Publications

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Annual Report 2001

Freedom of Religious Belief and Practice

The dawn of the 21st century heralded no sign of improvement in the spheres of religious freedom in Chinese-controlled Tibet. The Beijing government’s concerted efforts to assert its control over Tibetan religious belief and practice has grown in intensity during 2001 and poses an ever more serious threat to the Tibetans’ right to freedom of religion and practice. Tibetans are today subjected to increase restrictions including intimidation, harassment and detention, with the degree of restrictions varying significantly from region to region.

Reports of gross human rights violations continue to emerge from Tibet and monks and nuns — the standard–bearers of Tibetan national and religious identity — were frequently the targets.¹ Hundreds of prisoners of conscience, most of them monks and nuns, remain imprisoned. In 2001, TCHRD has received information of the expulsion of 9,408 monks and nuns including 7,488 religious practitioners from Sichuan’s Serthar Institute and 1,500 from Yachen Gar, also in Sichuan. This year 57 monks and nuns were reportedly detained out of which 11 were sentenced to imprisonment. In addition, 509 monks and nuns fled Tibet.

The continuing exodus to India of Tibetans in robes testifies to the religious repression prevalent across the plateau. The sheer number of escapees can be attributed in part to the increasingly harsh religious persecution perpetrated by the Chinese authorities and the brutalities inflicted on those defiant monks and nuns who refuse to comply with Chinese government directives. Charged under the crime of “endangering State security”, the other significant factors leading to the imprisonment of religious detainees are possession and propagation of materials related to the Dalai Lama and opposition to the “work team”² diktats as well as more open political criticism of the Chinese government. (“Work teams” were first conceived to implement controls and propaganda sessions in Tibet’s monasteries and nunneries under Beijing’s 1996 “Patriotic Education” Campaign).

The focal point of overall religious repression this year is the massive expulsion of clergy from religious institutions, unremitting “work team” visits across Tibet with their Marxist ideological control campaigns, a heightened Dalai Lama denunciation campaign, restricted admission of clergy into religious institutions and prohibitive measures on public expression of belief and practices.

The worst attack on religious freedom is exemplified by a series of crackdowns in the summer of 2001 at Serthar Institute in Karze “TAP”, Sichuan, which led to mass expulsions among the nearly 9,000 religious practitioners; demolition of living quarters; the placement of the Institute’s leader Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok³ under Chinese government custody, and an official ban on religious teachings and practices. This series of crackdowns is the culmination of two years of escalating restrictions and propaganda campaigns instituted by the Beijing authorities against the Buddhist academy. Yachen Gar⁴ also witnessed mass expulsions and demolitions this year.

Elsewhere in Tibet, prohibitions on the Dalai Lama’s photo and overt displays of devotion have become a part of the “political re-education” sessions conducted by “work teams”. The authorities seek to impose restrictions and closer surveillance on what Beijing terms “normal religious and cultural activities” such as the observance of Saga Dawa (the fourth month of the Tibetan lunar calendar), the Dalai Lama’s birthday celebration, and Tibetan New Year or Losar. The official silence over, and interference with, the Panchen Lama reincarnation issue in recent years — and government’s involvement in the recognition of other reincarnate lamas — has highly affronted the religious sensibilities of Tibetans and raised concern amongst the international community.

Party policy overruling religious freedom

The legal protection of citizens’ rights to freedom of religious belief in China is largely in accordance with the main contents of the relevant international documents and conventions. Some of the stipulations in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Vienna Declaration and Action Programme are all included in China’s laws and legislation in explicit terms.

Under international law, all people have the right to freedom of religion. Article 18(1) of the ICCPR states,

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No State organ, public organisation or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The State protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State...

Within the PRC, various other legislation such as the Autonomous Regions of National Minorities Act (Articles 11 and 53), the Penal Code (Articles 147 and 165), the Civil Code (Article 77), the Military Service Code (Article 3), the Electoral Code (Article 3), the Compulsory Education Act (Article 16) and the Organisation of Rural Committees Act provide for the protection of freedom of worship and equality of rights for religious citizens. In particular, Article 147 of the Criminal Law provides that

State officials who violate the freedom of worship of citizens or the customs of national minorities are punishable in serious cases by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a short term of imprisonment. Any person who forcibly prevents legal religious activities, compels believers to abandon their religion, compels a citizen to practise any form of worship, illegally closes or demolishes legal places of worship or other religious premises is violating democratic rights and individual freedom and failing in his duty and is punishable by law.

The Chinese government’s policy on Tibetan Buddhism however is in complete contradiction to these regulations. In December 2001, China outlined its religious policy for the new century at the National Religious Working Conference held in Beijing. Beijing’s top leaders attended the conference, which is viewed as having an “important and far-reaching influence” on religious work.⁷ The basic tasks for this work were determined to be implementing the Party’s policy on the freedom of religious belief, administering religious affairs according to law, actively guiding religions to adapt themselves to the socialist society, persisting in the principle of independent administration, consolidating and developing the patriotic United Front of the Party with the religious circle.⁸

Establishing a Marxist outlook

At the conference, President Jiang Zemin reiterated China’s policy of protecting religious freedom but warned that nobody will be allowed to abuse religion in order to sabotage the party, socialism or national security. He also warned against “infiltration by foreign forces cloaked in the mantle of religion” and called for the “establishment of management networks pertaining to religions at the county, town and village level, in addition to better training of grassroots officials in religious policies”. The conference decided to firmly establish a Marxist outlook on religion, unswervingly implement the Party’s policy on religion, closely unite with the religious believers in the common effort for the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, and to strengthen propaganda on the actual situation of China’s religious policy and freedom of belief.⁹

China has granted a number of rights to its citizens on paper which are not legally enforceable due to the lack of a constitutional court and the existence of wide and undetermined “claw-back clauses” leaving it to the discretion of the administration whether to enforce these rights.¹⁰ The two Chinese White Papers entitled Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 2000 and Tibet’s March Towards Modernisation released in 2001 note that China guarantees religious freedom to its citizens and pays attention to safeguarding human rights through perfecting legislation, ensuring an impartial judicature and strictly enforcing the law. Claims such as these that international rights have been incorporated into national law have to be understood in the framework of the Chinese Constitution.

The Fourth Work Forum on Tibet held in Beijing in June this year emphasised the need “to increase control” and to “promote a Marxist outlook on culture and religion”.¹¹ Jiang Zemin, President of the Chinese Communist Party, said at the forum that it is important “…to strengthen the administration of religious affairs, strike those who use religion to carry out splittist criminal activities, and vigorously lead Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialism”.

The official concern over religious belief and loyalty to the Dalai Lama — especially among Tibet’s cadre contingent — has remained a priority. The cadres were instructed to recognise the significance of cultural exchange among nationalities on the one hand and oppose “cultural separatism” on the other.¹²

Jiang Zemin told the forum it is important ‘to strengthen the administration of religious affairs, strike those who use religion to carry out splittist criminal activities, and vigorously lead Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialism’

In line with the statements made by high-ranking officials, the State propaganda machinery attempts to gloss over the religious repression unleashed on Tibetans. The People’s Daily in an editorial titled “Tibetan Buddhists Support China’s Current Religious Policy” quotes a Tibetan “Buddhist leader” as saying that Buddhists in Tibet enjoy absolute freedom of religious belief; that the current strength of lamaseries and temples in Tibet is 1,700, an increase of more than 300 from that in 1959; and the number of resident monks have risen to 46,300 since the days of the Cultural Revolution.¹⁴ He further comments on the resumption and celebration of religious festivals that were previously suspended.

The socialist road to suppression

Religious repression is largely imposed through Beijing’s “Patriotic Education” Campaign. This campaign, first launched in 1996, is designed to suppress patriotic sentiments and outbursts, and to mould the monastic community along the Party’s communist line. The campaign, besides being a serious infringement on the rights of Tibetan monks and nuns in terms of their belief, practice and allegiance, has resulted in widespread arrests and expulsions. In view of its “success”, the campaign has now been officially extended into the lay community. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Rudd Lubbers, one-third of approximately 3,000 Tibetan asylum seekers who flee Tibet every year do so to escape the “patriotic education” campaign.¹⁵

The year 2001 witnessed regular visits by ‘work teams’ to enforce the ‘Patriotic Education’ campaign in monasteries and nunneries regarded as ‘hot-beds of dissent’

Almost all religious institutions in Tibet now have Democratic Management Committees (DMC) installed by the Chinese Communist Party to oversee admission, areas of curriculum, and in general “to set up a system of control to ensure that the clergy assume Chinese ‘socialist’ ideals in preference to traditional Tibetan Buddhist teachings”.¹⁶ In recent years the DMCs at several large monasteries have begun to collect all the funds generated by sales of entrance tickets or donations by pilgrims. These funds were previously distributed to monks engaged in full-time religious study. As a result, these “scholar monks” are now engaged in income-generating activities. Several experts are concerned that fewer monks will be qualified to serve as teachers in the future as a result.¹⁷

In June 2001, Jampa Phuntsok, deputy head of the “TAR” Office for Patriotism Education for Lamaseries, said that Chinese authorities have conducted a campaign to enhance “patriotic education” in religious institutions since 1996 “to promote the concept of motherland, the awareness of law and the responsibility of a Chinese citizen, and adapting Tibetan Buddhism to modern society”. He explained that Tibet has currently launched a new round of campaigns to advance publicity of State laws and regulations in some major lamaseries, so that lamas take the initiatives to be law-abiding citizens and know how to resort to law in order to protect their legitimate rights.¹⁸

The year 2001 witnessed regular visits by “work teams” to enforce the “patriotic education” campaign in monasteries and nunneries regarded as “hot-beds of dissent”. Usually these visits aim to destroy political and religious loyalty to the Dalai Lama, give classes on laws and policies of the Beijing government and enforce stricter control in religious institutions. Such government-sponsored campaigns directly contravene international conventions — particularly ones to which China is a party. Specific reference can be made to Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which obliges State Parties to “prohibit racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”

In an attempt to show the media that religious institutions are free from political interference, Chinese officials brought a group of foreign correspondents to Kumbum Monastery in Qinghai in December 2001. When asked about the Dalai Lama and whether they can worship freely, one monk said, “Things are bad here and the pressure is intense”.¹⁹ After the 1998 defection of Agya Rinpoche, abbot of the 440-year-old monastery, Kumbum monks underwent intensive indoctrination in communist ideology for three months and those who refused to denounce the Dalai Lama were expelled.

The correspondents remained concerned that three years after Agya Rinpoche’s defection, “…dozens of para-military police armed with truncheons still patrol the temples, dormitories and religious schools of Kumbum Monastery” and security forces seemed to “outnumber the red-robed monks”.²⁰ Reports state that when questioned the senior monks had to frequently consult one another in whispered Tibetan and their uneasy moments of silence “spoke volumes about the limits of religious freedom in China”.²¹

TCHRD received reports during 2001 of intensive “work team” indoctrination sessions driving monks to the point of committing suicide. One such case is that of Phurbu Audatsang, a 40-year-old monk from Drayab Peugue Monastery, Chamdo Prefecture, “TAR”, who committed suicide by jumping off a bridge into a local river as a result of pressure exerted by “work teams”.²² Since the late nineties, “work teams” of seven to 14 members have been making monthly visits to Kana Monastery in Dzatoe County, Jyekundo “TAP”, Qinghai, to “educate” the monks politically. They enforced a ceiling of 30 monks for the monastery when 300 monks were resident, set an age bar for monks to enter of 18 years, and upheld the official ban on photos of the Dalai Lama. Approximately 45 monks from Kana Monastery have escaped to India since the start of the “patriotic education” campaign.

The authorities have introduced complex bureaucratic procedures to deter young Tibetans from joining nunneries and monasteries, especially in the capital Lhasa. It is traditional cultural practice for Tibetans to admit one son to the monkhood. Additionally, as impoverishment increases among rural communities, enrolment of a son at the local monastery can become an economic necessity. However, Chinese policy makes it illegal to admit youths under the age of 18, thus barring them from a traditional religious education. Where no schools exist, this condemns the child to no education at all.²³ To illustrate, a “work team” in collaboration with local policemen enforced an age limit of 18 years in Druka Monastery in Kenlho “TAP”, Gansu, in 1998, leading to the expulsion of 18 monks.²⁴

Article 14(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that State Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Article 14(3) of the same convention subjects the above provision to limitations as are prescribed by law and are “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others.”

Karma Nyandak from Tengchen County, Chamdo Prefecture, “TAR”, fled Tibet in 2001 after facing a formidable array of bureaucratic procedures while attempting to join Sera Monastery in Lhasa. He had to obtain six official documents from 1) his previous monastery; 2) the township authorities; 3) the county authorities; 4) the city authorities; 5) the Department of Religious Affairs in Lhasa and 6) a government office in Lhasa which decides on the final recruitment of monks to the three major monasteries in Lhasa — Sera, Drepung and Gaden — in close association with the PSB. Even if he had been successful in obtaining all the necessary documents and secured admission, he would not have been allowed to participate in the official religious functions.

Crackdown, expulsions and demolitions

Almost all expulsions from religious institutions today occur in the context of visits from “work teams”. The most common “crimes” prompting monastic expulsion are possession of photos of the Dalai Lama, cassette recordings and publications by the Dalai Lama, and suspected involvement in political activism.

The number of monks and nuns in Tibet has reduced significantly over recent years particularly since the inception of the “Patriotic Education” Campaigns. This decrease is widely attributed to the massive expulsions of clergy who refuse to obey the orders of the “work teams”, such as denouncing the Dalai Lama, parroting a Chinese version of history, and failing to vow loyalty to the Chinese motherland.

A Western tourist to Tibet in 2001 observed, “I visited many monasteries and nunneries throughout Tibet, and the overall impression I received was one of emptiness. Many temples within the larger monasteries were totally empty, and the assembly halls that were in use showed definite evidence of the restrictions in number [of monks and nuns] enforced by the Chinese authorities. The halls would only be half full, at the most… with the rest of the rooms cavernously empty. I saw very few monks in attendance at the majority of the monasteries and little evidence of study being undertaken.”²⁵

Apart from the damaging “Patriotic Education” Campaign, the greatest current concern for the survival of Tibetan Buddhism is the prohibition on religious education. Disgruntled members of the community point out that the beautiful religious institutes are mere museum pieces. The religious freedom that only allows people to offer butter lamps and perform prostration serves only to fool foreign visitors.²⁶

The harshest brunt of religious control in 2001 was meted out to Serthar Institute when Chinese authorities expelled over 7,488 residents of the institute (known locally as Larung Gar) and enforced a ceiling of 1,400 students.²⁷ More than 1,000 huts were razed to the ground in this crackdown to prevent the students from returning to the site. TCHRD has as yet unconfirmed information that six of the around 4,000 nuns studying at Serthar have died and many were hospitalised in the aftermath of this onslaught. Two of the nuns are reported to have committed suicide while four others died of unknown causes. It is alleged that the deaths were related to despair and desperation triggered by the recent crackdown. By year’s end, the Chinese authorities had cancelled all teaching programmes and religious ceremonies at the institute. For the few students who remain, lectures and studies have been severely disrupted.

At the time of dismantling, Serthar was the most populous institution for higher learning on the plateau. Its almost 9,000 monk, lama and nun students included 1,000 foreigners from China and South-east Asia. They were the first to be expelled. At the time of expulsion, monks and nuns were pressured to sign documents containing three points: a promise not to return; denunciation of the Dalai Lama, and a commitment to follow official policies. Article 18 (2) of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Clearly this has been grossly violated by the PRC’s brutal crackdown at Serthar Institute.

When the 1,000 Mainland and Overseas Chinese and other Asian nationals were expelled, they were also warned that failure to leave the institute within the specified time would be considered illegal and could result in arrest. All the non-Tibetan students left the institute expressing deep sorrow and a wish to return. Article 1 of the Rules on Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens²⁸ in China stipulates that its purpose is to “…protect the freedom of religion of foreign nationals in China”. Articles 3 and 4 of the same regulation provide that the PRC respects the freedom of religious belief of aliens within Chinese territory, and protects and administrates the religious activities of aliens within Chinese territory in accordance with the law.²⁹

‘It is a threat to the government’s idea of unity if either Tibetans or Chinese believe in the Buddha’ says a Chinese doctor who studied Buddhism in Tibet

A 45-year-old Chinese doctor who had studied at Yachen Gar for four months after he had been forced to leave Serthar Institute told ICT, “The authorities forbade teachers from Serthar Institute and Yachen Gar from giving vajrayana³² to Chinese or to travel to China to teach. The Chinese government knows that the more people believe in the Buddha the more those people will respect the Dalai Lama. So it is a threat to the government’s idea of unity if either Tibetans or Chinese believe in the Buddha.”³³

The expulsion and demolition operations carried out by the massive contingent of police, army personnel and “work teams” at Serthar and Yachen Gar directly contravene laws guaranteeing punishment for violation of religious freedom. Article 251 of China’s Revised Criminal Law articulates that State personnel who unlawfully deprive citizens of their freedom of religious belief and infringe upon the customs and habits of minority ethnic groups, when the circumstances are serious, are to be sentenced to not more than two years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention.

Closures of religious institutions

Resistance by Tibetan monks and nuns to the “Patriotic Education” Campaign, and officially enforced ban on traditional religious practices, has led to the closure of additional religious institutions. To date, a total of 24 religious institutions have been sealed by the Chinese authorities of which two were closed down as recently as this year.

The Beijing government clearly stipulates the penalties for the infringement of citizens’ rights to freedom of religious belief. There is a specific legal reference to the “People’s Procuratorate placing on file a case in which a State functionary illegally deprives anyone of his or her legitimate freedom of religious belief and put on record cases of illegally closing or destroying lawful religious sites and other facilities”.³⁴

Tawu County authorities closed down Tsalpo Nunnery in Tawu County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan, in mid-2000 when the nuns refused to supply their identity photographs and allow inspection of their rooms. The doors of the nunnery are officially closed with red ribbon bearing the seal of the local authorities and all 300 nuns have returned to their respective families.³⁵ In February 2001, Chinese officials sealed Drakkar Nunnery in Nyalam County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR” and expelled all its 20 nuns. The nunnery was accused by the officials of having no permit from the government. “The nunnery received no grants from the government. The permit which the officials claimed to be mandatory, was just to legitimise their stringent and repressive crackdown on our religion,” says a nun.36

The Dalai Lama as the ‘enemy’

Beijing’s policy to demean the Dalai Lama has become increasingly hardline following the 2001 Fourth Work Forum on Tibet. The Third Forum held in 1994 referred to the Dalai Lama as “the serpent’s head” that must be “chopped off” in order to kill the snake. Since then, the PRC’s rhetoric against Tibet’s leader in exile has gained momentum and senior Beijing leaders continually stress the need to step up the polemical attack against the Dalai Lama. Beijing authorities choose to equate any displays of reverence for the Dalai Lama with “separatist activities” and therefore employ and explore endless strategies to upgrade their Dalai Lama denunciation campaign.

The Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism are inseparable. One Beijing analyst writes that it is the Dalai Lama’s ability to transform Tibetan religion into a political weapon, which has put Beijing in a dilemma.³⁷ It can be extrapolated that the language of the campaign against the Dalai Lama will extend to Tibetan religion. Chen Kuiyan, the former “TAR” Party Secretary, has concluded, “Monasteries are the most critical places penetrated by the Dalai clique. These are their conspiring and hiding places. These are also the places where most of their followers reside”.³⁸ Therefore, it has been decided to “…pull the monasteries out of the Dalai Lama’s control”.

Beijing claims that the Dalai Lama — in complicity with “foreign forces” — has nurtured “splittist” activities in Tibet in the monasteries. However, Tibet’s new heightened sense of nationalism is the real trigger for the heightened religious persecution devised and perpetrated by Beijing authorities.

The Chinese authorities in Tibet try to exterminate the Dalai Lama’s influence through imposing bans on his portrait, literature, cassettes (audio and video) as well as through the intensification of “patriotic education” in which denouncing the Dalai Lama constitutes one of the major components. Li Ruihuan, Standing Committee member of the CCP, and head of Nationality Affairs, describes the Dalai Lama as being not only the “…source of disturbances in Tibetan society, but also the biggest obstacle for establishing order amongst Tibetan Buddhism.”³⁹

Over the years, the number of detentions due to possession of materials related to the Dalai Lama have been on the rise leading to harsher official reprisals in the form of torture, prolonged imprisonment and surveillance after release. These cases of detention contradict Chinese claims of unrestricted religious freedom in Tibet. In May 2001, Meng Deli, Director of the “TAR” Department of Justice stated that “…nobody was put into jail for the so-called reason of hanging the portrait of the Dalai Lama.”

In February 2001, Basang, Vice-Secretary of the Tibet Regional Committee of the CCP and Director of the “TAR” Committee for Receiving Returned Tibetans, called for clearer understanding of the denunciation campaign against the Dalai Lama. He stated, “The battle against the “Dalai clique” is not just a simple question of whether one believes in religion or not, nor a matter concerning self-government or not, but an issue which relates to safeguarding the unity of the motherland.”⁴⁰

In 1994 the Chinese authorities imposed a restriction on Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok’s overseas travel because of an audience he had had with the Dalai Lama in India four years earlier. The eminent lama was interrogated four times in 1998 concerning his connection and communications with the Dalai Lama. The current whereabouts of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok remain uncertain. It is believed that the ailing abbot of Serthar Institute is being held incommunicado under Chinese custody in Sichuan’s capital, Chengdu.

Many cases were reported to TCHRD this year of monks and nuns being arrested or otherwise punished for supporting the Dalai Lama. “Work team” officials demoted and subsequently replaced a chant master called Thopchu-la from Kirti Monastery in Ngaba County, Ngaba “TAP”, Sichuan, for allegedly offering a long-life prayer to the Dalai Lama.⁴¹ In early 2001, a monk pointed out to the Chinese authorities that being in a monastery is now pointless as worship of the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa are forbidden to the Tibetans. Soon after this outburst, the monk was taken for interrogation and the details of his whereabouts and present condition remain unknown.⁴²

A Sera Monastery monk remains incarcerated at a Lhasa detention centre — and his family has been denied visitation rights — after he was caught in January 2001 listening to an audiotape containing teachings by the Dalai Lama.⁴³

Evidence that the “Patriotic Education” Campaign is now also being targetted at lay communities arose on March 2000, when several Chinese policemen conducted extensive raids in every Tibetan household in Tingri County and searched for photographs of the Dalai Lama. The raids created panic amongst the villagers and some of them ran away to hide in the nearby hills. After the forcible confiscation of about 700 photos collected from anxious villagers, three Tibetans were detained. For possessing and collecting the Dalai Lama’s photos, described as a “criminal act” by the local authorities, the detainees were fined 5,000 yuan each to secure their freedom or face life imprisonment.⁴⁴

When Geshe Sonam Phuntsok⁴⁵ was granted five minutes to speak out in the courtroom after his sentencing in March 2001, he said, “My arrest and court trial belies the Chinese claim of religious freedom in Tibet and it should be made known to the public”. His major offences were “illegally conducting  religious ceremonies on several occasions within Karze County, seeking an audience with the Dalai Lama in India and taking photographs with him, and conducting a long-life prayer ceremony for the Dalai Lama”. For this the Geshe was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Sources within Tibet speculate that due to his growing popularity and following amongst Tibetans, the Chinese authorities regard Geshe Sonam Phuntsok as an element of threat to the stability of the nation.

Lhasa witnessed renewed restrictions on the age-old traditional celebration of Trunglha Yarsol (the Dalai Lama’s birthday) in July 2001.⁴⁶ The Chinese authorities, as part of various checkrein measures, distributed official circulars “illegalising” Trunglha Yarsol, issued threats and arbitrarily arrested and detained Tibetans just two days prior to the 6 July celebration. A circular titled “Strengthening Abolition of the Illegal Activities of Trunglha Yarsol Celebration and Protection of Social Stability”, issued by the Chinese government on 24 June 2001, lauds their success in curbing earlier birthday celebrations and re-affirms the official stand against such “illegal activities” in the future.

While the circular makes claims about guaranteeing “normal religious activities” and “protecting religious freedom”, it also has a contradictory provision prohibiting any individual or organisation from celebrating Trunglha Yarsol. Activities such as offering prayers, performing an incense-burning ceremony, and throwing tsampa (roasted barley) in the air are rendered “illegal”.

Hundreds of Tibetans were detained from Lhasa region alone two days prior to the Dalai Lama’s birthday on 4 July 2001, under the guise of the “Strike Hard” campaign. These detentions clearly demonstrate how the Beijing government attempts to curb by intimidation the cultural and religious freedoms of Tibetans.

Promoting atheism over religion

Beijing focussed this year on suppressing the growth and manifestation of traditional religious activities by imposing various restrictive measures on the secular community. Tibetans are trapped in the dichotomy between the Chinese Constitution and laws guaranteeing freedom of belief to all citizens, and doctrinaire atheism of the Communist Party. The current campaign promoting atheism has gone hand-in-hand with an increasing number of restrictions on public expressions of belief such as bans on hoisting prayer flags, burning incense, and circumambulating holy sites.⁴⁷

The high-level December 2001 National Religious Working Conference in Beijing called for protection of “normal religious activities” according to the law, but vowed to maintain social stability by cracking down on criminal activities carried out under the cover of religion. Under the PRC government’s broad definition of “splittism” citizens can be penalised for merely practising Buddhism in the privacy of their own homes.

To create an impression of public endorsement for its religious policy in Tibet, the “TAR” government organised a survey on religion this year and the result declared that 87 percent of the 100 households surveyed in Lhasa expressed satisfaction with the existing religious policy. Only one percent of those polled was reportedly dissatisfied. Vice-President of the Buddhist Association of China and President of the Association’s Tibet branch cited the results of the survey to bolster official claims that Buddhists in Tibet enjoy absolute freedom of religious belief.⁴⁸

An editorial in Tibet Daily suggested that young children should be educated in atheism “in order to help rid them of the bad influence of religion”. ⁴⁹ As part of the anti-religion campaign, authorities in middle and primary schools in Lhasa discourage Tibetan children from expressing religious faith and practising any devotional activities. The authorities have labelled practices associated with Tibetan Buddhism as “backward behaviour” and an obstacle to progress, and even banned people from wearing the traditional Buddhist “protection cord” received from high lamas.

Failure to observe the ban on blessed “protection cords” can result in detention, expulsion from school, payment of fines, and being “named and shamed” in front of the whole school. Cases have also been reported of confiscated protection cords being burnt or cut to shreds in the class.⁵⁰ In Lhasa Middle School 2, students are completely banned from wearing such cords or visiting monasteries. Tibetan teachers at the schools are subjected to sudden raids on their homes in searches for objects of religious significance; parents are called to meetings at which they are advised not to take their children to monasteries or to attend any religious ceremonies.⁵¹

An editorial in Tibet Daily suggested that young children should be educated in atheism ‘in order to help rid them of the bad influence of religion’

High-ranking Communist Party officials, including China’s President and CCP Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, have stated that Party members cannot be religious adherents. In October 2000, Wang Lequan, secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee, warned Party members that “…cadres at all levels should consciously adhere to Marxist atheism. Do not believe in religion; do not take part in religious activities”. Such prohibitions extend to the military. The “Routine Service Regulations” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) state explicitly that servicemen “may not take part in religious or superstitious activities”.⁵²

A Beijing insider explains that while the Chinese authorities generally prohibit government-salaried Tibetans from expressions of religious belief, among non-government employees religion is tolerated to an extent.⁵³ But the authorities insist that religion must conform to socialist society,⁵⁴ and if a conflict develops between religion and socialism it is religion that must give way. Clear directives have been made consistently over recent years forbidding Party members, Party officials and government employees from believing in religion. The Dalai Lama should be regarded as an enemy, religious practice prohibited and the display of religious symbols such as statues, thangkas or altars, the Dalai Lama’s portrait, and performing religious ceremonies were all forbidden. Expulsion from Communist Party membership, loss of government jobs and pensions and non-promotion of students to higher classes are penalties imposed for violation of these rules.

This year, TCHRD received information on the defection of a Tibetan communist cadre in 2001 who opposed restrictive religious polices in Tibet. Wangtse had worked for the Chinese Communist government for 24 years when, in June 2000, he criticised the official ban on pilgrimages and the recitation of mantras, restrictions on Tibetan cadres to practise religion, and above all, the ongoing “Patriotic Education” Campaign in monasteries. He testifies that though Tibetans resent the prohibitions on religion, very few dissenting voices can be heard as everyone plays safe and treads cautiously when it comes to “fishing in troubled waters”. A colleague warned him that the Chinese authorities had convened a meeting to assess his loyalty to the Party and look into his alleged critical statements. For fear of being arrested and detained by the local police, Wangtse escaped from Tibet in August 2000.⁵⁵

Article 19(1) of the ICCPR states that everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution guarantees that citizens of the PRC enjoy freedom of speech, of the Press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration. Clearly, Wangtse did not.

The Lhasa authorities tightened control over celebration of significant religious and cultural festivals during the first month of the Tibetan New Year and forbade government workers, cadres and schoolchildren from attending prayer festivals or making financial donations to monasteries.

TCHRD sources report that though restrictions on prayer rooms and shrines are now abating, those embarking on traditional pilgrimages are being subjected to new restrictions. Since the summer of 2000, Chinese authorities in Gergye County, Ngari Prefecture, are insisting upon official permits on payment of a fee, and possession of ID cards to circumambulate Mount Kailash and Manasarovar Lake. Security checkpoints have been set up along the routes to check the identity of pilgrims and about 60 Chinese security guards have been stationed at Mount Kailash. A seven-room building has been constructed for the guards indicating that this is to be a permanent station. The three-day pass costs 18 yuan but people over 50 years are charged only 14 yuan. A new permit must be purchased after every three days.

The politics of reincarnation

On paper, the Chinese State recognises and respects the reincarnation of “holy men or Living Buddhas” and considers the reincarnation procedure a “religious ritual and historical convention of Tibetan Buddhism”. However, Beijing’s “continued interference in this age-old tradition is not only an act of retribution by an atheistic state against the practice of religious freedom”, it can be attributed to “Chinese reincarnation politics”.⁵⁶ On 16 January 2001, the PRC government gave its stamp of approval to the selection of two-year-old Sonam Phuntsog as the seventh incarnation of Reting Rinpoche. Many of the monks at Reting Monastery in Phenpo Lhundrup County, Lhasa Municipality, opposed the selection and intervention in the process by Chinese officials. The young reincarnate is reportedly under close Chinese surveillance in a residence near the monastery.

Another reincarnate lama, seven-year-old Pawo Rinpoche, who was recognised by the 17th Karmapa, is also reportedly under Chinese custody in Nenang Monastery in Toelung Dechen County, Lhasa Municipality. He has been “denied access to his religious tutor” and even foreign officials are “repeatedly denied permission to visit his monastery”.⁵⁷ TIN reports that morale at Nenang and Tsurphu Monastery (seat of the Karmapas) is low following the removal of Pawo Rinpoche to Lhasa and the escape of the Karmapa to exile in India. The decline in the number of monks in both monasteries is partly a result of “work teams” imposing “patriotic education” and also due to the absence of their religious leaders.

The whereabouts and well-being of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 12-year-old 11th Panchen Lama recognised in 1995 by the Dalai Lama, continue to be unknown. The second highest spiritual leader of Tibet disappeared in May 1995 just days after the Dalai Lama announced his choice. All appeals from the international community for access to the boy to ascertain his state of health and circumstances have been rejected by Beijing. Conflict between the religious leadership in Tibet and Beijing over the Panchen Lama succession was highlighted when the abbot of Kumbum Monastery, Agya Rinpoche, spoke out in support of the Dalai Lama and rejected Beijing’s choice of Gyaltsen Norbu as the new Panchen Lama.⁵⁸ Agya Rinpoche was expelled from the CPPCC in June 2000 after defecting to the USA in 1998.

Tibetans are also expressing grave concern over the fate of Chadrel Rinpoche⁵⁹ , former abbot of Tashilhunpo Monastery and head of the Search Committee to identify the successor to the 10th Panchen Lama. When his six-year prison term expired in May 2001, Chadrel Rinpoche failed to make any appearance.

The 17th Karmapa, head of Tibetan Buddhism’s Karma Kargyud School, decided against the career charted out for him by Beijing and at 14 years old escaped across the Himalaya into exile. A Chinese scholar reports that the popularity of the Karmapa among Tibetans, when he was seen as part of Beijing’s “United Front”, is nowhere compared to the popularity he has now gained after fleeing to the Dalai Lama’s camp.⁶⁰ Following the Karmapa’s escape, all Kargyud monasteries in Tibet have remained under tight control. The monks of his Tsurphu Monastery have been subjected to serious restrictions and armed police continuously scrutinise their movements and activities. The normal flow of pilgrims and tourists to Tsurphu has declined drastically and the “TAR” officials have revised the administration.

Having anointed their own candidates for Tibet’s religious hierarchy, Beijing is now anticipating its role in recognition of a future Dalai Lama. Raidi, the Tibetan Deputy Secretary of the CCP, told Hong Kong journalists visiting Lhasa in August 2001 that the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation would be chosen according to “historical customs and religious rituals”. The choice will then be confirmed “…after being ratified by the central Chinese government”, according to reports carried by the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Beijing’s need to manipulate the selection of a future Dalai Lama is seen by analysts as official fear of losing control over the region’s restive and highly religious people. Raidi even accuses the present Dalai Lama of “sabotaging economic growth and instigating unrest in Tibet”.⁶¹ The Dalai Lama, in his turn, has chosen to leave the issue of his next incarnation to be decided by the people of Tibet and all those who believe in the institution”.⁶² In an interview with Julian Gearing, (Asiaweek 10 October 2000) the Dalai Lama predicted, “If I pass away, my reincarnation will logically come outside Tibet, in a free country. That’s because the main purpose of reincarnation is to continue the task not yet accomplished in this life. But China will pick a boy as the next Dalai Lama, though in reality he isn’t . As with the Panchen Lama, Tibetans won’t recognise him.” Politics govern reincarnation and every other aspect of religious life in today’s Tibet.

The US condemns the PRC for ‘persecution’

The International Religious Freedom Report 2001 released by the US State Department on 26 October concludes that overall repression in Tibet remains high, and the government’s record of respect for religious freedom remains poor.

There is specific mention of the PRC government’s “tight control on religious practices and places of worship in Tibet” and forcible suppression of those religious activities viewed as “vehicles for political dissent”.⁶³ President George Bush noted in sharp terms that, “traditional religious practices in Tibet have long been the target of especially harsh and unjust persecution”.⁶⁴

The European Parliament’s 15 February 2001 Resolution on Religious Freedom criticises the “…state control over religion” and the “…policy of repressing religious activity in China”. While condemning China’s delay in ratifying the ICCPR, the resolution defines the violations of human rights in Tibet as “severe” and notes the discrimination against the Tibetan people on the basis of their ethnic, religious, cultural and political origin. The resolution urges all Member States to submit a resolution to the UN Commission of Human Rights over the issue of “…violations of religious rights, and in particular, those directed against Tibetan and Mongolian monks…”⁶⁵

In his address to the European Parliament’s General Assembly on 24 October 2001, the Dalai Lama expressed concern that “…an entire Tibetan people with its unique culture and identity are facing the threat of extinction”. Three days later, an official of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing called the Dalai Lama’s statement “sheer nonsense designed to fool the world”. The official boasted that Tibet has experienced “earth-shaking changes” over the years and the freedom of religious belief and all the fundamental rights and freedoms have been guaranteed to the full.⁶⁶

New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Phil Goff, raised the issue of religious freedom to the Chinese authorities in Lhasa during his four-day trip to Tibet in June 2001. He was concerned that the freedom of religion in Tibet remained under “tight control”.⁶⁷ Conversely, Legqog, Chairman of the “TAR”, declared in a press conference a month earlier that the freedom of religious belief is well guaranteed according to the Chinese Constitution. But he warned, nobody is allowed to undermine social stability and economic development in Tibet under the pretext of religion.⁶⁸

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concluded a two-day hearing on a Chinese government report on minority rights with a statement that it remains “concerned with regard to the …freedom of religion by people belonging to national minorities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet”. The UN body urged China to ensure the promotion of local and regional culture and traditions and respect for the rights of the populations.⁶⁹