Annual Report, 2000: Enforcing Loyalty
Chapter 2: Restricting Religious Freedom
The Chinese authorities continued to exercise state control
of religion throughout the year 2000 in the belief that
religion breeds instability, separatism and subversion.
The massive crackdown designed specifically to purge
the influence of religious belief amongst Tibetans has
affected religious freedom on the plateau in major ways.
Renewed and more draconian campaigns were initiated this
year, aimed at annihilating the distinctive cultural and
ethnic identity of the Tibetan people through operations
ranging from the aggressive anti-Dalai Lama campaign,
to imposition of restrictions on religious practices for
the "cadre contingent", to increased control
and surveillance of religious institutions. A new wave of
regulations were launched that subjected monasteries and
nunneries to greater scrutiny and control.
At a work meeting on Tibet held in Chengdu, Sichuan, on 20
April 2000, attended by
Chen Kuiyan
(the outgoing Party Secretary of "TAR"),
Raidi
(Executive Deputy Secretary for Chinese Communist Party in "TAR")
and
Guo Jinlong
(the new Party Secretary),
the prevailing instability and
disharmony in Tibet was attributed solely to religion and
the Dalai Lama, who was vilified for using spirituality
as a tool to oppose the Chinese government.
The meeting's internal document, which was circulated
secretly in June, calls upon all concerned officers in the
"TAR" to enforce stringent laws that restrict participation
in religious practices and forbids people from displaying
or possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama or displaying
altars. The objective is to efface Buddhist religion from
the Tibetan horizon. The Chengdu document further denounces
as illegal the customary observance of sangsol
(incense-burning ceremony) near Kuru Bridge in Lhasa on
the third day of the Tibetan New Year and the Dalai Lama's
birthday celebration in July. The authorities are directed
to curb such practices in the future.
During the third meeting of the seventh CPPCC held in "TAR"
on 10 May 2000,
Dongbu Tsering Dorjee
stated, "To achieve
obliteration of religious faith that is manifested in our
sensibility and mannerism is an important responsibility."
Tibet's enduring religious tradition, a perennial area of
concern for Communist China, is viewed as the fountainhead
of instability and "splittist" activities in Tibetan
regions of the PRC. Chinese antagonism towards Tibetan
Buddhism originates from a fear of national unity and
identity, since religion is central to the Tibetan psyche.
Religious practise per se, is viewed as an obstacle to
China's economic "development" of the region and monks
are criticised vehemently for their lack of contribution
to economic growth. The Party's basic policy on religion
is reflected in the 1999 speech of President Jiang Zemin
1
on the correct implementation of the Party's religious
policy, management of religious affairs according to law
and adaptation to socialist society, as the three-fold
solution to "handle religious problems".
In their White Paper
2
on "The Development of Tibetan Culture", the Chinese
authorities state that "The state respects and safeguards
the right of Tibetans and other ethnic groups in Tibet
to live their lives and conduct social activities in
accordance with their traditional customs, and their
freedom to engage in normal religious activities and
major religious and folk festival celebrations· The
central people's government and the government of the
"TAR" have all along paid special attention to respect
for and protection of the freedom of religious belief
and normal religious activities of the Tibetan people."
Conversely, a strongly-worded statement made to the "TAR"
People's Congress a month earlier in May by
Legchog,
Chairman of the "TAR" People's Government, indicated
that the authorities in "TAR" have made further plans to
strengthen control over religious activities.
Thousands of Tibetans continue to flee Tibet, the most
prominent being the 17th Karmapa,
Orgyen Trinley Dorjee,
who had previously been projected as a major pro-Chinese
religious figure since he was recognised by both the
Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. The clandestine
escape of this high-profile Tibetan religious leader in
the last days of the 20th century was a major cause of
embarrassment for the Chinese government whose initial
explanation for the escape was that he was collecting
religious instruments from India. After the dramatic
freedom dash of the 14-year-old Karmapa, extensive
investigations and interrogation led to several arrests
and detentions in and around Tsurphu Monastery, near Lhasa,
traditional seat of the Karmapas in Tibet.
The Chinese government has never understood the true
strength of Tibetansā belief in their religion, in the
institution of the Dalai Lamas and in the authenticity
of their historical claim to nationhood. In an internal
official document circulated secretly in June 2000,
reference was made to Karmapa's defiant act against the
Chinese government in corroborating the prevalent religious
repression when he stated he had limited freedom to study
and practise religion in Tibet.
In his public speech in Dharamsala on 19 February 2000,
the Karmapa said, "...over the last two or three decades,
Tibet has suffered great losses. Tibetan religion and
culture have reached the point of complete destruction."
Another major defection to make headline news in 2000
is that of 49-year-old
Agya Rinpoche,
Abbot of Kumbum Monastery in Qinghai Province (Amdo),
who stayed back in
the United States in 1998 and was granted political asylum.
He was on an official foreign tour at that time in his
capacity as Vice-President of the Buddhist Association of
China and Deputy Chairman of the Qinghai People's Political
Consultative Conference. In his first public statement
thereafter, in March 2000, he spoke at length on the lack
of religious freedom in his monastery in particular and the
whole of Qinghai in general. In June, China's official
news agency, Xinhua, carried a brief report about
the removal of Agya Rinpoche from his earlier post within
the Chinese Communist government but published no reasons
for his dismissal. With Agya Rinpoche's defection and
recent condemnations, Beijing was faced with further
credibility crisis.
The Chinese Constitution stipulates that freedom of
religious belief is one of the fundamental rights of
every citizen. Article 36(3) of the Chinese Constitution
pronounces that "The state protects normal religious
activities." Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) provides for the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion and the freedom to
manifest religion and belief in teaching, practice, worship
and observance whereas Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees
the members of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
to profess and practice their own religion. Section 147 of
the Chinese Penal Code stipulates that officials who are
convicted of illegally depriving citizens of their right
to freedom of religious belief are subjected to up to two
yearsā imprisonment. No officials have been charged with
this crime so far, despite massive violations of religious
freedom across China.
"The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on [the] Religious Question
During Our Country's Socialist Period" formulated in
March 1982 issued a clarion call for the cadres at both
Party and State level to follow "correct and effective"
methods in the implementation of religious policy.
3
More popularly known as "Document 19", it is regarded as
Beijing's "most authoritative statement on the permissible
scope of religious freedom". The verdict on the eventual
fate of religion - which according to the document,
"shall disappear from human history through the long-term
development of Socialism and Communism"- reeks of blind
atheistic dogma.
A further set of more specific restrictive religious
policies were determined by the Third National Forum on
Work in Tibet held in July 1994. The Forum produced a
set of guidelines for stricter control over monastic
institutions, a ban on unauthorised construction of
religious buildings, numeric limits on the monastic
population, and restriction on Tibetan Communist cadres
practising religion. One of the key components of the Third
Forum is the especially "hostile and aggressive campaign"
initiated against the Dalai Lama whereby instability in
Tibet is blamed on the alleged secessionist influence of
the Dalai Lama and the "Dalai Clique". It is evident from
the reports of massive religious intolerance prevalent
in the year 2000 that the Forum policy guidelines are
still being maintained and carried out by the Chinese
authorities.
Buchung Tsering,
a former Vice-chairman of the "TAR" government, declared
in 1987 that out of more than 2,700 monasteries existing
in Tibet in 1959, 550 remained in 1966 and only eight
were still standing by the end of Cultural Revolution.
China's White Paper on human rights in Tibet, issued
by the authorities in February 1998, fixed the extant
religious institutions at 1,787 and monks and nuns at
46,380 within "TAR". While briefing US House Representative
Matt Salmon about Tibet's political affairs, history,
culture, education and religion, Passang (Ch: Basang) said,
"There are 1,700 religious venues of all kinds and 46,000
monks and nuns in the region to satisfy the needs of the
religious followers."
The 1999 Annual Report of the US State Department on
"Human Rights Conditions in China and Tibet", released
on 25 February 2000, comprehensively details the "poor
human rights record which deteriorated markedly throughout
the year". Besides reference to "an increasing attack on
Buddhism by the Chinese government," there were "reports of
imprisonment and torture or abuse of monks and nuns accused
of political activism and closure of several monasteries".
Canadian Cabinet member
Raymond Chan,
after his visit to Tibet,
emphasised on 8 June 2000 that religious repression
is "worsening" in Tibet where government officials are
being refused the right to practice as Buddhists and
ageing monks are being forced to retire from monasteries.
"The control on religion is getting worse. On the surface
you won't see much but below there are concerns,"
he added.
6
The ongoing "patriotic re-education"
7
in religious institutions since 1996 stifles the right
of Tibetan monks and nuns to exercise their religious
freedom. In contravention of the many international
covenants to which China has been a signatory, Tibetan
monks and nuns are forced to abrogate their belief,
practice and allegiance. In March 1998,
"TAR" Deputy Party Secretary
Raidi
said that "patriotic re-education"
had "rectified 35,000 monks and nuns in more than 700
religious institutions".
Legchog,
Chairman of the "TAR",
at a meeting of "TAR" People's Congress on 22 May 2000,
boasted that 1,300 monasteries and nunneries in the region
have been rectified by "patriotic re-education" and further
emphasised the need to "conduct frequent education on
patriotism in key monasteries·so that leadership over
monasteries will always remain in the hands of patriotic
religious personalities."
Traditional studies of Buddhist scriptures have been
sidelined with the forced indoctrination of monks and
nuns studying China's version of history, politics, law
and religious policy. Their text books include "History
of Tibet", "Propagation of Opposition to Splittists",
"Propagation of Knowledge about the Legal System" and
"Explanation of the Policy on Religion."
Long drawn-out political classes and frequent visits by
"work team" are serious infringements on normal monastic
education. The period of "re-education" generally ranges
from three months to a year and the "work team" may make
more than one visit. Sessions commonly run from nine in
the morning to six, with an hour's lunch break. Problems
arising out of restrictions on religious activities and
forced expulsions from monasteries are the main causes of
fear and apprehension among the religious fraternity.
One can ascertain the level of disruption to monastic
studies from the calendar of political indoctrination at
Tsang Monastery
8
since 1996. The first "work team" visited Tsang Monastery
in June 1996; the second series of visits were in January,
June and August 1997; and the third series were in January,
May, June and August 1998. A case illustrating the
curriculum of "re-education" campaign is the visit of 50
Chinese "work team" officials to Kumbum Monastery
9
in the autumn of 1998. For a three-month period, the
officials held regular "re-education" sessions on the
importance of "patriotism" and opposition to "splittism"
and the Dalai Lama. The "work team" officials conducted
examinations at the end of every session; the monks were
compelled to answer according to earlier instructions.
The gruelling "re-education" classes play havoc with
the mental equilibrium of monks and nuns, sometimes
leading them to take extreme steps. Incessant political
brainwashing is followed by intensive interrogation
procedures that the "work team" members employ to force
the clergy to reiterate party principles. Most of the
time monks and nuns are faced with a catch-22 situation
when their basic religious beliefs are grossly violated by
Chinese orders to conform to the Marxist view of religion.
In such cases the victims undergo extensive mental agony —
sometimes driving them to commit suicide.
The mysterious death of
Tashi Rabten
on 1 May 2000 occurred just after a 30-member "work team"
interrogated and then forcefully led him to the private
hall of Thenthok Monastery
10
to search for photos of the Dalai Lama. Soon after, fellow
monks discovered Tashi lying on the ground in a critical
condition. He had reportedly fallen from the third floor
and died immediately, despite efforts by the monks to
save him. Local residents speculated that Tashi's death
was pre-meditated murder and even asked the authorities
for clarification and voiced strong resentment. On 3 May,
PSB officials announced that a heavy prison sentence would
be imposed on anyone who dared to blame local officials for
this death. They denied any responsibility and described
the death of Tashi Rabten as a case of suicide.
At the height of the Panchen Lama imbroglio in July 1995,
monks of Panchen Lama's monastery,
Tashi Lhunpo,
staged a
mass protest at a meeting attended by
Raidi
and
Gyaltsen Norbu,
both Executive Deputy Secretaries of the "TAR".
After several arrests and a few posting incidents, the
monks underwent violent political "re-education" for 12
hours a day. The purpose of this "re-education" was to
force them to denounce the
Dalai Lama,
Gedhun Choekyi Nyima
(the Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama)
and
Chadrel Rinpoche
(abbot of Tashi Lhunpo)
and "to point out other's fault and to accept one's own crime".
The eight
Chinese police and "work team" members repeatedly beat the
monks and tortured them by pointing guns and threatening
to shoot. Unable to bear this torture,
Wangdu, 25,
a Tashi Lhunpo monk, committed suicide on 17 July 1995.
Various policies designed to rid the monastic institutions
of their monks and nuns were introduced in all parts of
Tibet in 2000, aimed at turning monasteries and nunneries
into places housing only a handful of caretakers.
Chinese authorities often exert excessive control over
the admission process for novice monks and nuns in
religious institutions, expelling those below the age of
18 years.
Abdelfattah Amor,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Religion,
was told that members of China's minorities were
exempted from the 18-year age limit. In his report,
Mr. Amor called on China to introduce legislation
guaranteeing the right of religious belief to minors.
11
Building monasteries in Tibet and recruiting new monks and
nuns are viewed with great concern by the authorities.
Official ceilings, besides confirming the denial of the
right to study and practice religion, also result in the
depletion of the monastic populace.
An official order issued in mid-2000 compelled the mass
withdrawal of juvenile monks and nuns from institutions in
various counties under Lhasa City. Cadres and government
employees were instructed to withdraw their children from
monasteries and nunneries or face imprisonment or expulsion
from their employment. Approximately, 13 nuns from Potoe
Nunnery and 20 monks from Sera Monastery in Phenpo Lhundup
County were withdrawn from their respective religious
institutions following the official order.
Tsering Karma,
an official from Chusang Township in Toelung Dechen County,
removed his three children - two nuns and a monk.
Lhabu
and
Paldon from Village Number Two, Tsodue Township,
withdrew their son and daughter from their respective
monastery and nunnery.
Tenpa Samphel and
Pema Youdon
withdrew their son while
Jampa Wangyal
took his daughter back from her nunnery.
Additionally, the forcible retirement of monks and nuns
who are over 50 now endangers the very survival of Tibetan
Buddhist tradition, since senior religious practitioners
have played a pivotal role in the transmission of religious
teachings. According to the London-based monitoring agency,
Tibet Information Network (TIN), "·the move represents a
serious threat to the Buddhist tradition in Tibet and is a
new dimension to the patriotic re-education campaign". In
one such case, 49 out of 52 senior lamas from Youning
Monastery in Gonlung County, "Haidong Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture," Qinghai Province (Tib: Amdo), were ordered
to retire permanently from their religious duties.
12
Numeric limits on the total enrolment of monks and nuns
are today controlled by Chinese government regulations.
A 10 March 1995 article in Xizang Ribao stated that
"·overstaffed monasteries must liquidate their excesses".
The role of the "work team" members in executing such
limitations is paramount. Of the 40 monasteries in Ngaba
County, Sichuan Province, Kirti Monastery was the largest
with more than 3,000 monks. The "work team" that arrived
at Kirti Monastery in the winter of 1999 decimated the
monk population to 600. Then in Pashoe Monastery
13
,
officials enforced age limits in 1998 compelling many monks
to leave. Currently, the maximum number of monks allowed
at the monastery is 238. There are, however, additional
140 monks who have been officially expelled but who still
surreptitiously continue their studies and leave during
"work team" visits.
With responsibilities for monastic discipline and the
curricula under their control, the Democratic Management
Committees (DMCs) have usurped the historic authority
of abbots, the traditional head in a monastic hierarchy.
These DMCs often play repressive role by collaborating with
security officials in the arrest and expulsion of monks.
14
In regulating religious affairs, finance, security and
study, committees vary widely in the degree of control
they exert; at larger monasteries, their involvement is
more repressive, while smaller or more remote monasteries
may continue to be relatively independent- and relatively
democratic.
15
The official rationale behind the establishment and
objectives of DMCs as laid out in the "Golden Bridge
Leading Into A New Era"
16
is thus:
"The Democratic Management Committees in all monasteries
are the grassroots unit of our administration, and they
assist in administering the monasteries. We must choose
well the members of the DMCs so that those who have
authority over monasteries are patriotic devotees who act
according to the civil and religious laws. We must enhance
the understanding of the monks and nuns about patriotism
and law."
The "work team" members in conjunction with DMCs seek
to identify, expel and arrest dissident monks and nuns,
and ensure that party principles prevail over Buddhist
doctrine. On their second visit to
Yungtrung Peri Monastery
17
in September 1999, a two-member "work team" held a meeting
with the monastery's DMC to review its functioning and the
conduct of its monks. The DMC was ordered to continue the
Īre-educationā campaign and told that officials would pay
regular visits to the monastery to check the maintenance
of discipline. Fifteen monks
- 12 under age and three over age -
were expelled from the monastery.
On 8 January 1999, a meeting of the "TAR" Propaganda
Department decided that
"atheism is necessary to promote
economic development in the region and to assist the
struggle against the infiltration of the Dalai Clique".
The most direct contravention of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other international norms is the
Chinese government's policy forbidding Tibetans their
religious beliefs and traditional practices. The nation
is now deprived of its right to faith and religion, and
lacks the freedom to engage in religious training fully
and freely. Restrictive measures, previously targeted
at government workers and Party members, have now been
extended to the Tibetan community at large in Lhasa.
The implementation of more radical restrictive policies,
like the March 2000 directive, prohibits Tibetan government
workers and Party cadres from displaying pictures of the
Dalai Lama, hoisting traditional symbolic prayer flags, and
installing juniper hearth for incense-burning. During one
search operation in June 2000 conducted on 18 houses of
members of the Lhasa-based Opera Association, Chinese
officials forcefully seized religious belongings including
altars, thangka-paintings, statues, and other religious
artefacts. These were finally dumped into the nearby Kyichu
River. Following the sudden raids, many Tibetan government
employees and cadres have reportedly shifted their altars
and religious artefacts to neighbourhood monasteries
for safekeeping. A similar incident was reported in Sog
County where government officials including health workers
were forced to remove their butter lamps, thangkas, altars
and pictures of the Dalai lama from their homes. In Lhasa,
two students were reportedly suspended from school for
having offered prayers for success in their examinations.
The Central Committee of the government of Lhasa
distributed a circular on 26 January 2000 directing
Tibetans not to participate in Tibetan New Year
incense-burning ceremonies at the main bridge linking the
Sichuan-Tibet highway with Lhasa. The circular defended the
order with statements like
"the incense-burning ceremony
near the bridge attracts not only large numbers of people
and vehicular traffic, but also prevents the free flow of
traffic on the highway and adversely affects the normal
social life of the masses of people during the period
of festivities".
The authorities raised concerns
in the circular about "national unity" and "stability"
and concluded,
"if the ceremony goes ahead· there is
every possibility that the splittist forces will exploit
the gathering of such large crowds of people to create
situations and cause disturbances."
Major Buddhist
festivals like Lhabab Duchen
(Buddha Shakyamuni's Descent from Heaven)
in November 2000 drew few celebrants
in Lhasa due to intensified control over traditional
celebrations. This festival, considered to be one of
the permitted public events by the authorities, was a
strange juxtaposition of political tension and subdued
celebration.
The Chinese Communist Party believes that a considerable
number of their leading cadres at various levels are not
"well versed" in the party's basic doctrine and policy
towards religion. "The lower the level, the more
confused is the mind of our cadres about religion"
18
and hence, the urgency to energetically implement
President Jiang Zemin's suggestions for the need to
minimise religious influence and propagate the Marxist
view of religion.
The ban by the authorities on circumambulation (a religious
ritual for Tibetans) around Lhasa City was enforced during
the Buddhist festival of
Saga Dawa
(the month of Buddha's Birth, Enlightenment and Death)
in June 2000 for one whole month. This ban had the most affect
on government cadres, retired workers and students who
were threatened with dismissal from job, loss of pension
and expulsion from school. Reliable reports indicate that
security cameras were positioned at strategic corners to
scrutinise "culprits" who violate the ban order. Even the
ritual of changing prayer flags outside homes were banned
for government workers at the time of Tibetan New Year in
February 2000.
Similar ban affected all schools in Lhasa just few days
before previous Saga Dawa, with a circular issued
by "TAR" Education Department. In June 1999, school
authorities of Lhasa Middle School # 8 announced during
its regular assembly that the students were forbidden
to make traditional Lingkhor and participation in
Trunglha Yarsol (birthday celebration of the Dalai
Lama). They were threatened with expulsion from school if
caught.
The ban imposed at the start of 2000 in Nyemo County,
Central Tibet, forbids Tibetans - particularly officials
in that area - from circumabulating stupas, offering butter
lamps, keeping altars in their homes or even performing
religious rites for the deceased. Orders were issued to
the Tibetans to either take down or replace traditional
prayer flags with China's national flag. Altars were
removed from the houses of government doctors, teachers
and retired staff by the township and county authorities
following the orders. In February 2000, all the monks and
nuns related to officials in Nyemo County were instructed
to "voluntarily" leave their religious institutions.
The authorities maintained that adherence to such enforced
instruction would "strengthen the image of Tibetan
officials and their reputation in the government offices
of the PRC".
Over the years, the Chinese government has stepped up
efforts to reduce the amount of offerings and donations
to monasteries by the laity. Sichuan Party Secretary,
Zhou Yongkhang,
on 13 March 2000 accused Tibetans in the
province of wasting money by making donations to Buddhist
monasteries and thus becoming destitute. He further said,
"Promoting religious freedom has caused people so much
hardship. Although the Tibetan people live a harsh life,
they donate 30 percent and sometimes two-third of their
income to the monasteries. But what's the point of talking
about the future when you ignore the present."
19
The people's goal, prefecture authorities said, should be
to "invest our money in commercial production instead
of giving to monasteries."
20
China's characterisation of the Dalai Lama has grown more
aggressive over recent years. A core Chinese political
strategy is to thwart the deep devotion of the Tibetan
populace to the Dalai Lama through denunciation campaigns
that are specifically incorporated in the Īre-educationā
programmes. The authorities choose to link faith in the
Dalai Lama with "separatist" activities and therefore make
use of every possible avenue to flush out this inherent
Tibetan symbiotic relationship. Bans were imposed in
2000 on the display of photographs of the Dalai Lama and
on the participation in his birthday celebration. Overt
expressions of opposition to the Dalai Lama constitute
one of the five political pledges required to be signed
by monks and nuns in every "re-education" examination.
Often, this has led to protests, expulsions and the arrest
of monks and nuns.
For as simple an act as seeking an audience with the
Dalai Lama in exile in India, the Chinese authorities
have reportedly kept
Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok
under strict
surveillance since the beginning of 1999.
Khenpo, the
eminent founder of Ngarig Nangten Lobling Institute, in
Eastern Tibet, was granted an audience by the Dalai Lama
in Dharamsala in 1993 after which the Chinese government
imposed absolute restrictions on his movements within and
outside Tibet. Even visits to the nearest county have
been denied to him. Kandze PSB officials additionally
ordered Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok not to keep any pictures
of the Dalai Lama in his room or at his Institute.
Earlier reports indicate that Khenpo was confined to his
three-storey building. No further information is available
on his current status or well-being.
Guo Jinlong,
the newly-appointed "TAR" Party Secretary, said during
his speech at the All-Tibetan Conference on Ideological
and Political Work on 17 September 2000, "The facts
prove that the Dalai is the overall chief of an outright
separatist group, a loyal tool of international anti-China
forces, the overall source of turbulence in Tibet, and
the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a normal
order in the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism." The
earlier indictment of the Dalai Lama as a political figure,
described as the "root cause of Tibet's instability", has
now been escalated to cover his religious status as well.
In mid-September 2000, red banners denouncing the Dalai
Lama were displayed prominently outside Tibet University
in Lhasa, a clear indication that the hard-line policies
of the central authorities are unchanged.
21
Chen Kuiyan's
statement of May 1996 that "we do not
recognise the Dalai Lama at all as a religious authority"
is nothing but a polemical attack on the religious
standing of the Dalai Lama. It was stated earlier that
since the Dalai Lama and his followers had spread rumours
and incited one group against the other, "in what way can
he be regarded as a spiritual leader?" This denunciation
campaign targeted to instil seeds of doubt in Tibetan minds
about the status of the Dalai Lama both as a political
and religious figure has proved to be counterproductive.
Such propaganda is liable to increase the devotion of the
majority of Tibetans to the Dalai Lama and increase their
opposition to Beijing.
The claims made by the Chinese government in its White
Paper on Tibetan Culture released on 22 June 2000 blatantly
contradict the ground reality of restrictive religious
policies that grossly violate the rights of Tibet's
populace. Lhasa City Discipline Inspection Commission
during its sixth general body meeting held from 15 to
17 March 2000, barred citizens from acts of worship,
from considering the Dalai Lama as an enlightened being,
sending their children to schools run by the Dalai Lama
in exile and pursuing the path of the "Dalai Clique".
The Commission further stressed that those violating the
statutory law shall be subjected to severe punishment
following strict investigations.
Another sign of escalation of religious restrictions in
Tibet is the ban on photographs of the Dalai Lama. The
entire Tibetan populace is now covered by the new
restrictions that previously applied only to Communist
Party members, government officials and employees, and the
monastic body. In March 2000, Chinese security forces
conducted extensive raids on Tibetan homes in Lhasa,
searching for religious artefacts and photos of the Dalai
Lama. 450 Tibetans were fined 500 yuan each (US$ 60) for
having the Dalai Lama's picture on display in their homes.
It was mandatory in most of the monasteries and nunneries
to remove pictures of the Dalai Lama.
During 2000, privately-owned printing and publishing
companies were banned from publishing and distributing
photographs of the Dalai Lama by the regional branches of
"TAR" Propaganda Department, the Cultural Printing Press
and the PSB. Recent measures indicate an increasing
determination to enforce this ban, and there are
indications that printing companies have been pressurised
not to respond to the demand in Lhasa for photographs of
the exiled 17th Karmapa.
22
Restrictions on photographs have even affected rural areas
of Central Tibet like Phenpo Lhundup County and Toelung
Dechen County. In June 2000, a Review Committee set up by
officials of Toelung Dechen County and heads of various
townships undertook extensive raids to flush out pictures
of the Dalai Lama. Forcible seizures of these pictures
from the homes of Tibetans took place in as many as 10
townships in Toelung Dechen County.
23
In the third week of June 2000, Committee members set
the confiscated photographs of the Dalai Lama ablaze in
Nangkha Township. The Review Committee threatened local
Tibetans with legal investigation if pictures of the Dalai
Lama were discovered in their homes.
Lhasa Municipality Industrial and Commercial Bureau issued
a circular on 26 June 2000 titled: "Concise Information
about the Lhasa City People's Government abolition of
the Illegal Occupation of Trunglha Yarsol". The circular
rendered participation in Trunglha Yarsol "illegal".
The circular accused the "Dalai Clique" of "instigating
disturbances in various parts of Tibet, relying on
pretexts like the celebration of Trunglha Yarsol to try
to split the motherland". The order further noted that
the government would take "necessary action towards this
illegal occasion and therefore it is expected that people
will not participate." Two beggars, upon instruction and
on being paid 100 yuan (US$ 12) by Lhasa PSB officials,
destroyed the incense-burning hearth where celebrations
of the Dalai Lama's birthday are observed every year.
Chinese officials of Ngachen Township built a hall to
hold dance competitions on the ruins of the sangsol
(incense-burning ceremony) area. A fence has been erected
around the hall to prevent Tibetans from entering the
sacred area.
Arrest and expulsion are a substantial element of China's
repressive mechanisms to frustrate political activity in
monasteries. The "patriotic re-education" campaign,
since its launch in 1996, has resulted in the expulsion of
12,271 clergy, as of December 2000, including 1,876 nuns.
In the year 2000 alone, TCHRD has recorded 862 expulsions,
of these 147 are nuns. Contrary to official claims
of successful "rectification" of the monastic populace
by Party officials, this campaign has always met with
resentment, protests and demonstrations.
Monks and nuns comprise approximately 73 per cent of the
total 451 known political prisoners currently held in
various prisons in Tibet.
This is a clear indication
of China's fears that religion is a nexus of Tibetan
nationalism. The greater the incidence of resistance by
monks and nuns, the harsher the crackdown by the Chinese
government resulting in the survival of a diluted form
of faith. However, since faith, patriotism and conviction
are internal qualities, problems only erupt when they are
expressed externally in the form of observation, prayers
and rituals, and outright opposition to Chinese government
directives.
On the heels of an announcement made by the Chinese
authorities on 15 July 2000 that called for the urgent
need to subject religious institutions in and around
Lhasa to greater scrutiny and control, 30 monks from
Lhasa's Tsuklhakhang (Central Cathedral) were expelled. The
expelled monks were prohibited from practising and engaging
in any religious activities in Lhasa or in their respective
regions. Many monks and nuns have been arrested, expelled
and imprisoned for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama
and Tibetan nationalism, and for taking actions contrary
to the aims of "patriotic re-education".
Thenthok Monastery witnessed one death
24
,
five arrests and 20 detentions on 1 May 2000. The monks
strongly protested against an official order to remove
Dalai Lama photos from the monastery. In retaliation,
three monks were severely beaten by security personnel
with one sustaining a broken rib. The following night,
slogans such as ĪTibet is independentā appeared on the
walls of the main prayer hall. Subsequently, PSB officials
from Dzogang County in collaboration with local officials
conducted a joint investigation resulting in the arrests
of five monks and detention of 20 laymen.
Other "crimes" include involvement in peaceful
demonstrations, pamphleteering or possession of proscribed
religious texts. In a very strong-worded directive,
the Third Work Forum ordered that those who "make,
put up or distribute counter-revolutionary publications,
and those who shout counter-revolutionary slogans should
be punished severely and in a timely manner, according to
the relevant stipulations in the law." To "puncture"
the pride of "separatist forces" is a focal point of the
strategy. Eight people were arrested from Sog County
25
in March 2000 for their alleged involvement in an poster
pasting incident considered to be serious political action.
Five out of the eight people reported to have been arrested
were monks from Sog Tsendhen Monastery and the other
three were lay people from the county. Since their last
detention in the "TAR" Intelligence Bureau, the eight have
not been seen nor have their family members been allowed
to visit them.
Restrictive measures in the form of fines and detentions
are placed upon clergy returning from exile in India.
Regarded with suspicion for possible instigation in
political activities, their movements are monitored with
constant surveillance and regular inquiry. In September
1999, two former nuns of Gonlung Nunnery
26
were detained by the local authorities for approximately
two months in Shigatse Nyari Detention Centre, and fined
500 yuan (US$ 60) each for "escaping to India". Back in
their native Nagchu Prefecture both nuns were restricted
from admission to a nunnery, from performing religious
services and forbidden to travel beyond Nagchu without
permission from the local authorities. Besides enduring
constant harassment, they were also accused of being a
bad influence on other nuns.
The Chinese authorities continue to face strong resistance
to their "patriotic re-education" campaign in almost every
religious institution that they have "cleaned up" so far.
In cases where resident monks and nuns have stubbornly
resisted enforced indoctrination, the authorities resort to
closure of the monasteries altogether. One pronouncement
warned that the monasteries which side with "reactionary
forces" and stir up disturbances should be "reorganised"
within a certain time and "if necessary their doors can
be closed in order to do so"
27
.
I
n 1999, TCHRD recorded the closure of 18 monasteries
and nunneries since the launch of the "Strike Hard"
campaign. A total of 17 religious institutions were
reportedly closed in 1998 including three in 1997.
28
In the year 2000, TCHRD has received reports of four more
closure of religious institutions, making the total number
to 22.
Officials closed and sealed Nag Nunnery
29
in May 2000.
The 130 nuns unanimously defied the order of the "work
team" to oppose the Dalai Lama and refused to sign pledges.
As a result, officials stopped the functioning of the
nunnery. On 13 November 1999, A-Kyong Yarthang Monastery
30
was declared closed due to the repeated failure of the
monks to turn up for "patriotic re-education" meetings
during three visits of the "work team". Even threats
of arrest and reduction in their stipend were ignored.
The monks stated that to oppose the Dalai Lama is against
the basic vows of Īrefuge-takingā in Buddhism and contrary
to the monkshood itself.
However, a different rationale lay behind the closure of
Nyizong and Dolma Lhakhang monasteries
31
in mid-1998.
In ordering these closures the officials maintained
that the monasteries were "the property of the Chinese
government and nobody could own them". They halted
renovation work and expelled all 206 monks who were
ordered to return home. At present, both monasteries
remain closed.
[ Next:
Chapter 3: Racial Discrimination --> ]
[ Contents ]
[ Notes ]
[ Recommendations ]
|
