Publications

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Annual Report 2001

THE RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD

The right to livelihood is a term that can be used to describe the fundamental rights of people to fulfilling, dignified work or other sources of subsistence, including access to land and productive resources, and to basic labour protections. It draws in several articles of the ICESCR, such as the right of a people to not be “deprived of its own means of subsistence";¹ the right to freely choose work which is adequately renumerated;² the right to assistance from the State in the event of unemployment or lack of resources;³ and the right not to be discriminated against in relation to all these rights.⁴

The right to livelihood must be read in the light of the first article of the ICESCR which guarantees the right of all peoples to self-determination and the right to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. This right has been further clarified in the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD), the right to development requires governments to “formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom”.⁵ It is therefore inherent in the right to livelihood that the people whose livelihood are affected are themselves involved in the development of any policies affecting them.

In 2001, testimonies provided to TCHRD show a rural sector struggling under insensitive policies which in many cases destroy the ability of Tibetans to eke out a living. While Tibet’s rural sector suffers, Tibetans in urban areas face increasing unemployment or discriminatory employment conditions. China’s policy of population transfer of Chinese migrants into Tibet is rapidly marginalising Tibetans in towns and cities. The Chinese language has become the language of business, while Chinese businesses can access cheaper goods from Chinese markets in the east.

The formulation of all these policies occurs in Beijing, with little involvement of the Tibetans whose lives are affected by them. In 2001 the PRC showed no interest in delivering policies to Tibetans based on their needs, requests or interests. Rather it pursues its own agenda of resource-extraction and “modernisation”. The result is an increasingly dissatisfied Tibetan rural sector largely untouched by massive Chinese investment in Tibet; discrimination against Tibetans in the market economy; the loss of livelihoods in both rural and urban economies; and the potential for massive environmental devastation. These conditions appear set to worsen after China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001.

Rural livelihoods

The vast majority of Tibetans living in Tibet – over 80 percent of Tibetans⁶ – sustain their living in agriculture and/or nomadic pastoralism. Crops such as barley (which accounts for over half the grain harvested in Tibet), wheat, peas and rapeseed are cultivated, while nomads herd yaks, sheep and goats. Beijing makes much of its support of the rural sector, boasting that “no levies have been imposed on the peasants and herdsmen in Tibet since 1980 and there is no compulsory state purchase of grain there. The income that Tibetan peasants and herdsmen earn is entirely their own…”⁷ However this statement is contradicted by testimonies from refugees who fled Tibet in 2001. Refugees describe a rural sector struggling under high taxes, compulsory selling of produce to the government at below-market prices, an insensitive land distribution policy, and forced labour schemes. In addition, the so-called environmental protection schemes disproportionably impact upon traditional rural livelihoods while leaving untouched China’s massive resource-extraction programme.

Divide and rule: destroying nomadism

The distribution and fencing of grasslands has been based on the geographical location of villages and without consultation with the nomads as to a just system of distribution. High mountain villages have been allocated the high land surrounding them while low-lying villages are given low land. The seasonal rotation essential for effective nomadism was therefore destroyed. Low-lying villagers have no access to the high grazing land in warmer months, and high-land villagers have no access to low-lying land in the winter. Once recent arrival from Ngamring County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR” provides a concrete example of the effect on his community:

We do not have good grassland in the winter. People quarrel over the grassland because their animals graze on others’ lands. When there is a shortage of grassland, the animals stay hungry.¹²

The PRC has also justified fencing as necessary to protect lands from overgrazing (see section on “Right to control natural resources” within this chapter). However, the current policy encourages overgrazing of available grassland, leaving little free for rejuvenation. It has also been pointed out that the distribution and fencing of land provides a good opportunity for restricting the access of nomads to lands the PRC wishes to mine.¹⁴

The Tibetans suffering under the programme can see no point behind the policy except to destroy their way of life. One refugee believes the fencing system is deliberately setting Tibetans against each other.

If we live happily with our neighbours the government officials tell us that we cannot live this way. The government distributed the grasslands, divided the river and always makes us fight because we are told to stop other people’s cattle coming onto our land. The government doesn’t come at all to give advice. The officials are happy if we fight because they will receive bribes to allocate larger amounts of land.¹⁵

In some cases people had to sell their cattle in order to buy fences, and when they finished erecting the fences, there were no cattle left to put within them

Some nomads believe that the division of the grasslands is motivated by a desire to sedentarise nomads in order to make it easier to collect taxes from them.¹⁷ A former village Community Party Secretary who escaped into exile in 2001 was responsible for collecting taxes for his village. He is extremely critical of the heavy taxation experienced by nomads.

The nomads have to pay animal tax, land tax, tax when animals are killed, tax when animals are sold. The government every year says there is a new tax and that the total amount of tax is increased. If one household has to pay 1,500 yuan (US$176) tax this year then they have to pay 2,000 yuan (US$235) next year. They kill the nomads’ lives with their taxes.¹⁸

There are also recent reports of government authorities telling nomads to abandon herding and take up business, and many nomads believe this is because the government will then be able to “take lots of tax”.²¹ In Malho “TAP”, Qinghai, some nomads, desperate for money to survive, have begun selling their land to Chinese traders who then set up shops.²²While this may provide nomads money in the short-term, this is no solution to long-term survival. This also shows no respect for the skills and unique culture of nomadic Tibetans. Once again, a vital – and viable – part of Tibet’s culture is being destroyed in order for the PRC to pursue their own agenda on the Tibetan plateau.

Arbitrary policies in the farming sector

While nomads have borne the brunt of the PRC’s rural “reform” programme in 2001, testimonies to TCHRD also show a struggling farming sector. The arbitrary and outdated land allocation scheme is a major complaint of many farmers. The PRC collectivised all private property in China after assuming power in 1949; after the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) the PRC admitted that collectivisation had been disastrous, and so the “Household Responsibility System” was introduced into Tibet in the early 1980s.²³ Farmlands were decollectivised by apportioning amounts of land and animals to each family based on the number of people in the family at that time. As there has been no re-allocation of land after the initial grants, families who had children after the date of allocation are still expected to survive on the same acreage.

A comparison of several Tibetan families illustrates the effect of an arbitrary land-allocation policy on their livelihoods. Lobsang, a farmer from Dromo County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, his wife and three children try to live from three mu (equivalent to 201 sq m) of land which is the share allocated to just two people, as none of Lobsang’s children had been born at the time of land allocation. To make ends meet, Lobsang’s family are forced to seek alternative sources of income.²⁴

Tenzin from Ngamring County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, has 11 family members. Seven members of the family were alive when land was allocated so they received a large portion of land, around 37 mu (2,500 sq m). Tenzin says that her family’s agricultural livelihood is sufficient to support them, although several family members also do “sidejobs” for additional income.²⁵ Sonam from Karze County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan, lived with her three daughters and husband on a farm. As two of her daughters were alive in 1980 when the land was allocated, the size of their farm is sufficient to support them.²⁶

The plight of those families with small land allocations is exacerbated by a complicated taxation scheme. A recent article in the Beijing Review admitted that a multitude of “agricultural fees” were collected from farmers throughout China for such things as “public accumulated funds, public welfare, management, education, family planning and communications”.²⁷ Taxation is sometimes levied by township authorities, and sometime by the county government, with very little consistency throughout China.

A recently-arrived refugee from Tingri County in Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, outlines the scheme for taxes, fees and quotas his family is obliged to pay:

• land tax calculated annually based on the number of mu – in 2001 the amount per mu was three times the previous year’s rate;
• water fees/tax for irrigation calculated monthly, again based on number of mu;
• compulsory sale of wheat to the government: an annual amount of between 165-175 gyama (82.5 – 87.5 kg) of wheat per family member, for which the government pays half the market price.²⁸

The money made from selling to the government covered the taxation fees; the remaining grain was just enough for the family to feed itself. Farmers are not permitted to sell their grain privately. Non-farmers in his region, mostly nomads, had to purchase grain from the government stores at market prices. To ensure that the nomads do not bypass this system, checkpoints have been set up and nomads who are found with grain for which they have no government receipt have their purchase confiscated and those farmers who sold the product are fined.²⁹

Most Tibetans TCHRD interviewed had no idea what all these taxes were used for, except where they gave directly to government officials for those officials’ winter food supplies. Indeed, even village or town leaders who liaised with county governments were unaware of the purposes of the taxes or why particular increases were necessary.³⁰ In the absence of information or any tangible improvement in their lives, it is easy to understand why Tibetans may suspect that their money and produce goes into the pockets of local officials.

An illuminating article in the Beijing Review recently admitted that the “burden on farmers is mainly embodied in supporting redundant township staff members”.³¹ The PRC apparently has plans to remedy this situation and has introduced pilot taxation reform projects in some provinces in rural China.³² However neither the “TAR”, nor any of the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures, appear to be involved with the pilot projects. In any event the tax reform only expects to increase farmers’ incomes by around 60 yuan (US$7) per year, hardly enough to improve the conditions of Tibet’s farmers.

While Tibetan agriculturalists are struggling to earn a livelihood due to high taxes and compulsory sales of grain at below-market prices, Chinese settlers in urban areas of Tibet receive subsidies of approximately US$128 per person, including access to wheat imported into Tibet purely for consumption by Chinese residents.³³ The United Nations World Food Programme, for example, has estimated that almost the entire budget of Amdo (Ch: Qinghai) is spent on importing grain.³⁴ The combined effect of a food subsidy policy favouring urban settlers, while primary producers in Tibet face increasing taxation and below-market price for their grain, is discrimination against Tibetans in favour of Chinese settlers.

Threatened “sideline” incomes: the case of Yartsa Gunbhu

Due to government policies eroding farming and nomadic incomes, rural Tibetans have relied on “sideline” or supplementary sources of cash. For example, a farmer from Ngamring County in Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, spends two to three months every year to do minor construction work on houses, laying electricity wires or wool-spinning.³⁵

Another important source of income has been collecting and selling the medicinal plant Yartsa Gunbhu (cordyceps sinensis).³⁶ In 2001 information came from Tibet that collection of this plant is now under threat due to interference by the PRC and the rapidly-growing interest of traders from outside Tibet.

Yartsa Gunbhu is highly valued in China as an ingredient in indigenous medicine, and increasingly popular in the West. It has been promoted on internet sites as a “miracle ingredient” improving stamina in athletes and making people feel younger.³⁷ Yartsa Gunbhu grows in Tibetan highlands. Traditionally the highlands were accessible to all Tibetans from the local area, so families would go to “pluck” the plant for free. They would then sell to traders for around 3,000 yuan (US$353) per gyama; in an average season one family could pluck anywhere between two to eight gyama (one to four kg) of the valuable plant.

As grassland throughout Tibet becomes fenced, some families or county governments end up with Yartsa Gunbhu growing on their lands. They can therefore charge collectors for access or prohibit access altogether. This has further exacerbated tension over the fencing of grassland. A recently-arrived refugee told of at least 10 deaths in his region caused by fights over access to Yartsa Gunbhu: “We have asked the Chinese authorities to come up with a solution to this conflict but they haven’t come up with anything”.³⁸

In addition to these fights between Tibetans, there is now hot competition with traders from China.³⁹ One collector says that his group of four used to gather seven to eight gyama (3.5 – four kg) of the fungus, but “now we only get three to four gyama (1.5 – two kg) because that is all that is left after outsiders come in”.⁴⁰

A former Tibetan trader in Yartsa Gunbhu suspects that private collection of the product is now under threat from government authorities. He told TCHRD of reports that from 2002 the government plans to stop the plucking of Yartsa Gunbhu by private individuals. They say that no one is allowed to pluck it unless they give tax… Previously the town government took 200 to 500 yuan (US$23 - $59) from each person plucking. From next year, the government will take 1,000 yuan (US$118). This will make it very difficult for local people to make a profit.⁴¹

At the Fourth Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing in 2001, priority was given to the development of specialist Tibetan industries and economies which may include Tibetan medicine.⁴² Given the information from this trader, and the sheer value of Yartsa Gunbhu, it appears inevitable that the Chinese government is now moving to take over this industry, thereby comandeering another crucial source of livelihood for rural Tibetans.

Poverty reduction schemes

The ICESCR obliges governments to recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing.⁴³ In the absence of employment or other sources of independent livelihood, governments must guarantee people the right to social security.⁴⁴ Article 8 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development also obliges governments to undertake “all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure…equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income”.

China’s Constitution grants citizens the right to material assistance from the state and society when they are old, ill or disabled, if necessary through social insurance, social relief and medical and health services.⁴⁵ The sorts of “social relief” offered to Tibetans in 2001 showed once again that the Beijing government fails to consult or include Tibetans.

In October 2001 the PRC released the White Paper on the Development-Oriented Poverty Reduction Programme for Rural China (heareafter White Paper on Poverty Reduction)⁴⁶ which acknowledged that poverty in areas such as the “TAR” and other autonomous regions had not been eradicated.⁴⁷ Only a month later the PRC claimed in the White Paper on Tibet’s March Towards Modernisation (hereafter White Paper on Modernisation) that “…people of all ethnic groups in Tibet [have] basically shaken off poverty, and had enough to eat and wear…”⁴⁸

The PRC claims that the impoverished section of the population of “TAR” has been reduced from 480,000 in the early 1990s to just over 70,000 today. It has been pointed out that China calculates its numbers of poor people using China’s own poverty line which is equivalent to around US20 cents per day – a fifth of the internationally-accepted poverty line of US$1 per day.⁴⁹ Obviously if China used the international poverty line the numbers of impoverished people in Tibet would be much higher.

The information TCHRD received from Tibetans reaching exile in 2001 shows that poverty-reduction schemes put in place in Tibet have been disorganised, inconsistent from county to county and even village to village, rife with corruption and largely inaccessible to the very poor. Several exiles said that poor families did receive one or two sacks of grain from the local government.⁵⁰ However, other exiles said in their region the government gave nothing to the poor.⁵¹ In some cases, the only assistance for the poor is provided by the local monastery; for example, the shop of a monastery in Trika County, Tsolho “TAP”, Qinghai, provides daily necessities, animal medication and fertiliser to poor families on credit and at cost price, with an understanding that these families will pay the monastery back when they have the money.⁵²

China boasts about its provision of “small-amount credit loans” to poor households as a measure to eradicate poverty.⁵³ A recent arrival from Tibet explained that families could only borrow money from the government if they owned property to mortgage.⁵⁴ A quarter of the amount loaned would be taxed by the government in the name of the “help-the-poor” scheme. In theory this fund would then be accessible to poorer families to borrow money to build a house. However, in practice very poor families were refused loans. The TCHRD informant gave an example of a nine-member family in his village who through misfortune lost all three adults capable of earning a living. After repeated requests for assistance the county government gave the family a 300 yuan (US$35) grant but nothing more. As there is no social security or income support available, this family is now dependent on the generosity and charity of Tibetan neighbours.

Another unpopular element of China’s poverty eradication plan is to encourage migration of poor families away from “areas with extremely difficult living conditions to more favourable areas”.⁵⁵ A recent arrival explains that in her area the scheme first of all used forced labour to build new houses and break new fields. Then she comments

the policy behind the forced labour was poverty reduction, a concept with potential that was once again poorly implemented. The poor people for whom the houses and fields were being constructed often refused to leave, not wanting to be forced to leave their family’s area.⁵⁶

Finally, TCHRD was informed by some refugees that the township authorities faked their incomes so that they did not appear as poor as they actually were.⁵⁸ A former township party secretary described his job as being

to make fake reports on the development of the people, places and animals. When we write the reports and submit them to the higher levels they also exaggerate more in the reports and then submit them to their superiors.⁵⁹

The right to control natural resources

The ICESCR recognises “the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”⁶⁰ The UN Declaration on the Right to Development also states:

The human right to development also implies the full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.⁶¹

The poor people for whom the houses and fields were being constructed often refused to leave, not wanting to be forced to leave their family’s area

The government’s policy of forced sedentarisation of nomads not only denies a large sector of the Tibetan community their livelihood but also threatens Tibet’s environment throughthe opening up of lands for mining.⁶² In Lithang County, Karze “TAP”, Sichuan, grassland which used to be nomads’ grazing lands was spoiled by a mine, and animals can no longer graze there. The informant who gave this information to TCHRD says that income from the mine and factory does not benefit the area. Local people do not work at the mine or factory; employment is provided only to Chinese settlers.⁶³ A Tibetan from Chentsa County in Malho “TAP”, Qinghai, is very cynical about mining.

In our area there is a mountain which we consider very sacred. Now the government says that they will dig the mountain…They said they would extract the minerals and so they constructed a road to the mountain last year. It is said there are eight different kinds of minerals in the mountain. Close to this mountain there is a group of people who the government has deceived by saying if they allow them to extract minerals from this mountain they will draw water to them.⁶⁴

Because we dig by hand we are not able to excavate all the gold. The Chinese dig with machines for more gold. After they have done that we can’t find more gold again in that place. They dig up stones and rocks, whatever their machines meet, and leave holes big as four to five storey buildings. We Tibetans don’t have such machinery. We sit and watch in amazement at the sites where the machinery of the Chinese is at work.⁶⁵

If you can manage to pay bribes to the right officer in the forestry department, an Authorisation Certificate can be obtained which would allow the logging and transportation of timber ranging from 30 to 100 lorry loads. Once you have the Authorisation Certificate, there is no one to stop you from transporting the timber to anywhere for sale for a massive profit. Most of this timber goes to China.

There are also fears that logging operations will merely shift from non-“TAR” areas into the “TAR”, which has not been subjected to logging bans. Logging practices within “TAR” are, however, controlled by the government but the purpose of the control is less to limit the amount of logging than it is to provide the government with yet another source of income. A recent arrival from Dromo County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, explained that prior to 1996 his family would chop wood for six months every year and earned 10 yuan (US$1.20) per bundle selling to private buyers in the cities of Shigatse and Lhasa. In 1996 the zhangmo, or forest department, took over operations, requiring people to sell wood directly to the Department for only 4.5 (US$0.50) yuan per bundle.⁶⁸

Many refugees informed TCHRD of another environmental initiative apparently designed to lessen the likelihood of flooding: enforced plantation.⁶⁹ Farmers across the plateau have been ordered by the government to plant some of their farmland with trees and grasses. Although compensation is provided in small amounts of cash or grain, many families report that it is insufficient.⁷⁰ Without sufficient land on which to farm, many families are suffering a drastic reduction in their quality of life and are reduced to living hand-to-mouth.⁷¹ Some Tibetan farmers claim that this new scheme is in the name of the Western Development Programme: they protested to the government that all “Western Development” meant for them was the loss of their land.⁷² Needless to say, these complaints have gone unheeded by Beijing.

This year TCHRD was provided with information about the exploitation of several lakes through over-fishing.⁷³ According to a refugee who left Tibet early 2001, two lakes in Matoe County, Golog “TAP”, Qinghai, were depleted of fish when Chinese settlers took up commercial fishing there. The Chinese fishermen then moved on to fishing at two more lakes which were considered by local Tibetans to be “very sacred and should not be exploited”. This informant said that Tibetans are protesting against fishing in these sacred lakes “but as usual, the locals’ protests are in vain”.⁷⁴

In addition to overfishing, Tibet’s watercourses are suffering from ill-designed dams for powerplants which often lead to unexpected flooding of farm and grasslands, affecting thousands of Tibetans.⁷⁵ The wishes and aspirations of local people are clearly not consulted or considered when the PRC designs these projects. In 2001, several refugees warned of plans for another dam on the Machu River crossing Malho and Tsolho “TAP”, Qinghai, which will require forced resettlement of at least 1,000 people.⁷⁶

Many new hotels and restaurants will be constructed, and many people from China who have lost their jobs will come to find work . . . [T]he influx of more and more Chinese people with education and skills means that local Tibetans . . . will gradually be marginalised

Urban livelihoods

The 15-20 percent of Tibetans who live in urban areas of Tibet encounter different problems to rural Tibetans, most of them caused by China’s policy of population transfer. Since the early 1990s the Beijing government has encouraged a mass influx of Chinese migrants into the “TAR” and surrounding “TAP”s. These migrants are lured to urban areas by offers of employment, government-sponsored infrastructure projects, a rapid improvement in infrastructure of these cities, relaxed regulations governing private enterprises and cut-price loans to Chinese migrants to start businesses in Tibet.⁷⁷ Gyaltsen Norbu, then-chairman of the “TAR” government, stated in January 1993 that “We must open our door wide... and formulate preferential policies to attract qualified personnel.”⁷⁸

This policy of attracting Chinese migrants to Tibet through offers of employment in infrastructure projects received a boost in 2001 through the Chinese government’s all-out promotion of the Western Development Programme. Originally launched in June 1999, the Western Development Programme is explained by the PRC as “preferential construction projects of infrastucture facilities, ecological environment and resource development in the western region”.⁷⁹ In 2001 the Fourth Tibet Work Forum also described the Western Development Programme as a “leap-over” model of development for Tibet.”⁸⁰ The Chinese government’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) for National Economic and Social Development identified four major infrastructure projects in China: the Qinghai-Tibet railway, the west-to-east gas pipeline, west-to-east electricity transmission, and water diversion from north to south.⁸¹ All these projects will attract more Chinese personnel into Tibet, and in the case of the railway, will actively transport Chinese migrants.⁸²

In addition, this year the Chinese government announced that a new 12.5 sq km Special Economic Zone (SEZ) would be set up in the Ne’u township in Toelung Dechen County, Lhasa Municipality. The Tenth “TAR” Five-year Plan (2001-2005) in announcing the SEZ promised that the zone would “become the pioneers of economic development of Lhasa and even the whole autonomous region”.⁸³ In an effort to entice investors, taxation rates for businesses setting up in the SEZ are being offered at half the normal rate. The SEZ will also be the site of the Lhasa railway terminus.⁸⁴

A Tibetan former government official who lived in Lhasa explained that the economic development of Toelung Dechen following the announcement of the new railway station, would increase the numbers of Chinese workers in the area but was unlikely to benefit local Tibetans.

Many new hotels and restaurants will be constructed, and many people from China who have lost their jobs will come to find work. There may be some short-term benefit for Tibetans in the construction of shops and restaurants for local people, but the influx of more and more Chinese people with education and skills means that local Tibetans may only be able to hold onto these jobs for a couple of years, and will gradually be marginalised. After the construction of the railway station at Xining (northern Tibet), local people got jobs as cleaners and ticket sellers and so on, but gradually many of them lost these jobs due to competition from more skilled Chinese migrant workers.⁸⁵

The population transfer, coupled with Chinese government propaganda often referring to Tibet as a “backwards” area, is also the cause of racial harassment and discrimination against Tibetans.

A Tibetan woman who used to work as a taxi driver in Lhasa claimed that racist opinions are prevalent among Chinese settlers in Tibet, and can be shown in the fact that “Chinese people never ride in taxis driven by Tibetans, they always seem to prefer taxis driven by fellow Chinese”.⁸⁸ Given the high percentage of Chinese people living in Lhasa, and their higher disposable incomes, such discrimination would have a significant effect on Tibetans employed in private transport.

A former traffic policeman from Sangchu County, Gannan “TAP”, Gansu, reported that Tibetan drivers were more regularly penalised than Chinese drivers.⁸⁹ He believed that the Chinese officials in charge of traffic infringements were biased, and arbitrarily interpreted the vague traffic regulations in such a way as to fine only Tibetans. Receipts for the fines were not issued and there was a widespread belief among Tibetans that the Chinese officials embezzled the money. In general, this informant felt that Tibetans were looked down on by Chinese settlers and accused of being lazy. He believed that as Tibetans are a minority in the workforce, discrimination against them went unchecked.

Discrimination in employment

In ratifying the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the PRC bound itself to “recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work”⁹⁰ including fair wages and equal renumeration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind;⁹¹ safe and healthy working conditions;⁹² equal opportunity for promotion;⁹³ and a reasonable limitation of working hours plus paid holidays.⁹⁴ When read in conjunction with the ICERD, which China ratified in 1981, it is clear that “equal” and “just” employment conditions include employment being available without discrimination on the grounds of race.

The Chinese Constitution declares that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right as well as the duty to work”⁹⁵ and that all citizens be treated equally.⁹⁶

In 2001 it was apparent that despite international law and the Chinese Constitution, Tibetans experienced great difficulties in obtaining employment of any sort; when they did obtain work, they often experienced discrimination. In jobs where Chinese and Tibetans undertook the same work, large discrepancies in wages are reported with Tibetans receiving half the salary of Chinese - or an even lesser ratio. An exile from Rebkong County, Malho “TAP”, Qinghai, who was employed at an aluminium factor testified that “Tibetans are paid only about 200-400 yuan (US$23-47) whereas the Chinese were paid as high as 1,000 to 1,500 yuan (US$117-176), all for the same work.”⁹⁷

One area in which Tibetans have in the past found employment is the tourism sector, as Tibetans are better able to act as guides and interpreters. International NGOs also prefer to work with Tibetan rather than Chinese interpreters, as Tibetans naturally have a better accent.⁹⁸ However, in 2001 many Tibetan tourist guides, particularly those who had spent any time in India, were being subjected to repeated questioning by Chinese authorities. It was also rumoured that a thousand Chinese tourist guides were being trained in China and would be brought to Lhasa to replace Tibetans in the tourist industry.⁹⁹ This year reports also emerged that porters in Tingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”, are being hit with a taxation increase from 20 yuan (US$2.30) per climb to 450 yuan (US$53) per climb – considering that each climb earns porters 800 yuan (US$94), this appears to be a concerted attack on one of the last sectors in which Tibetans were better equipped to earn a living than Chinese people.¹⁰⁰

This year the PRC government claimed that “a great number of farmers and herdsmen have become businessmen, throwing themselves into the mainstream of the market economy”.¹⁰¹

Obtaining employment or running a successful business in Tibet often centres around guanxi or “connections” rather than the skills or suitability of the applicant. Chinese settlers in Tibet are far more likely to have connections with high-ranking Chinese officials, putting them in a better position to obtain employment and business permits. A Tibetan student reports that

without a good connection with high up Chinese officials there is no chance of getting employed. Even higher qualifications do not count in terms of finding a job unless you have equally good Chinese contacts...it is through personal contacts and backdoor connections that good jobs are obtained.¹⁰³

An exile from Mangra County, Tsolho “TAP”, Qinghai, shares the view that fluency in Chinese language is the most important criteria for employment. This has led Tibetan youths to believe that learning Tibetan is of no benefit if they want to succeed in the workforce.¹⁰⁵

This year the PRC’s Tenth Five-Year Plan for the “TAR” proposed a recruitment drive for teachers of Chinese nationality in order to further develop Tibet. The Plan states “We must put existing qualified personnel to good use and actively recruit from outside [the TAR] the qualified personnel we urgently need.”¹⁰⁶

The cumulative effect of discrimination meted out to Tibetans accelerated problems of unemployment among them. Today, many young Tibetans who have struggled to obtain university degrees are uncertain about their livelihood, and the few who are able to gain employment find themselves in jobs that do not reflect their qualifications.¹⁰⁷ One refugee reported that

even after graduating from university the students do not get a job. They often wait three or four years to start work. Now there are more than 200 graduates from our Tshodrug County who are unemployed. It is said that graduates from teacher’s college do not get jobs at all. If the university graduates manage to get employed, it is usually just a forest job. Most of the educated opt for agricultural work, which itself is not free from discrimination.¹⁰⁸

Despite a plethora of international and national laws claiming to protect women in the workforce, Tibetan women continue to face discrimination in their attempts to gain employment in Tibet. The International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of gender, while Article 11 of the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) provides for equal employment of women, including the right to freely choose employment, the right to equal pay for equal work and the right to healthy and safe working conditions.

A Tibetan woman employed as a bricklayer reports that the Chinese labourers not only receive higher wages for easier work, but Tibetan men also receive higher wages than she did for the same work.¹¹¹ In the face of discriminatory practises, the economic difficulties faced by the many unemployed Tibetan women could render them vulnerable to being exposed to trafficking and prostitution.¹¹² It has recently been estimated that there are 7,000 Tibetan girls in Lhasa now working as prostitutes.¹¹³ In June 2001, a recently-exiled monk knew 23 girls from Tsolho “TAP”, Qinghai, who went to Lhasa for teacher’s college training. On completing the training, the girls were unable to find employment. They told him that “they had finished all their money and were left with no other ways to make their living except to become prostitutes.”¹¹⁴

While Tibetans struggle to eke out a living in the primary sector or in the employment market, an increasing number are being utilised by the Chinese government in compulsory labour schemes. “Re-education-through-labour” camps provide a source of cheap labour for the Chinese government. Such camps have been roundly condemned by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), of which China is a member, for being in breach of international law in that people detained in the camps are not sentenced by judicial bodies but rather by administrative committees.¹¹⁵

In Tibet, re-education-through-labour is used often for the detention of political dissidents against whom criminal charges have not been made but who have shown “splittist” inclinations.¹¹⁶ People who have been convicted by a court and imprisoned also undertake labour while in detention. Once again, this also includes many Tibetan political prisoners.¹¹⁷ The work done by the detainees of both types of camps includes major development projects in rural and urban areas. A refugee interviewed by TCHRD in 2001 reported that

the Lhasa railway station is being constructed by people in the labour camps. Any people who were found gambling in Lhasa were arrested and sent to work for the railway station for two years as punishment. Any Tibetan who were caught trying to escape Tibet were also sent to work on the railway for three to four years.¹¹⁸

I believe a serious review leading to the abolition of the practice of re-education- through-labour is justified. The concept of using forced labour as a punishment is against the accepted international human rights embodied in many international instruments.¹¹⁹

Beijing’s economic goals for Tibet

This year the PRC stated in their White Paper on Modernisation that “social and economic development has improved the [Tibetan] people’s material and cultural life remarkably”.¹²⁰ The White Paper then goes on to list various economic statistics, making it clear that when China refers to development it means an increase in productivity, economic investment, the gross domestic product (GDP) or average incomes. However, many rural Tibetans in the case studies given above spoke disparagingly of the “Development Programme”, commenting that their lives were certainly not developing.

Claims of development of Tibet by the PRC based on these economic indicators can be criticised on two fronts: firstly, the PRC fails to differentiate between the incomes or economic condition of ethnic Tibetans as opposed to Chinese settlers; secondly, the definition of development as purely economic improvement runs counter to the holistic concept of development held by the United Nations.

The PRC claims an increase in incomes across Tibet in the White Paper on Modernisation. Keeping in mind that for China “Tibet” is only the “TAR”, these statistics fail to differentiate between the incomes of ethnic Tibetans and Chinese migrants who have moved into the “TAR” under the PRC’s policy of population transfer. Given the testimonies of the Tibetans living in urban areas dominated by Chinese settlers, it is clear that the beneficiaries of the PRC’s policy in Tibet are Chinese settlers while Tibetans are becoming more marginalised. By averaging incomes the PRC effectively covers up the increasing polarisation between rural and urban incomes, and between Tibetan and Chinese people’s incomes in urban areas.

A second criticism of the Beijing government’s claims in relation to Tibet is that its plans for development are purely based on ideas of modernisation or economic advancement. However GDP and income statistics mean very little when taken out of context from other poverty indicators such as health, education, nutrition, clothing, housing, and quality of life. The United Nations Development Programme has consistently found that the “TAR” and other Tibetan areas are ranked lower than most other areas of China in the Human Development Index, which uses indicators such as education, income, and health.¹²¹ In 2001 a representative of the Asian Development Bank in China advised the Chinese government that living conditions will not improve by increased expenditure on infrastructure programmes alone, but only if more money is spent on education and health.¹²²

The definition of development as economic advancement is clearly not the same as the definition conceived by the United Nations. The ICESCR states that all peoples have the right to pursue their “economic, social and cultural development”. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize winner for Economics, has articulated a framework of development which is used by the UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development.¹²³ He states

In judging economic development it is not adequate to look only at the growth of GNP [gross national product] or some other indicators of over-all economic expansion. We have to look also at the impact of democracy and political freedoms on the lives and capabilities of the citizens.¹²⁴

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China gives the central government the role of developing economic policy for minority autonomous areas in order to speed up development of those areas. In 1984 the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law granted the “TAR” People’s Congress some limited powers regarding the administration of economic policies. Despite this lip service paid to “autonomy” of the Tibetan people, economic policy for Tibet continued to be set by the Beijing government.

In February 2001 the Beijing government removed even this token of respect for Tibet’s so-called “autonomy”. It amended the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law to ensure that the development of Ethnic Autonomous Regions (such as “TAR”) will be carried out under the unified plans of the central authorities in accordance with market demand.¹²⁵ The government justified the amendments as being necessary to accelerate the development of autonomous regions and further integrate such regions into the rest of China.¹²⁶ These amendments make it clear that development in Tibet will be based on the needs of the Chinese market rather than local needs and interests.

To ensure close adherence to Beijing’s economic goals, Tibetans have for some time been sent to different parts of China to learn economic production strategies. In 2001 a Tibetan now living in exile explains the results of this training:

Tibetans who have been deputed to undergo specialist training in different parts of China have undergone political indoctrination rather than focusing on the realities of local situations prevailing in the Tibetan areas where they are to work. These Tibetans do learn about scientific and technical means of raising [industrial] economic productivity but these are based on Chinese policies of development, and are aimed at pushing forward the campaign to popularise “scientific” means of improving economic productivity, replacing the traditional methods of production practised among the farming and nomadic communities of Tibet. These policies are frequently incompatible with either the current economic realities [in Tibet] or the cultural life of the Tibetan people…¹²⁷

Perhaps in awareness that many Tibetan cadres are reluctant to be a propaganda tool for the Beijing government, since 1995 the PRC began posting Chinese cadres into administrative positions throughout Tibet. This year, for example, the PRC boasted that 70 cadres were being educated in Tibetan language and “nationalities policy” at the University of Tibet. Upon completion of their course the cadres will be appointed to various administrative positions in farming and nomadic areas of the “TAR”.¹³⁰

Tibetans who fled into exile in 2001 display a keen awareness that the Chinese government is only interested in what it can get out of Tibet rather than what it can do for Tibet. The Chinese government pays no attention to feedback from Tibetans regarding the economic policies designed in Beijing. However one refugee pointed out that China has selective deafness on matters relating to Tibet:

When disputes over pastureland result in bloodshed among the nomads, the authorities hardly take any notice. One would think they never notice anything that Tibetans do, but this is not so. When some Tibetans put up posters demanding Tibetan freedom, immediately Chinese police swoop on the site.¹³¹

Effect of WTO and globalisation

China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 11 December 2001. The Chinese government promoted this as a “‘win-win’ and ‘all-win’ [event] for China as well as for the world”.¹³² However some economists have predicted that China’s accession to the WTO, and indeed the wider processes of globalisation, have the potential to destroy the livelihoods of many Tibetans.¹³³

China has tried to argue that the globalisation of China’s economy will benefit Tibetans through opening up their access to commodities. This year’s White Paper on Modernisation boasts “[c]ommodities from other parts of the country and the world are flowing into Tibet in a continuous stream to enrich both the urban and rural markets and the lives of the local people”.¹³⁴ This “continuous stream” of commodities is likely to become a flood in the wake of China’s entry into the WTO. However, given the experience of Tibetan traders being unable to compete with Chinese businesses, it appears unlikely that Tibetans will be enriched by this flow of commodities.

WTO membership will have an even greater impact on Tibet’s primary producers. WTO rules dictate that the Chinese government can no longer protect local produce by imposing high tariffs on foreign imports. Tariffs on many agricultural imports into China will be slashed, allowing in cheaper foods from vast and hi-tech foreign farms which can produce cheaper products than small Tibetan farms. Barley producers are likely to experience a drop in the market price because the government will no longer be able to impose high taxes on foreign barley coming into Tibet.¹³⁵ Without such protection, market prices for important Tibetan produce such as barley, wheat, rapeseed and meat, are likely to plunge. Experts predict that nomads will also “…have their markets adversely affected as they face increasing competition in their marketplaces”.¹³⁶

Even more significantly, the PRC is itself dubious about the benefits of WTO accession on its rural sector. In the White Paper on Poverty Reduction the PRC admits that labour- and resource-intensive industries, such as agriculture and herding, “…may be adversely affected after China enters the WTO”.¹³⁷ Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji expressed concern to a group of Chinese journalists about the impact of the WTO membership on China’s farmers.¹³⁸ A senior economist with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was more precise: “There’s no doubt the peasants will have it worse.”¹³⁹ Given that over 80 percent of Tibetans draw their sustenance from the already-marginalised rural sector, such statements are cause for serious concern.

The PRC expresses a hope that short-term suffering upon accession to the WTO will give way to long-term benefits, once Chinese (and Tibetan) producers find new markets across the world.¹⁴⁰ In the White Paper on Poverty Reduction China discusses a plan of economic restructuring in order to cope with increasingly fierce competition from foreign markets.

[I]n order to improve the competitiveness of their industries, [the developed regions] are transferring some labour-intensive industries to the less-developed areas. The poor areas, mostly situated in the central and western parts of China, have relatively rich resources and cheap labour, which place them in a locationally advantageous position to respond to such transference.¹⁴¹

Accession to the WTO will also increase access to Tibet by multi-national companies whose exploits in Tibet have already come under much criticism.¹⁴³

The experience of other countries who enter the WTO, or who are dealing with the economic effects of globalisation, is that groups who are already excluded from mainstream national markets become even further marginalised.¹⁴⁴ The NGO Forum Declaration at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001 noted that this type of marginalisation can deepen inequalities, particularly those based on race:

[C]urrent forms of globalisation and policies of international financial and trade institutions, as well as the activities of transnational corporations, prevent the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights of all peoples, maintain and depend upon the social exclusion of groups that are most marginalised and heighten tension and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

It is clear from the many Tibetans interviewed by TCHRD in 2001 that their right to livelihood is being sacrificed by the Chinese government as it pursues its’ goals of resource- and labour-exploitation. These goals are targeted towards rapidly modernising urban areas of Tibet to cater for the increasing Chinese population, while doing little for rural Tibetans who constitute over 80 percent of all Tibetans. In fact, the PRC’s policies in relation to nomads appear formulated to destroy a crucial element of traditional Tibetan culture. Farmers also suffer under arbitrary taxes and an insensitive land distribution policy. Environmental policies target Tibetan agricultural and nomadic lifestyles while leaving China’s resource-exploitation strategy in Tibet largely unaffected. It is also anticipated by many experts, including the Beijing government, that China’s accession to the WTO will have a detrimental effect on the rural sector.

In urban areas, the Beijing government continues a policy of population transfer by offering preferential employment, business rates and subsidies to Chinese migrants. Tibetans are becoming rapidly marginalised in towns and cities, facing discrimination in access to employment and services.

In many cases Tibetans complained and protested about the policies affecting their livelihoods, but such concerns were either ignored by government officials or quickly repressed. The Beijing government continued to train Chinese cadres and place them into government positions throughout the “TAR” and “TAP”s to ensure that economic and political policies are implemented under directives of the Beijing government. In 2001, many Tibetans were denied the right to livelihood while the right to participate in their own development remained just a dream.