Annual Report, 2000: Enforcing Loyalty
Chapter 5: Subsistence Rights
Very often the Chinese government has attempted to
negate criticism of its human rights history in Tibet
by asserting that the Tibetan people have benefitted as
a result of the development policies implemented by the
Chinese authorities.
In a recent brochure inviting foreign investment in Tibet
the Chinese government proudly claims that, "There is
a highway system in Tibet that consists of 15 main highways
and 315 branch highways. The total length of the roads
in Tibet suitable for automobiles is 22,000 kilometers
of which 920 km is made of asphalt. There are 433 power
plants with capacity of 1,70,000 kilowatts. Furthermore,
there are several energy resource facilities being built
and will be put into operation one after another to meet
the development needs."
1
If the claims of the Chinese government are to be
believed then Tibet is one of the most economically
developed regions in China. And yet the growing number
of refugees escaping Tibet, and their testimonies, seem
to indicate that while there has been notable economic
growth in Tibet, especially in the urban areas, this has
principally benefitted the Chinese settlers. Furthermore,
it has been a growth heavily dependant on state subsidies
and characterised by a preference for large scale
infrastructure projects, mining or state-owned industry.
This kind of growth has been very top down and has yet
to encourage active Tibetan participation or ownership in
either the means of production or in its outcomes. There
is also evidence to suggest a systematic marginalisation of
the Tibetans from the mainstream economy. This is resulting
in the creation of a new social underclass whose task is
primarily to service the mainstream economy.
The latest formulation of China's human rights strategy
with its focus on development and subsistence was released
early 2000: "The characteristics of this road are,
in terms of the basic orientation of developing human
rights, that we stick to the principle of developing the
productive forces and promoting common prosperity, based
on the improvement of the living standards of the entire
people and promoting the human rights of the entire people;
in terms of the order of priority, the top priority is
given to the rights to subsistence and development, while
taking into consideration the people's political, economic,
social and cultural rights and the overall development of
individual and collective rights; in terms of the methods
of promoting and guaranteeing human rights, we stress that
stability is the prerequisite, development is the key,
reform is the motive power, and government according to
law is the guarantee."
2
The Chinese government makes constant claims about the
improvements that have been made in terms of development
in Tibet. But if we look closely at some of these
claims we can begin to see the elements to China's
development strategy. Firstly, it is clear that the
claims for success are reliant upon figures which are
themselves heavily reliant on the artificial boosting of
large Central government subsidies. These figures do not
reveal a healthy economy, but rather one that is entirely
reliant on outside sources, a classic pattern of control.
In a recent interview Chen Kuiyuan, the former Secretary
of the Chinese Communist Party Committee of "TAR", made
the following comments about development and the Western
Development plans: "Generally speaking, Tibet is a region
yet to be developed, on this stretch of land which accounts
for one-eighth of the national total area, most of the
resources above and under-ground have not been tapped and
utilised· Tibet's shortages stem from the low level of
economic development, the lack of talents and the lagging
of infrastructure construction."
3
There are also indications of a cover up of the real
situation in Tibet, both in terms of the economy, social
conditions and the eradication of poverty.
Gyaltsen Norbu,
Chairman of the "TAR" People's government, reported the
following in 1997: "We should do away with the unhealthy
trends of boasting and exaggeration and hiding the truth
from higher levels in the work of aiding the poor."
4
China has signalled that the year 2000 is a target year
for the eradication of poverty in Tibet and in China.
A recent article in the China Daily, that quoted
Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao reiterating this claim, reveals the
government's focus when he talks of poverty eradication.
The Vice-Premier urged that the focus be "placed on poverty
relief in areas in need of major capital construction
projects, including transport and water conservancy
infrastructure."
5
This, while necessary, reveals the pre-occupation within
the Chinese government's central planning agencies with
big developmental statements (rather than sustained and
sustainable development involving local participation,
skills and reflecting local priorities): highways,
urban housing and big hotels, dams, mines and factories.
China is confident of achieving its aims, and claims in its
latest human rights white paper that 95 per cent of rural
people had enough to eat and wear and that the targets
"to solve the problems of food and clothing of the entire
Chinese people and to enable them to live a relatively
comfortable life ö have already been basically achieved."
6
In its plan to eradicate poverty in Tibet, China has
focused heavily on income generation in certain areas
of the Tibetan plateau, hoping that a rise in income
statistics, taken out of the context of the many other
possible indicators of poverty such as health, education,
nutrition, clothing, housing, quality of life, access
to the right to development and so on, will show that
poverty has been eradicated. However, many areas within
Tibet remain neglected and as we shall see there are
important questions to be asked in terms of access to the
development and wealth generation that is occurring in
Tibet. Gabriel Lafitte, has identified Tibet as a "land
of centres and peripheries· a patchwork of development
and underdevelopment," and the inequalities that mark
colonial economies can be increasingly discerned within
the Tibetan economic environment.
7
The development that does occur is large scale and
often out of step with the traditional economy and local
communities.
China's claims about poverty are cash-based, but even
if we examine the latest Chinese statistics on income,
there are marked disparities between urban and rural areas
(where the majority of Tibetans live), and real questions
to be asked of the means of calculating such figures.
Chinese figures state that in 1998 the average per capita
income of rural Tibetans in the "TAR" was 1158 yuan, while
the average urban income in "TAR" was 5400 yuan per year.
8
These statistics can be compared with those for China as
a whole. The average annual income per rural resident in
China was 2162 yuan in 1998, almost double that in "TAR"
for the same period, while the average annual income per
urban Chinese resident was an equivalent 5425 yuan in
1998.
9
This equivalence fits into China's strategy to focus on
urban areas in Tibet. China claims that this leaves
only 110, 000 poor people in "TAR", but as we can see
the rural figure in itself leaves rural Tibetans in "TAR"
earning nearly half the "one dollar per person per day"
global measure for the poverty line if we are to use the
official exchange rate of roughly one US dollar to 8 yuan.
This measure in itself often underestimates the real extent
of poverty and generally we can see that a narrow focus on
income without looking at issues such as access to health
or education, the nature of subsistence production, the gap
between official income statistics and actual consumption,
and more detailed surveys of standard of living in Tibetan
areas, will not give a clear or accurate picture of the
level of poverty in its many senses.
10
It is often difficult to find realistic statistics for
Tibetans living in areas outside of "TAR" such as those
living in Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces
(Amdo and Kham). However, there are also indications
that the inequalities developing in Tibet go beyond the
urban/rural divide. Qinghai is relatively more developed
than other areas as a whole and in 1998 the per capita
income of farmers in Qinghai rose to 1347 yuan with that
of herdsmen at 2300 yuan.
11
These figures still fall well below acceptable rates but
begin to reflect regional inequalities.
12
The Chinese government's claims that Tibetans have
benefitted greatly from their policies regarding poverty,
can also be tackled on their own terms. Even if one were
to rely on Chinese statistics themselves there is an
indication that over 70 per cent of the people living in
the "TAR" are below the poverty line.
13
These figures are also confirmed by refugee reports
which indicate that many people face problems with food
shortages, access to health care, education, and in other
areas such as employment and housing.
Despite China's claims, and its successes in alleviation of
poverty and hunger elsewhere in mainland China, there are
many indications that in Tibetan areas poverty and basic
subsistence issues dominate the daily structure of life.
In December 1997 the ICJ argued that in the 1990s, "nearly
all Tibetans continue to exist at subsistence level,
their lives little touched by China's massive investment
in Tibetan infrastructure and superstructure."
14
As we enter a new decade there is little evidence to
suggest that this situation has changed, and heavy taxation
and rural/urban divides in terms of access to development,
continue to mean that poverty is a present concern for
many Tibetans. While the total household spending in rural
"TAR" (where 90 per cent of Tibetans live) is 564 yuan
per capita
15
(78 per cent below the global poverty line), the per
capita income for "TAR"'s urban areas (where almost all
Chinese settlers live) is 5036 yuan, or ten times as much,
and is growing at twice the rate.
16
Tibetans spend just 15.4 per cent of the rural Chinese
average on health care, 7.7 per cent of that of their
Chinese counterparts on education, culture and recreation,
54.9 per cent of rural Chinese spending on food and only
39.1 per cent of that spent by rural Chinese on housing.
17
These figures consistently rise for Qinghai and again for Sichuan,
18
where the percentage of the Tibetan population
decreases. Further, due to huge PRC subsidies and
incentives, Lhasa is the highest waged city in all of
China,
19
an incredible fact given Tibet's overall deprivation, while
it simultaneously contains large numbers of desperately
poor Tibetans.
The Chinese occupation of Tibet has been characterised by
various attempts to control Tibetan identity either through
direct violence or structural means such as assimilation.
One such indirect means of attempting to change and control
the nature of Tibetan culture and identity has been the
encouragement of Chinese population transfer into Tibet.
20
A transfer mostly of officials and army personnel
into Tibet marked the early period of the Chinese
invasion. Since the 1980âs, with the Chinese decision to
integrate Tibet into China's economy and social structure,
we see a conscious decision by the Chinese government to
transfer Chinese peasants, agricultural workers and other
groups of labourers and traders into Tibet.
21
From July 20 to 23 in 1994, the Third National Forum on
Work in Tibet was convened in Beijing. These decisions
were made to implement the Chinese government's policy to
integrate Tibet within the structure of China's economic
needs. The major thrust of the implementation strategy was
"to open Tibet's door wide to inner parts of the country
and encourage traders, investment, economic units and
individuals from China to Central Tibet to run different
sorts of enterprises."
22
The population transfer of Chinese into Tibet has been
massive, and enforced by the presence of over 200,000
troops.
23
According to both Tibetan and PRC statistics, whilst
there were virtually no Chinese in Tibet or neighbouring
provinces,
24
Chinese settlers now outnumber Tibetans in Tibet 7-7.5
million to 6.1 million.
25
The population transfer of Chinese settlers into Tibet has
had devastating economic effects for Tibetans. Settlers,
encouraged by government incentives, arrive in search of
jobs in an industrialised Tibet. Their presence threatens
the livelihood of the Tibetan people and is central
to the government's integration of the Tibetan economy
into the Chinese economy. Chinese settlers have come to
dominate the Tibetan economy, and they own virtually all
the businesses there.
26
There appears to be a degree of segregation between the
mainly urban Chinese settlers and Tibetans in remote
areas such as the nomads. One nomad who came from Nagchu
Prefecture, "TAR", and arrived in Dharamsala on 11 February
2000, said of the Chinese, "there are Chinese settlers,
but they are mainly business people and they are 4 hours
away from my village."
Dhondup,
a young student from a farming family in Kandze County in
Sichuan Province who arrived in Dharamsala on 2 April 2000,
reported that in Kandze County centre Chinese settlers
constitute at least 50 per cent of the population.
They mainly consist of government officials and business
people.
Chinese population transfer into Tibet has a great impact
on the kind of development that takes place in Tibet.
Central government subsidies and much of the infrastructure
in place have been directed at maintaining a distinct,
controlling Chinese community in Tibet, which can be seen
to be mainly urban, administrative, mercantile or military,
and segregated from the bulk of Tibetan communities.
The much-heralded, Chinese sponsored infrastructure
projects such as highways, mines and housing have
mainly been built to facilitate this settlement, fulfil
military objectives and to expedite resource extraction.
Subsidised economic growth has encouraged and facilitated
Chinese settlement as part of the wider attempt to absorb
Tibet. But in many ways this process has been one-sided
and has left much of Tibet's urban landscape sinicised.
Population transfer has also impacted on Tibetan access
to land, food and meaningful employment. Tibetans are
becoming a minority in their own country, excluded from
participating in and benefitting from the development that
is being carried out on their land and in their name.
Chinese officials have made some impressive claims
27
about the changes that have taken place in terms of
workersâ rights and labour protection, but what is the
situation in Tibet and how did Chinese communism's
conception of development and industrial growth and
production relate to a largely agrarian Tibetan economy?
Tibetans account for only 5-10 per cent of the labour force
in Chinese controlled industry and usually are placed in
the most low-paid, unskilled jobs, and with no genuine
opportunity of advancement.
28
Compulsory and forced labour practices are widespread
in Tibetan areas with Tibetans sequestered to build the
roads and housing needed to support Chinese development
of the Tibetan plateau. A number of refugees arriving
from Tibet have stated that they have had to perform
labour for various Chinese projects without receiving any
renumeration. The PRC's development of modern industry in
Tibet has provided some unskilled, subsistence employment
to a few Tibetans while mainly allowing for further Chinese
development, high waged employment and settlement.
Tsering Norbu
29
reports that after the harvest farmers in his village are
called to work for the Chinese government either as road
builders or as construction workers for houses. They are
not paid because they used the land owned by the Chinese
government. If they were absent they would be fined 10
yuan per day. If they could not afford to pay the fine
then they would be called for extra days of work. The
work is usually for a month per year. They were told that
the building they were making was for a school but the
school was never built. Instead the building was used as
a guesthouse for Chinese officials.
In Dawa's
30
area Tibetans have to go for compulsory labour without pay.
"In a year you must go for more than 20 days, if you
are above 18 years of age and below 60 years. If you
are sick you can stay at home but must work two days for
every day you are absent the next time. It is possible
to send someone in your place. The supervisor of this
compulsory labour is Chinese. If you do not work hard you
are scolded. Work starts from 10 am and continues till
8 pm. There are no breaks apart from a one-hour lunch
break. The work is mainly road construction connected
with forestry."
Furthermore, unemployment and underemployment remain
serious concerns in Tibet. Forced labour practices
come against this background of many Tibetans searching
for work, and are all the more reprehensible for this.
Real figures for unemployment for rural Tibet are hard to
find and analyse. Many Tibetans from farming and nomad
families consider themselves employed in the sense that
they help to look after the family animals or go for lowly
paid construction or forestry work, despite their wishes
to look for other kinds of work and their inequality of
access to different employment opportunities. This rural
underemployment is all the more acute when it is placed in
the context of China's planned urbanisation. Recently the
China Daily reported that "rural labour experts
estimate there will be 600 million available people in
China's rural workforce by 2005, but the demand for rural
labourers will fall to 168 million leaving a potential
432 million unemployed. Without the creation of local
employment, mass urban shifts are expected to occur."
31
A 19-year-old nomad from Sangchu County, Gannan "TAP",
Gansu Province, reports high levels of unemployment in
his village and community. He arrived in Dharamsala
on 25 January 2000 and reported the following to TCHRD.
"Many young people are unemployed after school. They stay
at home idle as mainly they don't know how to look after
animals. Ninety per cent of middle school students return
home unemployed, with only 10 per cent of Tibetan middle
school students able to continue their studies due to the
heavy school fees. There is no government assistance for
the unemployed, and the main reasons for unemployment are:
because Tibetans are unable mostly to pay the bribes to
get the jobs; and because only Chinese or the children
of government staff get the jobs. This is typically long
term unemployment."
Bhuchung
32
reports that, "around 25 per cent of my village are
unemployed in the sense that they have no housework to
involve themselves with, in terms of access to other jobs
there are greater problems. Those who are unemployed go
to Lhasa, but the common Tibetans canât afford the bribes
needed for jobs, only the rich families can."
Kelsang,
a 22-year-old man from Lhasa estimates that 40 per cent
of the Tibetans in the Barkhor area are unemployed, with
many trying to run some small business or something of
this nature. Some of the older generation of Tibetans
who are particularly desperate turn to begging, while
the younger generation, he feels, turn to thieving.
Kelsang arrived in Dharamsala on 6 January 2000.
It is clear that compulsory labour, low wages and
unemployment all form serious obstacles to the realisation
of Tibetansâ right to development.
Despite China's official statements that no taxes have been
collected from Tibetan farmers and nomads, in almost every
single refugee report (that the TCHRD conducted), Tibetan
farmers and nomads spoke of being subjected to excessive
taxes. They were taxed on their crop yield (including
medicinal herbs they were made to collect by hand), number
of animals, animal products like meat, hides, milk, butter,
cheese, fur and wool, number of family members, as well as
water, grass, and building taxes. They are also regularly
made to provide food for the frequent meetings of the same
officials who are implementing and enforcing repressive
and destructive policies against them.
Overall, poor Tibetans are subjected to 27 times the tax
rate of non-poor in rural China.
33
If there is little or no correlation between the amount
of money spent in subsidies and the severe taxation
policy, and if the revenue from the taxes does not make
a comparatively significant contribution to the economy,
then is the taxation policy yet another means through which
the Chinese government disciplines the Tibetan polity
into submission? These are not questions which can be
answered in an evidentiary manner but a closer look at
the lives of the Tibetan poor would clearly indicate it's
efficacy as a tool of oppression. Some of the features
of the tax system are best inferred by the narratives of
the Tibetan refugees who have supposedly benefitted from
the economic developments in Tibet.
Topgyal,
a 32-year-old from Nagchu Prefecture reports that his
family, which had a nomadic lifestyle, had to pay taxes
on the various products of their animals. Annually they
had to pay 100 to 150 gyama
34
of meat, 10 to 15 gyama of butter, one gyama
of "ra-khul"
35
for five goats, 30 to 40 gyama for "nor khul"
36
,
three yuan sok trel
37
for five goats, three yuan sok trel per sheep and
24 to 60 yuan sok trel per horse. The collection of
sok trel taxes varied from year to year and some
times they had to pay to officials from other counties
taxes in the form of butter, yoghurt and meat but these
were not considered to be a part of the annual tax.
Samdup
38
reports that Saga County is the poorest county in Shigatse
Prefecture and is mostly inhabited by nomads and farmers.
In his township which covers a population of around 1500
nomads, there is very little infrastructure. In the whole
township there is no electricity, clinic or hospital,
though there is a large military barrack. Tax is collected
according to each family's holding of animals. His family
is comprised of three members and they have 100 sheep, 10
goats, and one horse. They own no land but pay annually
60-70 yuan for grass tax. Seven animals were taken as
a meat tax, and the family were only given 100 yuan per
animals as opposed to their market value of 250 yuan.
The taxation policy covers almost every aspect of the
right to subsist ranging from taxes on human life, animals,
grass, herbs, animal skins, to education even if there is
no education provided. Thus while there exists a right to
subsist, the means to it are severely impaired. The system
is closed and self-referential. It defines even the rules
in cases of disobedience to the law. These rules include
the imposition of further taxes and fines, ignoring the
fact that the rules were disobeyed due to an inability to
pay in the first place. These fines are also coupled with
the arbitrary power of imposing punishments in the form
of forced labour. The administrative structure created
is arbitrary and both the taxes and the fines depend on
the authority collecting them. There is a clear absence
of any accountability or provision for appeal against what
are in most cases harsh and unfair taxes. Consistency and
transparency are sorely lacking in the taxes applied to
Tibetans.
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR states that: "The State
Parties...recognise the right of everyone to·adequate
food and (2) recognising the right of everyone to be free
from hunger, shall take·the measures·which are needed·"
Furthermore, Article 1(2) of the ICESCR states, "·In
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence."
China repeatedly declares that making Tibet self sufficient
in food production is a major goal in its development
policy.
39
The PRC's reference to Tibet's dependency on food negates
the fact that Tibet had always been self sufficient in
producing enough food for itself for thousands of years,
until the Chinese invasion.
40
It is the influx of Chinese following their invasion in
1950 and their enormous new demands that ended this long
history of Tibetan independence and self-sufficiency. The
Chinese themselves are the ones who created the dependency
that they now trumpet the need to overcome. The PRC has
implemented unsustainable, industrial mass production
policies with the intention of increasing agricultural
output in order to feed the overwhelming amounts of new
Chinese settlers.
Poverty is widespread in Tibet, not because of ecological
determinism or Tibetans' "backwardness", but due to the PRC
government policy of taking farmers and nomads surpluses
and subsistence produce.
41
As noted above, the PRC's taxation of Tibetan farmers,
usually taken in-kind as a percentage of their crop and
animal products, is excessive and frequently leaves them
and their families without enough to eat. Refugees very
often report that they and a very high percentage of
their district's residents are forced to borrow from more
prosperous families in order to survive. Tibetan farmers
and nomads are also forced to sell a certain amount of
their crops, animals and animal products to the State at a
fraction of its fair market value so that it may be resold,
either cheaply to Chinese settlers or to deprived Tibetans
at excessive prices.
42
While the Chinese take large amounts of the Tibetans
agricultural products, they provide no or little aid to
them in the event of crop failure.
Recent interviews conducted by TCHRD reveal that food
shortages remain a real concern for Tibetans, and a daily
reality for some. Such shortages highlight the problems
with agricultural policy and must also be placed in
the context of the heavy burden that rural taxation and
procurement is placing on Tibetan farmers and nomads.
Meanwhile, official Chinese media recently claimed
increases in grain production in "TAR" and that at present
"Tibet [TAR] boasts surplus grain capable of meeting local
needs for five years."
43
Norbu Choepel
44
had six members in his family, including four children.
He has around 11 mu of land, and his family
produce 600 gyama of cereals per year. However,
this is all consumed by the family and lasts for only
three months of every year. For nine months of every
year his family faces serious food shortage, and has
to borrow from other families to eat. The family has
suffered terribly since 1989, and annually face hunger.
He lives on the mercy of other farmers, and currently
owes a debt of 700 gyama of cereals and around
1000 yuan to his fellow farmers. In his village of the
18 Tibetan families only four are prosperous, while the
rest are annually troubled by grain shortages.
"In my village of the 60 Tibetan families, 15 families
usually face food shortages and borrow cereals from
other farmers to feed their families," reported Tsetan,
a 33-year-old nomad from Nagchu Prefecture who arrived
in Nepal on 22 November 1999. There is no help from the
government for these families who have to pay taxes as
per usual.
These testimonies reveal that hunger and grain shortages
continue to undercut China's claims for success in
developing Tibet and its agricultural economy. They
counterbalance the official line of mass poverty reduction,
and illustrate that attempts to transform the subsistence
nature of traditional agricultural practices have in fact
led to greater food insecurity for a number of Tibetans.
In addition, there are indications that in some areas
local Chinese authorities are enforcing animal limits
on nomads. These limits act to artificially keep some
families and areas poor and seem an unnecessary restriction
on traditional agricultural practices. In Nortsoâs
45
village, farmers were not allowed to keep more than 15
goats or sheep per family member. Chinese authorities
inspected the villages in autumn and slaughtered excess
animals. This policy was instituted by Ngamring County
officials in 1994 and those who failed to comply were
publicly criticised and had their animals confiscated.
A young monk from a nomad family,
came to Dharamsala on 4 January 2000.
He reports that in his village in Sershul County,
Kandze "TAP", Sichuan Province, there are animal limits.
"My family have no land. We have 20 yaks,
seven dri, 100 sheep and three horses. There is
an animal limit in the area. Each family is allowed to
keep seven yaks, no more, four dris, 20
sheep and three horses. For each sheep over the official
limit there is a fine of three yuan, for each yak
over the limit the fine is five yuan. It is two yuan for
each offending dri, and also two yuan per horse
over the limit. The village head collects these fines and
hands the money over to the County authorities who issue
the limits in the first place. However, to make any kind
of profit it is necessary to transgress this limit, and it
is still possible to make something after paying the fines,
from selling the skins and so on. As yet the animals have
not been taken away by the authorities for redistribution.
They say this will be done shortly, but no date has been
set."
A young nomad,
from Lhasa Municipality, came to Dharamsala
on 30 January 2000. There are nine members in his family.
The family has 40 yak/dri/dzo; 80
sheep; and one horse. Each member is allowed 30 sheep
or the equivalent thereof with one yak counting
as six sheep. They are not fined but they must either
kill excess stock or sell them to others. Every year the
village head comes to calculate the number of animals and
sets a date by which excess animals must be sold or killed.
He doesnât know how many animals his family had before,
but redistribution occurred in 1980.
The animal limit policies vary widely and seem to
be implemented in a haphazard way like taxation and
procurement policies. In some cases it seems that to
prosper, nomads and semi-nomads must exceed the limits
in any case and pay the fines levied. Such intervention
in the market economy is counterproductive and damaging.
The limits act to unnaturally constrain this integral
sector of animal husbandry within the wider Tibetan
economy, and along with other agricultural policies such as
fencing of nomad grazing lands, reveal an unfamiliarity
with traditional practices and an attempt to control
Tibetan practices and ways of living. Once again, Tibetan
participation and consultation in the formulation and
implementation of such policies is either minimal or
heavily constrained.
Chinese assistance to farmers and nomads facing shortages
or economic hardship due to natural disasters is either
insubstantial or non-existent. Critically the procurement
and taxation policies continue to be blind to actual
living conditions and yearly variations, so that Tibetans
facing economic crises are still required to pay taxes as
per usual. Tibetans also report that while traditionally
richer families were previously able to help those in
need, in many areas those families can no longer afford
to do this to the same extent and local government has
not stepped in to fill their place effectively.
"For two years my village didn't have good crops due to
heavy snow fall. Despite the failure of crops, there was
no government assistance, and we still had to pay a heavy
rate of taxation, despite our yield being much smaller.
At these times all the village people faced problems
and had to sell their animals. For the years of 1997
and 1998, my family had to sell 15 yaks and 20
sheep, as a result of the crop failures," said Tamding,
a 19-year-old farmer from Haiyen County, Qinghai Province
(Amdo) who reached Dharamsala on 15 December 1999.
A 24-year-old nomad from Malho "TAP" in Qinghai Province
arrived in Dharamsala on 3 January 2000. He reports
that there have been instances of government aid during
agricultural crises, but that taxation remained the same at
these times. In 1996 Chinese County authorities gave each
family in the village 500 yuan in government assistance.
This compensation was given after a very heavy snowfall
when many lost animals. "My family lost 20 yaks and
six sheep. The compensation was not enough and we still
had to pay our taxes at the usual rates, though not for the
dead animals. There are no Chinese farmers in the area."
The testimonies which TCHRD has gathered from recently
arrived refugees from Tibet indicates that the state of
development in Tibet is a source of major concern. China's
claims about reduction of poverty, food security, lenient
taxation policies, increased agricultural production,
and improving standard of living in Tibet are flawed and
hollow.
It is clear that there is a huge gap between the
professed development that has taken place in Tibet and
the real development that has touched the lives of the
Tibetan people. The gap between the official discourse of
development and the lives of the people is often blurred by
the use of impressive facts and figures. The development
that has taken place in Tibet, rather than benefitting
the Tibetan people, has actually occurred at their cost
resulting in a violation of their socio-economic rights,
or broadly their right to development.
While it may be true that some Tibetans have benefitted
from the development that has taken place in Tibet, we must
ask what has been lost, and recognise that today in Tibet
many have yet to see any tangible improvements in their
day to day lives. Development in Tibet is one of China's
greatest claims to success, but the picture emerging is
of a land of haves and have-nots. The promises made have
yet to be fulfilled and the cost borne in the decades of
Chinese rule has left the issue of "development",
which could be a real avenue of change and empowerment for
Tibetan people, tainted and controversial. We can only
hope that in the future fresh strategies and approaches
will yield concrete gains for Tibetans in realising their
right to development. Their participation will be the
key.
[ Contents ]
[ Notes ]
[ Recommendations ]
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