Lama and the exile government. For the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama is a political anathema. A large proportion of current arrests and detentions have a direct or indirect link to the issue of loyalty to the Dalai Lama, be it for possessing his photos, video and audio tapes, the forbidden Tibetan national flag, any materials with political overtones from exile, or simply the failure to denounce their exiled leader.

This specific targeting of the Dalai Lama and other symbols of national identity are explained by Wang Lequan, Xinjiang’s Party Secretary, “The Strike Hard campaign is a national campaign and different regions have a different focus depending on their local situations...”¹¹

Official paranoia over stability was a hallmark of China’s presence in Tibet throughout 2001. There was an intensification of security measures during festivals and special anniversaries such as 10 March¹² to prevent possible celebrations by Tibetans that might manifest in political dissent. Increased numbers of Public Security Bureau (PSB) personnel were reportedly deployed around major congregation areas in Lhasa city, and the authorities held a meeting of former political prisoners and their relatives several days prior to the 10 March anniversary, prohibiting them from indulging in any “anti-State” activities.

Government workers, cadres and schoolchildren in Lhasa were ordered to stay home to celebrate Tibetan New Year (which began this year on 24 February). In today’s political climate, making a religious offering in public during a sensitive anniversary, or failing to attend a political meeting, may be interpreted as being expressions of protest.¹³ Reports emerging from Tibet indicated that during the 52nd anniversary of the foundation of the PRC on 1 October, Tibetans in Lhasa were compelled to buy and display the Chinese national flag as a matter of political duty.¹⁴

With its primary focus on development, Beijing held the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in June 2001, attended by all seven members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee. This meeting deliberated priorities for China’s policy implementation in the “TAR”, along with broad guidelines that “TAR” leaders and officials must follow. Analysts see the objectives of the forum as being two-fold; firstly bringing economic development, prosperity and social stability, and secondly augmenting central control by pursuing a policy allowing greater assimilation of Tibet into a more “unified” Chinese state. The authorities openly acknowledge the fact that this all out economic drive is political as well as economic; the underlying issue is Beijing’s determination to “maintain stability” in Tibet.

Premier Zhu Rongji¹⁵ very clearly revealed this when he stated, “the special supportive methods and policies adopted by the Central government towards Tibet are not only in consideration of Tibet’s particular difficulties; looking at it from the perspective of protecting the unity of the nationalities, the unity of the Motherland and State security, [these methods and policies] are the requirements of [Tibet’s] situation and the needs of [China’s] overall situation.”¹⁶

A month after the Fourth Work Forum, Vice-President Hu Jintao¹⁷ flew to Tibet in July amidst strict security to preside over the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the “peaceful liberation” of Tibet. Several thousand Tibetans were forced to participate during the main ceremony in the Potala Square on 19 July. Heightened surveillance and restrictive measures were imposed.

The right to determine one’s political future

Tibetan people, although recognised by many international bodies as being a distinct people, have had their right to self-determination denied since China’s invasion of 1950. China of course claims that the “Autonomy” formula granted by Beijing guarantees Tibetans sufficient self-determination.

A White Paper issued by the PRC in April 2001 claims that over 70 percent of all officials in the “Tibet Autonomous Region” (TAR) are Tibetans. Entitled Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 2000, the document asserts this when specifying equal rights and special protection for ethnic minorities in the country. “Tibet now has over 50,000 officials from ethnic minority groups. Laws in China protect rights of ethnic minorities to participate in the administration of State affairs on an equal footing and manage their own regions and ethnic affairs with autonomous rights.”¹⁸

Most significantly, the new White Paper fails to refer to the position of “TAR” Party Secretary, the single most powerful figure in Central Tibet. The Party Secretary is directly appointed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing and a Tibetan has never held the post. The dominant members of the “TAR” administration have always been Party members and it is the Party which retains the prerogative to confer positions. Elections are held in Tibet merely to enable China to claim the existence of “democratic rights”. A former township party secretary who fled Tibet early this year from Kolug Township, Nagchu County, “TAR”, explains, “We were at first appointed by the higher levels and then the public voted for the selected candidates.”¹⁹

The system of “democratic politics at the grassroots level in rural areas, with democratic elections, decision-making, administration and supervision as the basic components”²⁰ as described in Beijing’s White Paper is profoundly at odds with the current system of governance in Tibet. There is a total absence of grievance procedures for villagers to express their concerns up to local leaders who theoretically have the responsibility to be “middlemen between the grassroots people and higher authorities”. ²¹

A former township party secretary explains, ‘we were at first appointed by the higher levels and then the public voted for the selected candidates’

Another party secretary also spoke of restrictions on “party members including strict instructions prohibiting them from possessing shrines, altars or pictures of the Dalai Lama, performing religious rituals or burning butter lamps.”²³

Party members or officials who are seen to be inclined towards encouraging or indulging in Tibetan culture and tradition are either transferred or demoted. Shalo, the head of Karlang Township in Karze County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan, was highly respected for his interest in preserving Tibetan culture and his work in helping the needy. In August 2001, villagers were informed that he would be transferred to Dartsedo County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan sparking off a local protest against his removal. A local committee delegation also visited the county government requesting that Shalo should remain.²⁴

A special cadre class

Whatever limited autonomy Tibetans might exercise is further weakened by the influx of Chinese cadres occupying local leadership positions to administer districts, prefectures and regions. Since 1995, several batches of special cadres from China were sent into Tibet. The present Chinese leadership believe that these special cadres are more reliable than their Chinese and Tibetan counterparts in Tibet, and will work harder to build the Party work. These cadres enjoy special privileges — get triple wages and promotion within three years of their postings in Tibet.

Since these special cadres are answerable directly to the leadership in Beijing, they will definitely enjoy more power and therefore can overrule any decisions made by the local cadres, both Tibetan and Chinese, who permanently reside in Tibet. If this trend continues, it is definite that there will be more and more direct interference by Beijing in the day-to-day administration of Tibet. This will seriously jeopardise the functioning of the local cadres, in particular the Tibetans. At present approximately 70 Chinese cadres are reportedly attending Tibet University in Lhasa. This is the first time that such a large number of Chinese students have enrolled in the University’s three-year Tibetan language course. Officials at the university reportedly told students that these Chinese graduates will “be particularly instrumental in consolidating and defending social stability and peace in Tibet”.²⁵

Such surveillance evidently expands to educational institutions where departments are created specifically to keep an eye on the “discipline” of students. A young Tibetan student from Chentsa County was caught with political slogans written on the back of a notebook in Qinghai Nationalities Teachers Training University. The Chinese teacher, Tunhan Phrim, who found the scribbles, reported the matter to the head of the university who expelled the boy straightaway. The teacher was promoted to be head of the political office (Ch: zheng zhi chu).²⁶

Freedom of Expression

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all people

have the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

In Beijing’s 9 April 2001 White Paper a large section dwells on “the guarantee of citizens’ political rights”²⁹ Despite its promising title, the paper makes no mention of ensuring citizens’ rights to freedom of expression or opinion.

The reality is that throughout 2001 the Tibetan people’s rights under Article 35 of the Constitution of the PRC were repeatedly violated.³⁰ Punitive and repressive measures are now being employed to censor, regulate and even rescind the rights of independent writers and reporters. A government-imposed Media Council in Tibet replaces independent, self-regulating enterprises, thereby preventing any published works being which are contradictory to PRC rhetoric or encourage devotion to the Dalai Lama.

Rinchen Dhondup from Chabcha Township, Tsolho “TAP”, Qinghai, was formerly on the staff of the Chinese Research Centre for Tibetan Education based in Beijing. He said that the centre’s writers had no freedom over the content of their works.³¹ “Anything remotely political in nature is deleted and replaced with Chinese versions or propaganda. Their intention is to bring the Chinese culture and history in harmony with Tibetan. Tibetans who are caught writing “incriminating” articles or literature are rigorously dealt with.”³²

Writer and editor Jinpa Gyaltso, 24, was arrested by the Gansu National Security Office for having distributed controversial material. This included an abridged life story of the exile martyr, Thupten Ngodup, the autobiography of the Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, and speeches of the Dalai Lama. Gyaltso was detained for 15 days, refused to disclose anything, and was then released. After three days he was re-arrested and temporarily released again on 29 August 2000. He immediately escaped to India.

Gyaltso had been an editor with a private magazine, Guku Choepo (A Bunch of Flowers) for five years. Although self-financed, the authorities withdrew an edition of the magazine mainly because it contained political stories.

Writers of present Tibet can be classified into three general categories. The first one are those who appease and eulogise the Chinese Communist Party to gain self-acclaim and social status. This group consists of Tibetan cadres and government employees who mainly deal with themes of the progress and development that the Party has brought into Tibet. These writers also write anniversary poems on significant occasions for the Party each year.

The second category consists of writers who are patriots with political understanding. They write critical essays and satirical poems aimed at social reform. Such writings are rarely published in any of the Tibetan magazines. The Public Security Bureau always look out for such elements in their writing and document them. The several times that I was taken to the Security Office, I found personal profiles and resumes compiled by PSB on some of my writer friends and myself.

The third group, narrow in their outlook, has no specific philosophy. They waver according to particular given circumstances. Such writers write mainly to get published in various magazines. The Chinese government does not pay much attention to these writers of the new generation who are in their budding stages. In general, these three types of writers are under direct pressure from the communist government.

In other words, I believe that Tibetan writers have absolutely no freedom of expression and it is difficult for them to produce well-written works with a Tibetan touch. Even if someone writes a meaningful article, which has political elements, there is no way in which it can reach the eyes of readers. I feel that as long as Tibet remains under Chinese occupation, Tibetan literature will never stand shoulder-to-shoulder with world literature but rather remain far behind the international standard.

As a young Tibetan writer, I represent the voice of all Tibetans in Tibet. However, I felt like a masked Tibetan for we have no freedom to express our Tibetan identity. Whatever writings are published in any of the magazines today are not true representations of Tibetan literature.

Tibetan people are not only suppressed with their rights to freely express their opinions and thoughts but their right to information is critically restricted by controlling media and the internet. This year a monitoring agency report revealed that the PRC is exerting considerable efforts to intercept foreign radio broadcasts reaching Tibet by running alternative programmes on the same frequency. Radio stations such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet have encountered jamming of their broadcasts into Tibet. These stations specialise in Tibetan language reportage on issues relating to Tibet, the Dalai Lama and the exile government, thus posing a “threat” to the Chinese government, which has a fear of “infiltration”.³³ The official Xinhua news agency warned of the dangers posed by these foreign broadcasting stations noting, “Infiltration by hostile radio stations from abroad into our region has lately become more serious.”

Since it is a criminal act to listen to foreign radio broadcasts in Tibet, Tibetans are reportedly extremely cautious while listening to overseas stations

The internet is a decentralised global source of information which has enormous potential to provide Tibetans with access to understanding of human rights, current affairs and alternative perspectives. In late 2001 Beijing ordered the closure of more than 17,000 internet cafes across the PRC. Officials also forced thousands more to install internet surveillance software as part of a major aggression on unsupervised use of the internet.³⁵ Beijing has additionally imposed tough legal controls over political content on websites. These include regulations passed last year prohibiting “information that goes against the basic principles set in the Constitution”.sup>36 Article 15 of the PRC’s regulation for Internet Content Providers (ICP) forbids the dissemination of any information including that which endangers national security, is detrimental to the honour and interests of the State or undermines State policy for religions.³⁷ In 2001 the PRC allowed the license renewal of only half of China’s internet cafes.sup>38

Since they are restricted from accessing independent media, thereby curbing the dissemination of criticism of the government of the PRC, Tibetans resort to traditional methods of information distribution — especially posters. In Tibet today, the political price paid for verbal or non-verbal protest or distribution of leaflets with political overtones is exceptionally harsh. This indicates the acute sensitivity the Chinese authorities have toward “splittist” sentiments being expressed by Tibetans as well as by indigenous inhabitants of other “national minority” regions.

Six Tibetans from Sog County, Nagchu Prefecture, “TAR”, were sentenced to varying prison terms ranging from seven years to life imprisonment for alleged political activities involving expression of opinion. Four of the six detainees are monks from Sog Tsendhen Monastery in Sog County. The detainees were produced for public trial at Nagchu Intermediate People’s Court in mid December 2000, nearly nine months after their initial detention. They were charged with supporting activities by the “Dalai clique and carrying out activities endangering State security”; evidence produced by the court included woodblocks prints and posters that advocated independence for Tibet, and cassette recordings of speeches by the Dalai Lama.³⁹

According to information received from Tibet this year, PSB officials from Ngaba (Ch: Aba) and Marthang County, Ngaba “TAP”, Sichuan have arrested four monks from Tsennyi Monastery. In August 2000, the four monks covertly pasted independence leaflets and posters in a city in Ngaba County. They repeated the leaflet-pasting activities in Marthang County four months later. Following the news of these pro-independence activities in the region, officials raided Tsennyi Monastery and discovered some leaflets and woodblock prints. Subsequently, Jigme (33) from Garsam Township, Jinpa (30) from Toema Township, Khedrup (45) from Tsaru Township and Kelsang (40) from Tsennyi Township were all arrested in March 2001. The present whereabouts of the four detained monks remains unknown.

Denying criticism of the authorities, Meng Deli, Director of the “TAR”’s Justice Department, argues that statements such as, “Tibet is a police state, or carries out wholesale arrests of monks, or has jailed many people under 18-year-old for political offences are utter nonsense. Such rumours are spread by the Dalai clique and other anti-China forces.” He claims that “…no one has been put in jail for possessing portraits of the Dalai Lama or shouting slogans in support of the Dalai Lama.”⁴⁰

However, numerous cases emerging from Tibet contravene such assertions. Lhasa Public Security Bureau (PSB) officials sentenced a Tibetan woman named Migmar to six years’ imprisonment after she was arrested while watching a video of the Dalai Lama at her home. On 16 February 2001, Chinese PSB personnel entered the room where Migmar and four friends were watching a video of the Dalai Lama. The officers confiscated the videotape and searched the house for additional “political evidence.”⁴¹

A similar case of arrest and sentencing for screening a video of the Dalai Lama was brought against Ngawang Tsultrim, a 24-year-old returnee from exile. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term in early 2000, to be served in Drapchi Prison. While in Lhasa, he played the video-cassettes that he had brought from India to some of his friends from Chamdo “TAR”. It was after the very first screening of the cassettes in July 1999 that PSB officials arrested Tsultrim and subjected him to severe beating and torture while in detention.⁴²

Campaign to win hearts and minds

In a new strategy to whitewash their image, the Chinese authorities have stepped up their propaganda machinery by encouraging the Western media to take organised tours of Tibet to see the “real situation”. This year information was obtained from a closed-door Tibetology and External Propaganda meeting held in Beijing in June 2000. Zhao Qizheng, Director of the Information Office of the State Council, outlined China’s plans to alter the way it presents “facts” on Tibet, in order to win international credibility and support. Zhao also acknowledged the success of the “non-politicised propaganda of the Dalai Lama.” He reasoned that where the government has failed, the responsibility now fell on academics to utilise their non-governmental status to convince foreigners of China’s position on Tibet.⁴³

TCHRD has access to the reports of at least two foreign correspondents who have visited Tibet during 2001 under this new propaganda strategy.

The BBC’s Beijing correspondent, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, was with a group of 30 other foreign journalists who visited Tibet in September. “Such trips in China are never easy”, he reported. “An army of minders accompany you everywhere. Supposedly there to help, more often their role is to obstruct. And the closer you get to Tibet, the more obstructive they become – and we were getting uncomfortably close…”⁴⁴

On a later tour, correspondents were taken to Kumbum Monastery in Qinghai. Christopher Bodeen, filing for Associated Press, wrote, “By bringing foreign journalists to this citadel of Tibetan Buddhism, Chinese officials apparently hoped to demonstrate the monks’ freedom from political interference. The dozens of policemen roaming the monastery halls suggested a different story.”⁴⁵

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

When it manifestly cannot be justified on any legal basis (such as continued detention after the sentence has been served or despite an applicable amnesty act).

When the deprivation of liberty is the result of a judgement or sentence for the exercise of the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁴⁶ and also, in respect of States parties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁴⁷

When the complete or partial non-observance of the relevant international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned relating to the right to a fair trial is of such gravity as to confer on the deprivation of liberty, of whatever kind, an arbitrary character.⁴⁸

According to these definitions, the majority of arrests of Tibetan political prisoners can be defined as arbitrary. Geshe Sonam Phuntsok is one such case. Information this year confirmed that this scholar-monk is incarcerated in Tranktung Prison, Dhatam, Dhartong County, Sichuan. Geshe was accused of “illegally performing a religious ceremony, and also travelling to India … for seeking an audience with the Dalai Lama and for taking photographs with him,” and “travelling on an illegal document procured from Lhasa”. He was charged with, and found guilty of, “endangering national security” merely for the exercise of fundamental freedoms contained in the ICCPR, specifically the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion (Art. 18) and freedom of movement (Art. 12). As the offences Geshe was convicted of under China’s Criminal Law are in breach of International Covenants, his arrest and detention are arbitrary.

In the past, the WGAD has found that an individual arrested without a warrant can be said to have been arbitrarily detained and arrested in breach of Article 9 (2) of the ICCPR.⁵¹ Article 59 of the PRC’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) states that “The arrest of a criminal suspect or an accused shall be approved by the people’s procuratorates or decided by the people’s courts”. Article 71 makes it mandatory for an arrest warrant to be presented at the time of arrest and Article 64 states where the person is to be detained, a detention warrant must also be presented for the location of detention. Most cases of arrest in Tibet are carried out without an arrest warrant.

Fresh information on the 26 October 1999 Karze protest demanding Geshe Sonam Phuntsok’s release as reported to TCHRD in June 2001, revealed specific information on 16 detention cases of Tibetans involved in the protest who have faced sentences ranging from two to six years’ imprisonment.⁵² None of them were issued an arrest warrant at the time of detention.

Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR states that a person should be entitled to trial within a reasonable time. Geshe Sonam Phuntsok was kept in custody for 17 months before sentencing. The CPL provides a two-month time limit for detaining a suspect for investigation, with a one to two-month extension permitted only after approval by the people’s procuratorate.⁵³ Where there are “special reasons”, the trial of a high-profile case can be postponed only on approval of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. It seems this procedure was not followed.

Lengthy detention periods are of particular concern because they provide ample opportunity for investigation authorities to “extract information” from the suspect. Testimonies from various detainees, both former and current, corroborate this concern. In the case of Geshe Sonam Phuntsok, when a relative visited him 17 months after his arrest, there were visible injury marks on his body. TCHRD can only infer that Geshe was subjected to torture while in detention in clear breach of Articles 247 and 248 of China’s Criminal Law.

The Chinese authorities, through their state-owned journal, Beijing Review, maintain that the legal rights and interests of Tibetans are fully protected. This includes the right to serve “terms outside the prison, reducing a sentence, probation, appealing a sentence, reporting the misconduct of others and pressing charges, visits by their families, meeting with visitors, getting released when their sentence is over…”⁵⁴ However, many cases prove these claims to be illusory. Chadrel Rinpoche, who headed the search committee for the reincarnation of the Tenth Panchen Lama, continues to be incarcerated in prison despite the expiry in 2001 of his six-year prison term. Gyaltsen Norbu, former Chairman of “TAR”, admitted to Chadrel Rinpoche’s extended detention in the face of repeated questioning by a Polish parliamentary delegation during its visit to Lhasa in August 2001.⁵⁵

Ngawang Choephel, the jailed musician from India, has received visitation rights only once in seven years of detention

Cases of Tibetan detainees being denied their right to visitation is commonplace. In November 2001 TCHRD interviewed a recent-arrival from Sog County, Nagchu Prefecture, “TAR” who confirmed that only two of six prisoners detained in March 2000, for political activities “endangering state security” were allowed visitors to date.⁵⁸ Ngawang Lochoe’s family was prevented from seeing her on a prison visit two weeks before her death on 5 February 2001. Reports indicated that Ngawang was suffering from acute pancreatitis for some time.⁵⁹

Human Rights in China, a monitoring agency based in Hong Kong and New York, has documented many cases of lawyers being prosecuted in the PRC for defending their clients.⁶⁰ Similarly, political repression on the plateau results in individuals attempting to remedy an illegal arrest often becoming subject to reprisals themselves. Hou Zongbin, Chairman of the NPC Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs, commenting on the findings of the NPC teams inspecting the implementation of the CPL in 12 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, admitted to lawyers, “having difficulties meeting their clients, accessing court files relating to their cases, and their reasonable petitions have more often than not been rejected”.⁶¹ Appealing a sentence or remedying abuses are unprecedented in occupied Tibet. Firstly, there is no legal or possible access to lawyers; secondly, there is a fear of reprisals against those who appeal on a suspect’s behalf, or against the suspect himself. Escapees report that any attempt to challenge arrests in Tibet results in punishment.

Friends of Geshe Sonam Phuntsok approached several lawyers in Sichuan to act on Geshe’s behalf in the court proceedings. All the lawyers refused to defend Geshe’s case for the reasons stated above. Furthermore, they advised Geshe’s friends that a person charged with political activities has no hope of successfully defending the case. Geshe’s supporters were also advised that in political cases, a lawyer generally has no access to the client or to read the evidence against him, rendering the services of a lawyer futile.

The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China states:

Whoever organises, plots, or acts to split the country or undermine national unification, the ringleader, or the one whose crime is grave, is to be sentenced to life imprisonment or not less than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment; other active participants are to be sentenced to not less than three but not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment; and other participants are to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights.

Whoever instigates to split the country and undermine national unification is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights; ringleaders or those whose crimes are grave are to be sentenced to not less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.⁶²

The Revised Criminal Law, in the context of the offences endangering national security, makes no attempt to establish standards to determine the quality of acts that might or could harm national security. That the Law establish such a standard is crucial, as that alone could make the Law reasonable, fair and just. Clearly, the national security law may be misused and, as long as it is part of the statute, it provides a rationale for restricting fundamental human rights and basic freedoms. ⁶³

• failure in the revisions to define precisely the concept of “endangering national security”, and application of the imprecise definition to a broad range of offences;
• the fact that acts of individuals in exercise of freedom of opinion and expression may be regarded as acts endangering national security;
• the fact that institutions, organisations and individuals outside China, working with domestic organisations, may be charged with, and convicted of, “endangering national security”;
• the lack of precision in the definition of the offence of attempting to subvert political power and overthrow the socialist system, or incitement to such an offence by “spreading rumours, slander or [through] other means” (Article 105);
• and the fact that under Article 105, even communication of thoughts, ideas or opinions, without intent to commit any violent or criminal act, may be regarded as subversion.

China’s response to serious allegations by the WGAD was to change the charge “counter-revolutionary” to “endangering national security” in an attempt at clarification. “Conspiring” was deleted from the original provision of “colluding with foreign powers and conspiring” to “endanger national security, territorial integrity and security”. However, changing the legal language does not reverse the fact that anyone who expresses dissent against Chinese rule continues to be liable to severe punishment under this revised law.

In the wake of this legal exercise, Beijing announced that 21 articles of the PRC’s Criminal Law had been compressed into 12, thus reducing the number of punishable activities as compared to the previous version of the code. None of these changes significantly alter the broad range of abuse that is likely to take place under the revision.

The fate of political prisoners

There are currently 254 political prisoners in Tibet, a significant drop over recent years. The Chinese authorities link this decrease to an alleged improvement in human rights standards. Head of the “TAR” Justice Department, Meng Deli, claims that “Over the past 10 years, persons put in jail on charges of threatening state security in the Tibet Autonomous Region in south-west China has become fewer and fewer, and there are only 100 such prisoners at present.” China’s lauding of this reduced number of political inmates “…may be a valid social objective, but it does not justify the imposition of control as a punishment under which an individual is liable to lose fundamental human rights ”⁶⁵

Problems are not limited to the treatment of former prisoners themselves; their families, friends and other associates, can all potentially be affected. Former colleagues also often fall under official suspicion simply through association

Since 1997, there is a record of 33 political prisoners dying either during or following their detention. The psychological trauma that often arises from maltreatment during imprisonment may be worsened by the circumstances following the release of political prisoners. They re-enter a hostile society in which the security forces are given extensive powers by the State to maintain security and public order, resulting in a system in which individuals retain little if any rights.

Former political prisoners face particularly intense surveillance over their daily lives and are frequently singled out by the authorities for questioning or threats before significant political anniversaries in Lhasa. A formal meeting in Lhasa of political prisoners and their relatives is unusual and is likely to have been part of the authorities’ attempts to prevent dissent on 10 March this year. Problems are not limited to the treatment of former prisoners themselves; their families, friends and other associates, can all potentially be affected. Former colleagues also often fall under official suspicion simply through association.

Tsering Lhagon, from Sog County, Nagchu Prefecture, “TAR”, was the sole breadwinner in his family. Following his 15-year sentence in December 2000, for carrying out activities “endangering national security”, reports reaching exile this year testify that his family is facing extreme poverty and hunger.⁶⁸ A recent refugee from the area reports that even Tsering Lhagon’s friends could not help for fear that they might be branded as “colluding with splittists”.

Generally family members may experience financial hardship as they lose their means of livelihood due to their “errant” relatives’ involvement in political activities. Furthermore, they have to meet high medical costs when a former prisoner is released on medical parole and requires prolonged treatment.

Thupten Tsering,⁶⁹ a 50-year-old from Sog County, Nagchu Prefecture, “TAR” cannot use the entire right side of his body. He was reportedly severely beaten during detention and was prohibited from rejoining his monastery upon release. Thupten is currently undergoing medical treatment in Yakhla Township as there are no hospitals in his hometown, Rawa Township. His family has been reduced to poverty through paying the bills for his medical costs. Additionally, Thupten’s brother, Tenzin Chowang, is currently serving seven years’ detention.⁷⁰

Tactics reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution are used to further dissuade Tibetans from expressing dissent. Parading prisoners around town in trucks, generally with placards around their necks, is intended to serve as a deterrent to witnesses: this display is appropriately described in Chinese as “killing the chicken to scare the monkeys.”

The right to leave and return to one’s own country

The right to leave ones own country is distinctly specified in the major international laws including the Universal Declaration,⁷¹ ICCPR⁷² and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).⁷³

Tibetans seeking to travel outside their place of abode — even to another county — experience bureaucratic obstruction. If they wish to leave their place of residence, or travel to border areas, they have to acquire specific documents. With official sensitivities over borders running high, Tibetans are required to procure tong xin zhang (a travel pass) to enter restricted border areas and this pass must cite the purpose of travel. Local traders commonly use the pass for a limited period. It can be obtained from a regional government office — run either by the PSB or PAP security apparatus, mostly PAP — after paying between 10 to 50 yuan (US$5.88). The travel document is issued only after the Chinese citizenship card shan fein zhang is produced.

The tong xin zhang travel document enables asylum seekers to approach Tibet’s southern border region safely, but it is quite difficult to obtain for citizens who do not live near the Nepal border. For this reason, Tibetans who have decided to escape across the border spend some time in Lhasa seeking to obtain — by legal or illicit means — a travel pass to enable them to cross the border regions without being in danger of arrest. Generally those asylum seekers who are able to acquire a tong xin zhang are better informed, wealthier and have contacts to officials (or the black-market) and, ostensibly, a valid reason for travelling in the borderlands.

Two young monks involved in a political protest in Karze County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan in 2000, fled their monastery and hid in Lhasa for a month. With assistance from their families, they purchased tong xin zhang passes. They then travelled south along the Friendship Highway, made contact with two guides and paid them 3,000 yuan (US$352) to be taken to Kathmandu via Dram, the Tibetan town bordering Nepal.

To leave Tibet legally, citizens have to apply for a PRC passport (hu zhao) from Lhasa PSB Passport Office. Such a passport is often difficult to obtain and the procedures are lengthy. Only those with some official contacts or leverage manage to acquire passports – and then only after resorting to bribery at different levels of officialdom.

Bukyi, a 25-year-old former monk from Kana Monastery in Dzatoe County, Jyekundo “TAP”, Qinghai, who managed to acquire valid travel documents and reached Kathmandu on 1 June 2001, describes the whole process.

I decided to escape Tibet in order to access better spiritual studies and practice in India. The Chinese government never issues visa for Tibetans if the destination is revealed as being India. However, it is a little easier to secure travel documents for Nepal, although one has to go through the usual verification process by proving the authenticity of the invitation letter and producing a photocopy of the sponsor’s Nepalese passport. So I decided to apply for a visa for Nepal. I resorted to bribing officials in order to speed up the snail-paced visa procedure.

The cost of visas has greatly increased therefore it is not easy for ordinary Tibetans to afford them these days. The procedure involves obtaining three papers from the police offices at the three different levels; county, prefecture and province. This normally costs only 10 yuan each, but I spent more money on bribing the concerned officials.

I knew an official (name withheld for security reasons) from the county police station who deals with visa issuance. When I requested the officer to grant me the necessary documents to obtain a visa for India, the officer categorically stated that no visa is issued for travelling to India - especially for monks. After much persuasion, the officer finally relented on the condition that I acquire a statue for him from Lhasa costing 350 yuan (US$43.75). I also paid 300 yuan as a surety that I would return to Tibet after the visit.

I then went to the prefectural police station at Jyekundo “TAP”, Qinghai with a paper from the county police station. The official there, who is a Chinese national fluent in Tibetan language, was very reluctant to grant me the papers. After waiting patiently for four months, I bribed the official with presents of 30 gyama (15 kg) of butter (the market price for each gyama is 13 yuan), milk and a newly hand-knitted woollen pullover, altogether worth approximately 700 yuan (US$87.50). Within two days I was given the necessary papers after a further payment of 700 yuan for which a receipt was issued.

The third step to acquire the provincial permit involved going to Xining Police Station in Qinghai’s capital. This time I went with the help of a Chinese-speaking relative and got the proper five-year visa for travelling within a week to Nepal. I paid 300 yuan (US$35) as the visa fee.

I think that had I bribed the official at Jyekundo “TAP” Police Station at the outset, I would not have had to wait so long. In Lhasa, I went to the Nepalese Consulate and paid 250 yuan for visa verification. After crossing the Friendship Bridge at the Nepal-Tibet border, on the Nepal side I finally had to pay 200 NC (US$2.6) to a security border policeman before reaching the Tibetan Reception Centre in Kathmandu.

Information this year also indicates that Chinese authorities warn Tibetans of confiscation of their land and imprisonment of their parents or relatives if they make attempts to flee. Such announcements during local county meetings are used to repress Tibetans and dissuade them from fleeing their homeland.⁷⁴

Most asylum seekers escaping to India do not bother to acquire travel documents, primarily because a request to the authorities to go on pilgrimage to Dharamsala to see the Dalai Lama, or to join a monastery in India, or to obtain a Tibetan-language education, would be instantly rejected and incur official wrath and punishment. Secondly, most of them are poor and cannot afford the travel documents and other “incidental” expenses involved in the procedure. But by attempting the journey without documentation they are liable to arrest. Suspicion of the intention to escape is sufficient reason to be detained, and lack of required documentation compounds and confirms the alleged offence.

This is corroborated by reports of 2,500 Tibetans being arrested while attempting to cross the border over a period of six months in 2001 by “TAR” Border Security Bureau Officials in line with the “Strike Hard” Campaign”.⁷⁵ According to a monk from Karze County, Sichuan Province, 300 Tibetans were arrested in June 2001 alone while trying to escape to India. They were sent to Nyari Detention Centre along with people who were arrested returning from Nepal and India. Apparently they were then all sent as labourers on the construction of the new railway line from Golmud to Lhasa.⁷⁶

Arrest and imprisonment is a regular result of attempts to escape Tibet. Common locations for arrest are in, or near, major towns along the Friendship Highway to Nepal: Shigatse, Lhatse, Tingri, Nyelam and Dram on the border. For this reason, many individuals and groups whotravel by bus or truck via the Friendship Highway disembark before the towns and re-board on the other side.

The penalties for escape

Tibetans apprehended while attempting to flee Tibet are rarely sent to court prior to detention. Punishment appears to mainly occur under a form of administrative detention such as “re-education-through-labour” detentions for one to three years. Trisam “re-education-through-labour” camp (located in Toelung Dechen County, 10 km west of Lhasa) is one of the biggest labour detachments in “TAR”.⁷⁷

Samdup, a former Trisam inmate, testifies that when he was first imprisoned in April 1999 there were approximately 300 prisoners in the facility. By the time he was released on 31 March 2001, the number had doubled to 600. The majority of prisoners hail from all across the “TAR”.

Samdup recounts that prison conditions “were horrific”; prisoners were half starved and were prone to falling sick due to contaminated water and unclean food. Prisoners were also required to clean human excrement from the toilets and manure the prison fields with this human waste.⁷⁸

Penpa, a 40-year-old from the Tsang Shalu area of “TAR” died in early 2000, just a month after he was released from Trisam labour unit on medical parole. He was six months away from completing his three-year prison term.⁷⁹

Following its 1997 visit to China, the UN WGAD resolved at its 20th session to resume the consideration of cases concerning PRC, in particular the issue of “re-education through labour”. It requested the Chinese government to take all necessary steps to implement recommendations made after its study tour emphasising that re-education through labour should not be applied to individuals who have peacefully exercised their right to freedom of opinion and expression.

In its document, the Working Group states:

During the course of the visit, the members of the Working Group delegation inquired of the authorities whether the measure of re-education through labour was applicable to persons who disturbed the public order by peacefully exercising their fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … and who were not prosecuted under the criminal law. The delegation was informed that the measure of re-education through labour was only applied to those who had committed minor offences under the common law and who were not required to be formally prosecuted. The Working Group strongly believes that if the measure is applied to persons who disturb the public order as indicated, the commitment of such individuals to re-education through labour would clearly be arbitrary.⁸⁰

Two Tibetans have reportedly died due to intensive hard labour at Xinhua “re-education-through-labour” camp (Ch: Xinhua Laojiaosuo) in Mianyang municipality (Ch: Shi), northern Sichuan. Pasang Dolma, who reached India in February 2001, gave a detailed account of her husband’s death while in custody. Tsering Wangdrak was one of the protestors in the Karze demonstration of October 1999 demanding the release of Geshe Sonam Phuntsok.⁸² The two Tibetans reportedly collapsed in 2000 while being forced to work in hot summer weather. They were denied water or first aid and died shortly afterwards. Tibetans at Xinhua detention facility appear to suffer from lack of acclimatisation to the heat and humidity of Sichuan summers, combined with the harsh labour and appalling prison conditions.⁸³

The standard punishment for those caught attempting to leave Tibet ranges from 10 days’ detention in a police station, to one to three months’ imprisonment in a detention centre or prison. Detainees report that Chinese police routinely torture and beat their captives. According to testimonies it is common for those arrested to be moved between several police stations, detention centres and prisons during detention. Such mobility may reflect the desire of local authorities to remove asylum seekers away from their jurisdiction and from proximity to the border, as well as to where the physical capacity exists to hold offenders. Dram Police Station at the Nepal border, for instance, is comparatively small. Samdup from Chushul County, near Lhasa, who arrived in Kathmandu in October 2001, reported to TCHRD regarding the fate of a mass freedom flight of 72 Tibetans during April 1999. Nagchu Police on 1 April 1999 detained a group of 72 Tibetan escapees in Nyima County, Nagchu, “TAR”. Twenty-five of the detainees, with ages ranging from six to 40-years-old, come from areas around Lhasa and the rest from eastern parts of Tibet. All were attempting to flee into exile.

The group was detained in Nagchu Detention Centre for eight days and then transported to Lhasa PSB Anti-Riot Department where they underwent intensive interrogation. Afterwards, they were transported to Lhasa’s Gutsa Detention Centre and detained for three months and three days. During their detention, the interrogation sessions sought to determine the purpose of their escape to India and their future plans.

Sixty-four escapees were released after four months of detention at various detention centres. However, eight Tibetans were singled out for the further punishment of “re-education through labour”. This penalty in theory applies to people who commit minor offences that do not rise to the level of crimes; in practice it is widely used against political dissidents. Here, courts do not make the decision to send someone to “re-education camps”. Rather they are made by administrative committees dominated by the police.

All eight of the Tibetans penalised this way were either former political prisoners, former monks who had been expelled from their monasteries by “work team” members, or current monks.

Five detainees were ordered to undertake two years’ “re-education-through-labour”. The other three were ordered to undertake one year of “re-education-through-labour”. All eight were moved to Trisam “re-education-through-labour” camp. Repeated attempts to escape Tibet are a common story. Perhaps one in 20 refugees who reach the Tibetan Transit Centre in Nepal report having been arrested and detained in Tibet on their journey.

Tibetan exile returnees face even greater risks of being charged with illicit “espionage activities for the Western forces and the Dalai clique”. Their “suspicious activities” can result in heavy prison sentences under the crime of “endangering state security” which “legalises” the punishment. The body of 27-year-old Saru Dawa, a monk of Kirti Monastery, Dharamsala was recovered by his relatives from near the Nyari Detention Centre in Shigatse in mid-February 2001. Saru Dawa had been arrested at the Tibet-Nepal border in Dram on 20 November 2000 while returning to Tibet to see his ailing mother.⁸⁴

Prison torture and ill-treatment

The UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment establishes the State as responsible for taking “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”.⁸⁵ Despite ratifying this Convention in 1988, it is the State of China that is responsible for innumerable acts of abuse through its repressive systems of surveillance, intimidation, and persecution inside prisons.

With respect to the legal environment within which protest and punishment occur, reports from throughout Tibet indicate that the 1997 revisions to China’s Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law have yet to bring about improvements in the treatment of Tibetans detained for political offences. Although torture as a means of coercing confessions — which once obtained generally serve as the basis for conviction — was explicitly banned by the 1997 CPL, human rights abuses against detainees, including beating and torture, have remained the norm during police investigations of Tibetans suspected of political activity.

A number of Chinese officials have spoken out about the pervasive flaws in the judicial system. Hou Zongbin, chairman of the NPC Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs under the National People’s Congress, acknowledged in December 2000 that the use of torture to extract confessions “is rather serious in certain places, causing terrible social consequences” and must be “conscientiously dealt with rather than tolerated”.⁸⁶

Two Tibetans, Tenzin Khedup and Thupten Thapkey, were severely tortured and coerced into confessions relating to an explosion incident on 11 July this year in Thandong Township, Tengchen County in Chamdo Prefecture. The two were given life sentences and fined 29,000 yuan (US$ 3,412) and 19,000 yuan (US$ 2,236) respectively in November 2001. A third detainee, Damdul, received a sentence of three years’ imprisonment and Sherab, the youngest of them all, was released. The four were among 16 Tibetans arrested on 18 July in relation to the Chamdo explosion. Among them was a monk, Tseta Marong, who was reportedly beaten to death while another suffered severe torture with an electric prod. Court and police officials reportedly refused to comment on this case.⁸⁷

The fact that torture is a regular feature of detentions is evidenced by Amnesty International’s 12 February 2001 report on torture. According to Amnesty, reports from China in recent years, “include a high proportion of victims [who] were killed or fatally wounded by torture during interrogation within the first 24 hours of detention”. ⁸⁸ Many report being beaten with whatever implement[s] a guard or interrogator can find at hand including gun-butts. The practice of torture is expanding in China, with growing numbers of officials inflicting pain on a wider range of victims through beatings, whippings, electric shocks and sexual abuse.

The Amnesty research revealed testimonies by witnesses and candid articles in government-controlled newspapers in describing the “widespread and systemic” use of torture against political activists, Tibetan nuns, migrant workers, criminal defendants and their lawyers. Kidney and liver ailments are common among prisoners as a result of kicking and beatings by prison guards aimed specifically at these sensitive organs. ⁸⁹

Apparently, when Amnesty International raised these issues with the Chinese government the human rights agency was met with silence or categorical denials. The response from the Chinese government to the Special Rapporteur on Torture⁹⁰ claimed that Ngawang Kyonmey is “currently serving his sentence and is in normal physical condition”. Ngawang Kyonmey, who was arrested in November 1998 and released on 18 November 2000, endured severe forms of torture. Ngawang suffered severe blows to his head, and was repeatedly banged against the wall. His wrists were handcuffed together by bending his right arm over his shoulder while the left arm was twisted behind his back. This impeded his bodily movement. He is currently in Dharamsala, India, after having fled Tibet in February 2001.⁹¹

The Amnesty research revealed ‘widespread and systemic’ use of torture against political activists, Tibetan nuns, migrant workers, criminal defendants and their lawyers

No medical services are made available for Tibetan prisoners who suffer illness, and cases show that abuse and torture continue despite serious medical conditions. Medical assistance is sought only at a critical or terminal stage of illness. Recovery rates are low.⁹³

A case in point is Lobsang Sherab, 30, a Sera Monastery monk, who was detained by PSB officers in October 1999 under suspicion of involvement in pro-independence activities. He was held in the “TAR” PSB Detention Centre, Lhasa, during which time he suffered intensive torture resulting in a fractured leg. He was also subjected to head injuries. Lobsang Sherab’s condition became so critical that he had to be released before being sentenced. By the time he was released on 24 November 1999, Sherab had developed a permanent limp. Despite treatment at the Lhasa Tibetan Medical Institute, his condition deteriorated drastically and, on 20 October 2000, Lobsang passed away in Lhasa. During the sky burial it was discovered that he had suffered a brain haemorrhage.⁹⁴

Violence against women inmates

Amnesty International, in its examination of women in custody, asserts that perpetrators of violence and torture are commonly found to be State officials.⁹⁵

While acts of violence are not exclusively perpetrated by the State, inaction by State bodies is a major factor allowing violence against women to continue. It is the government’s responsibility to protect and ensure women’s rights are upheld. In Tibet, this ideal remains unmet. This year, sources reveal 38 known female political prisoners still in custody.

Rape, stripping women naked and inserting wires that send electric shocks to reproductive organs and wrapping electrical wires around nipples are standard forms of gender-based torture.⁹⁶

Rape — or the threat of rape — may be inflicted for a range of purposes, such as to extract confessions, or to intimidate, humiliate or punish. This method of punishment inflicts not only physical, but also continuing psychological, trauma as testified by Tibetan refugees. Women in Tibetan prisons suffer rape by prison, security, and military officials. The electric cattle prod, a common instrument of torture for all inmates, is particularly utilised internally on female prisoners.

An example of this brutality is seen in the case of 28-year-old Tibetan nun Ngawang Lochoe, who died in Drapchi Prison on 5 February 2001, just one year prior to the completion of her 10-year prison sentence. Ngawang Lochoe was arrested along with five other nuns from Nyen Nunnery, for taking part in a peaceful demonstration in Lhasa on 14 May 1992. They were charged with “instigating counter-revolutionary activities and propaganda”.⁹⁷

Sangmo, a 25-year-old nun from Chubsang Nunnery, originally from Meldrogungkar County in Lhasa Municipality, endured severe forms of abuse and torture in Drapchi Prison where she was incarcerated for six years. Upon her release on 1 February 2001, Sangmo complained of constant headaches and was reported to periodically lose her mental stability. Despite financial constraints, her family gave her all the required medical treatment in Lhasa. But by March 2001 her eyesight deteriorated and she became blind.⁹⁸

The ICCPR states that “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”.⁹⁹ Furthering their general prohibition on gender-based discrimination to include gender-based violence, in 1994 the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted Recommendation 19 stating that violence toward women includes “acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty”.¹⁰⁰

Conditions and rights under detention

There are incidences where prison authorities do not inform family members or friends of the condition of detainees. Tsering Wangdrak was sentenced to almost four years for his political activism, and his wife was allowed to meet him only four weeks later. Wangdrak’s wife, Pasang, who fled into exile in February 2001, alleged that she had to go through an arduous process in order to obtain visiting rights after paying a bribe of 1,000 yuan (US$118) to see her husband. On 6 June 2000, eight months after Wangdrak was detained, a cellmate sent a message to Pasang that Wangdrak was in a grave medical condition. He passed away soon after she received this news. Four days after his death she received a telegram from the prison stating that her husband was sick. Pasang did not receive assistance in collecting her husband’s body to perform last rites, as the people in her town were afraid of antagonising the Chinese officials. No official death certificate was issued.¹⁰¹

Chinese propaganda has exerted considerable efforts to publicise the “noteworthy” prison conditions in Tibet. During 2001 a number of foreign correspondents and delegations were taken on tours of prisons in order to show the “true picture”. Numerous articles featuring positive descriptions of prison conditions appeared in China’s State-controlled media. A 22 May 2001 Xinhua report claims, “ While visitors panted due to the lack of oxygen in the prison at 3,672 meters above sea level, prisoners in blue uniforms were playing basketball, shouting and laughing.” Further glorifying the conditions, Xinhua elaborates on willows and roses blooming in the courtyard, prisoners practicing music with their guitar and electronic organ, reading novels, learning Tibetan language and the highlight of the article was the prison menu of, “…butter tea and roasted barley flour for breakfast, rice, boiled meat and radish for lunch, steamed bread and cabbage vermicelli soup for supper.”¹⁰²

Contrary to these glowing reports, former prisoners have complained of insufficient and unhygienic food. “While in prison, one of the most difficult problem I faced was insufficient food. I never received enough food throughout my time in prison. The food provided to us was worse than the fodder given to pigs. Meat was a rare feature in the diet, and when it was provided it was almost always pungent and spoilt,” recalls Norbu Damdul, a former political prisoner who arrived in India in early 2001. Norbu was released on 1 April 1999 after serving his three-year prison term in Ngaba Prison, Sichuan. After his release he was not allowed to return to Karze Monastery and he was prohibited from wearing monks’ robes, as his monastery was not willing to take the risk of readmitting him.¹⁰³

The laudatory Xinhua prison article concludes with, “Kabil Sibal, Chairperson of the WGAD who visited the prison four years ago, said that criminals here have received humanitarian treatment.”¹⁰⁴ In fact, the WGAD mentions in its 1997 report the difficulty they found in obtaining “…clearances from the Chinese government to visit specific centres of detention and particular provinces; it was not possible to prepare an agenda for the visit in advance”, thus ensuring the delegation observed only the centres specifically approved by Beijing. The group also faced obstacles in obtaining a translated version of the Chinese Laws despite repeated requests.¹⁰⁵

The government of the PRC cannot set priorities for the Tibetan people and deny their civil, political and cultural rights by suggesting that rights to subsistence precede all other rights. The rights set forth in the two Covenants that China is a party to are universal and indivisible. The Vienna Declaration of 1993 relating to these rights endorses, “The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question…human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of governments.”¹⁰⁶

What, then, is the point of the PRC becoming signatory to International Covenants if the leadership in Beijing continues to impose policies which contravene them?