Annual Report, 1999 - Tibet: Tightening of Control
Through a policy of population transfer ethnic cleansing
has been carried out in Tibet since the Chinese
invasion. The Chinese occupation of Tibet has been
characterised by various attempts to terminate the Tibetan
identity either through direct violence or structural means
such as assimilation into the Chinese identity. One such
indirect and yet far more insidious means has been that
of transferring the general Chinese population into Tibet.
Population transfer has been defined as "the moving of
peoples as a consequence of political and/or economic
processes in which the state government or state authorized
agencies participate."
The International Law of armed conflict first recognised
the possible misuse of population transfer policies during
times of conflict and Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention provided that: "the occupying powers shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies." The UN Special Rapporteurs
on population transfers have stated in their report that
population transfers constitute a violation of basic
principles of conventional and customary international
and human rights law.
While most principles of International law concerning
population transfers address the rights of the subject
group of the transfers, it has also been clarified that
population transfers cannot be used as a policy which
threatens the identity, culture and livelihood of a
minority group living in an area in which the transfers
are purported to be made.
The UN Special Rapporteurs on Population Transfers
have stated that "[t]he validity of even the consent of
the people being moved may be subject to the wishes of
the inhabitants of the place of settlement. While the
principles of consent safeguards the forcible removal and
dispersal of a minority settled in a distinct homeland
it cannot be used to achieve the chauvinistic overlaying
of national areas by planting of settlements, and the
imposition of cultural hegemony upon minorities."
It has been reported that on any given day an estimated
100 million people are on the move across China looking
for work. But, "perhaps nowhere is China's vast internal
migration having a more profound effect on the local
population than in Tibet. The arrival of tens of thousands
of job seekers from China's ethnic Han majority, while
a minor runoff in a country of 1.3 billion people, is
threatening to swamp the culture of 5 million Tibetans."
Chinese President
Jiang Zemin
has been quoted as saying
that his focus would be on economic development and the
opening of the Chinese economy, but that his biggest
problem was the country's large population. While 93
percent of the Chinese population is Han Chinese, ethnic
minorities inhabit regions which contain a vast percentage
of China's material wealth. Minorities predominate in 60
percent of China's territory, including regions crucial to
China's supply of natural resources such as timber, water,
minerals and petroleum. Areas dominated by China's two
most recalcitrant minorities Tibetans and Muslim Uighurs
comprise 2.4 million square miles, almost half of China and
much of its historically vulnerable border areas. In a case
of competition for scarce resources the Chinese government
attempts to fill such areas with Han Chinese presumably
loyal to Beijing. This policy also serves the twin purpose
of transferring people from over burdened areas into more
fertile areas and ensuring that the ethnic population
is assimilated into the larger Chinese identity thereby
preventing any successful claim to self-determination.
An analysis of the Chinese policy of population transfer
in the past 40 years reveal certain distinct patterns
concomitant with the Chinese economic policies towards
Tibet. A transfer mostly of officials and army personnel
into Tibet marked the early period of the Chinese
invasion. Since the 1980's, with the Chinese decision to
integrate Tibet into China's economy and social structure,
we see a conscious decision by the Chinese to transfer
it’s peasants, agricultural workers and other groups of
labourers and traders into Tibet. From July 2 to 23,1994
the Third National Forum on Work in Tibet was convened in
Beijing and decisions were made to relentlessly implement
the Chinese government's policy to totally integrate Tibet
within the structure of China's economic needs. The major
thrust of the implementation strategy was "to open Tibet's
door wide to inner parts of the country and encourage
traders, investment, economic units and individuals
from China to Central Tibet to run different sorts of
enterprises".
In 1999, for the first time an international organisation
was involved in a plan that would further China's policy
of population transfer. The $311 million Western Poverty
Reduction Project is partially funded by the World
Bank. The World Bank is contributing a total of $160
million to the project, $100 million in concessional funds
from its International Development Association (IDA) and
$60 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development for the project (IBRD).
As a result of the international protests made
against the $40 million Qinghai component (Tibetan:
Amdo), by International Organisations, The Tibetan
Government-in-Exile, and Tibetan human rights groups ,
the Board of Directors of the World Bank were forced to
reconsider their decision to pass the loan.
On June 24, 1999, the Board of Directors approved
the loan with the condition that no work would be
done or funds dispersed for the $40 million Qinghai
component pending a report that was to be submitted by
an Independent Inspection Panel. On September 9, 1999,
the board formally requested the Inspection Panel to
undertake an investigation to see whether Bank Management
had observed its policies on involuntary resettlement,
indigenous peoples and an environmental assessment. The
focus of investigation is still with respect to whether
or not the policies of the bank had been violated and not
about the larger issue of population transfers affecting
the Tibetan people.
The World Bank's Independent Inspection Panel returned
after a three-week visit to China, including an extended
visit to the proposed site of the Western China Poverty
Reduction Project in Qinghai. It is reported that the Panel
held in-depth interviews in Beijing with Bank officials,
and met with a number of the Tibetan and Mongol farmers
and nomads who would be affected by the project.
It is on the basis of the report submitted by this
investigation panel that the World Bank will decide whether
or not to carry on with the project. While the issue of
population transfer in Tibet has been well documented,
the fact that it is a state initiative ensures limited
information being available to the outside world. It is in
this context that it becomes important to look at the World
Bank project as a case study to understand the arguments
and processes that population transfer utilize. It is
also important to continue resisting the project as its
approval is important to China not only for the obvious
economic benefits, and "the loan would effectively grant
the regime an international rubber stamp of its relocation
policy." It is also important to keep in mind the fact that
large development projects in Tibet requiring population
transfers from China to Tibet are increasingly the norm.
A rejection of the Qinghai component will also serve as a
critique of the development policies of China, which rely
on large-scale population transfers.
According to the summary paper issued by the World
Bank "[t]he project in Qinghai is being supported by a
$26.7 million IDA credit and a $13.3 million IBRD loan
(total $40 million) as a part of the overall $160 million
package, and is supposed to transfer 58,000 people into
the Dulan area. At the county level settlement impact on
the population will be much reduced. The percentage of
Han in Dulan County will fall from 53.1 percent to 47.5
percent of inhabitants, that of the Tibetans from 22.7
percent to 14 percent and that of the Mongols from 14.1
percent to 6.7 percent while the population share of the
other minorities especially the Hu (from 7.2 percent to
22.1 percent) will increase."
The transfer will take place from five counties under the
jurisdiction of Haidong and Xining in the eastern part of
Qinghai into Dulan County in the Tsaidam basin. Dulan has
been home to Tibetan pastoralists since the seventeenth
century and is currently home to 11,952 Tibetans and 7,401
Mongols.
Dilution of Tibetan identity and increase in ethnic
conflict:
One of the chief claims of both the World Bank and the
Chinese government is that the transfers will not affect
the ethnic Tibetan and Mongolian population. It is said
that the transfers are not really from one province into
another, as the move will be from Haidong to Dulan,
all within Qinghai. It has also been contended that
the transfer is mainly of another ethnic group namely
the Hui. It should be noted that the Hui Chinese are not
different from the Han Chinese except for the fact that
they are Muslims. Their transformation into a distinct
ethnic group fits into the larger politics of controlling
the population through a process of naming.
It is insignificant that the move will be within Qinghai
province. The primary consideration is that the area is
nominally a Tibetan and Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture.
Rinchen Wangyal,
a 21 year old man from Panchen Shingdey in Dulan who is
now in exile reports that, "in the past, only Tibetans
and Mongols inhabited Dulan. It was then a spiritual
land with abundant material wealth. People led a peaceful
and content life. However from 1949 onwards outsiders
started coming in. Many Chinese settlers also made their
home there, being sent there by the government. This has
created a critical situation: farmers are now faced with
land and water scarcity, while nomads have to fight for
pasturelands. Similarly Dulan's environment is being
degraded as the new settlers cut down trees, hunt the
wild life to the point of extinction and carry out mining
activities desertifying large swathes of grasslands. The
Chinese are also eroding the Tibetan religion, national
identity, traditional dress and customs all of which
are dear to us as our life. By doing so they are trying
to sinicize our people. If new Chinese settlers were
transferred to Dulan as a result of the World Bank support,
the defenseless Tibetans would find themselves completely
assimilated."
Tibetans living in Dulan County fear such negative
consequences if the project is implemented. The ICT in
Washington received a letter from Tibetans in Dulan stating
"[r]ecently we heard of a Chinese plan to settle tens of
thousands of Muslim Chinese in Dulan. This is communist
Chinese policy to create conflicts between Tibetans and
the Muslims. There have been many conflicts and killings
over pasturelands. Many of us will die in the conflicts and
even if we survive where do we go? As it is, we do not have
sufficient pastureland to support our animals. How is the
land going to support tens of thousands of new settlers?"
The Bank states that this investment will also improve the
infrastructure of Dulan including education. According
to the Bank, children will be able to attend schools
reflecting their ethnic and language backgrounds; but
immediately adds a caveat stating that "it should be noted
that many of the ethnic groups including Tibetans moving
into Dulan speak only Mandarin". The obvious implication
from the statement is the fact that most of the schools
will also have Chinese as the medium of instruction.
This double speak is indicative of the nature of cultural
sensitivity involved in such development projects. The
threat to the Tibetan identity arises from the fact that
these are not exceptional cases of investment but are part
of the larger political economy of "development" in Tibet.
Long term impacts of the Project:
There is already intensive mining being carried out in
areas of the Tsaidam Basin and industrialisation in the
area has already attracted major foreign investment in the
particular region. However there is no infrastructure as
far as food supplies are concerned and presently they are
being sourced from great distances. One of the aims of the
project is to build up the agricultural infrastructure of
the area to meet the demands of the large number of people
involved in state controlled mining activities.
There are justified fears that "the World Bank's project
fits into a wider pattern of the steady march of Chinese
colonisation, and the assimilation of all Northern Tibet
from the Loess Valleys through the entire Tsaidam Basin."
Bringing in so many Chinese settlers into a remote oasis
makes economic sense, only when there is a ready market
with pent up demand, for grain and other foods nearby.
Xiangride and the other town of Dulan County, Chahanwusu,
have built up a number of industries meeting the supply
needs of the major Chinese resource extraction zone in
the Tsaidam Basin. Further west, where oil and gas, salt
and potash and other minerals are removed and processed
for use in China's energy, plastics, petrochemicals and
fertiliser industries. Among these industries are a coal
mines, sawmills, meat-processing plants, leather factories,
as well as vast fenced fields of wheat and rolls of hay
cut by machines. There is also a potassium and magnesium
factory, an ore-dressing factory and a precious stone
processing plant. These major industries are in much need
of fresh food, grains and other supplies to sustain an
immigrant workforce in an arid area. The oases of Dulan
County are among the closest centers of grain production,
and their exploitation thus forestalls the necessity to
bring in provisions by trucks from further away.
As is the case with such strategies, it is always
difficult to prove the larger policy intentions. However,
an article carried out by the official Xinhua News
agency is indicative of the trend when it says that
"a combination of available labour in the eastern portion of
the province with natural resources in the western part
should contribute to Qinghai's development." According to
Tsewang Phuntsok "[i]f the past is any indication we can
only say that the Chinese government will merely encourage
more Chinese from the adjacent areas to settle in the move
out areas."
An analysis of the intended benefits of the project from
the World Bank summary indicates that careful attention has
been paid to the benefits accruing to the move out area,
but the same care has not been taken when analysing the
impact of the project on Dulan's environment.
The World Bank summary states that "[t]he Qinghai component
involves direct benefits not both for those staying in
the hillsides as well as those moving out. By reducing
the population pressures on the hillsides the project will
support regrowth of natural vegetation on the hillsides,
which will reduce further erosion and enable the area to
better support livestock of those who remain."
The implication seems to be that more people will be
transferred into the move out area after the present
inhabitants have been moved into Dulan, fitting into a
wider pattern of waves of migration which threaten to flood
the fragile socio-ecological fabric of Tibetan society.
In 1999 as a part of the celebrations of 50 years of
the founding of the PRC, there were concerted attempts
by the Chinese government to reiterate it's position of
integrating Tibet completely within China.
Nyima Tsering,
Vice Chairman of the "TAR" Government, said the 10th five
year plan (2001-2005) currently being drafted would "high
likely" include a railway linking Tibet with other parts
of China: "Tibet is the only place in China that is not
linked up by railways. Such a deficiency has hindered
the opening up of Tibet to foreign investment". He also
added that efforts to suppress separatism would continue
to enable a stable environment for development.
The route of the proposed Qinghai-Tibet railway has been
confirmed following the completion of a survey by the
Railway Ministry. The railway which is seen as marking
the further integration of Tibet into China will extend
from Golmud in Qinghai to Lhasa, passing through Nagchu,
Damchung and Yangbajing. A report in the Qinghai Daily on
September 12 said that the rail line constituted what has
been termed as a political (front) line in consolidating
the south western border of the mother land, exploiting
rich natural resources along the railway and establishing
close economic and political ties between Tibet and China.
The main road linking the remote Tibetan capital Lhasa to
the rest of the world, via the north-western city of Xining
has been widened and upgraded. The road base of the highway
has been deepened, 13 bridges have been added, and road
surfaces on dangerous parts have been widened. Cars could
now run at speeds of up to 80 kilometres per hour (50 miles
per hour) on the highway, double the original figure.
Implication:
One of the pre-requisites of an easy implementation
of a population transfer policy is the existence of
infrastructure especially in the form of availability
of roads and railway networks to enable the movement of
people. China's decision to increase the infrastructure
in Tibet is motivated by a desire to use the developed
infrastructure to integrate Tibet's economy completely into
China's. This implies that the ease with which people can
be moved from mainland China into Tibet increases.
Violence can be either relational (i.e. the exercise
of directed force like arrests and tortures affecting
individuals) or structural (acts which affect relationships
of power). The chief difference between the two is the
fact that structural violence is made less visible through
discourses such as national interest and development, and
in an age of increasing international awareness of human
rights it is easier to detect the impact of relational
violence than structural violence.
The use of population transfer as a policy is a form of
structural violence as it affects the composition of
a community, access to means of livelihood and their
identity. By using the discourse of modernity and
development, the Chinese authorities have effectively
sought to marginalise the Tibetans within Tibet and there
is an urgent need for the international community to
recognise and stop such forms of structural violence.
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